Judge Melvin D. Sandvig, Case Number: 22STCV13766, Date: 2024-01-16 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 22STCV13766, Date: 2024-01-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV13766 Hearing Date: April 16, 2024 Dept: F47

Dept. F47

Date: 4/16/24 TRIAL DATE: 10/21/24

Case #22STCV13766

SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

Motion filed on 2/1/24.

MOVING PARTY: Defendant William S. Hart Union High School District

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff John Doe

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant William S. Hart Union High School District (the District) and against Plaintiff John Doe (Plaintiff). In the alternative, the District seeks summary adjudication of the following issues:

(1) Plaintiff’s 3^rd and 5^th causes of action for negligent supervision and retention must be dismissed because the District and its employees had neither actual nor constructive notice of Defendant Marguerite Lagnado’s (Lagnado) propensity to sexually abuse minors (Issue No. 1) (3^rd and 5^th causes of action);

(2) The District did not breach any duty to report Lagnado’s sexual misconduct because its employees had no reasonable suspicion that Lagnado was sexually abusing Plaintiff (Issue No. 2) (4^th cause of action);

(3) The District was not negligent regarding its hiring of Lagnado (Issue No. 3) (3^rd cause of action);

(4) The District properly trained its employees, including Lagnado, that sexual interactions with a minor are unlawful (Issue No. 4) (6^th cause of action); and

(5) Plaintiff’s claim that the District failed to warn Plaintiff about the potential dangers posed by Lagnado must fail because the District had no knowledge of any such danger (6^th cause of action) (Issue No. 5).

RULING: The request for summary judgment is denied. The request for summary adjudication is granted, in part, and denied, in part, as set forth below.

SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action arises from allegations that Plaintiff John Doe (Plaintiff) was sexually abused in the 1980s by his junior high school teacher, Defendant Marguerite Lagnado (Lagnado), an employee of Defendant William S. Hart Union High School District (the District) at the time.

On 5/4/22, Plaintiff filed this action against the District, Lagnado and Doe Defendants. As against the District, the operative First Amended Complaint contains causes of action for Negligent Hiring, Supervision and Retention of Unfit Employee (3^rd cause of action), Breach of Mandatory Duty: Failure to Report Suspected Child Abuse (4^th cause of action), Negligent Supervision of a Minor (5^th cause of action), and Negligent Failure to Warn, Train or Educate (6^th cause of action).

On 2/1/24, the District filed and served the instant motion seeking an order granting summary judgment in favor of the District and against Plaintiff. In the alternative, the District seeks summary adjudication of the following issues:

(1) Plaintiff’s 3^rd and 5^th causes of action for negligent supervision and retention must be dismissed because the District and its employees had neither actual nor constructive notice of Lagnado’s propensity to sexually abuse minors (Issue No. 1) (3^rd and 5^th causes of action);

(3) The District was not negligent regarding its hiring of Lagnado (Issue No. 3) (3^rd cause of action);

(4) The District properly trained its employees, including Lagnado, that sexual interactions with a minor are unlawful (Issue No. 4) (6^th cause of action); and

On 4/2/24, Plaintiff filed and served an opposition to the motion. In the opposition, Plaintiff agrees to dismiss the 6^th cause of action for Negligent Failure to Warn, Train or Educate. (See Opposition, p.7:24-25). On 4/11/24, the District filed and served a reply to the opposition.

ANALYSIS

Procedural Defects

The District failed to electronically bookmark the exhibits attached to the moving and reply papers as required. CRC 3.1110(f)(4).

Evidentiary Objections

The District’s objections to Ex.1, excerpts of John Doe’s deposition (Nos. 1-5); Ex.2, excerpts of Lagnado’s deposition (Nos. 6-13); Ex.6, Lagnado’s Felony Complain and Guilty Plea; and the declaration of Marian Stephens, Ed.D. (Nos. 15-27) are overruled. The District failed to cite any authority to support its evidentiary objections. See CRC 3.1354(b)(4). While the District cites People v. Sanchez to support its objections to the declaration of Marian Stephens, Ed.D., it failed to provide an actual case citation (See Objections Nos. 15-27). Additionally, the Court finds the objections to otherwise be without merit.

Request for Judicial Notice

The District’s Request for Judicial Notice is denied. The District requests, pursuant to Evidence Codde 452(c), (d) and (h) and 453 that the Court take judicial notice of (1) print-out of from the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing as it relates to Lagnado and her California teaching credential, and (2) a January 5, 1987 letter from the Los Angeles County Office of Education regarding Lagnado’s employment and teaching credential.

The District has failed to establish that the documents and/or the information contained therein are “[o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States [or] of any state of the United States” (Evidence Code 452(c)); “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States” (Evidence Code 452(d)), and/or “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy” (Evidence Code 452(h)).

Issue 1: Plaintiff’s 3^rd and 5^th causes of action for negligent supervision and retention must be dismissed because the District and its employees had neither actual nor constructive notice of Lagnado’s propensity to sexually abuse minors.

According to Plaintiff, the 3^rd and 5^th causes of action are based on the school/the District employees’ failure to adequately respond to inappropriate behavior and red flags of sexual abuse. (See Opposition, p.8:9-11). The elements of both claims are: (1) defendant’s duty to use due care, (2) breach of that duty, (3) the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury to plaintiff. See Doe v. Lawndale Elementary School District (Lawndale) (2021) 72 CA5th 113, 125.

Generally, employees of a public entity, such as the District, are liable for their torts to the same extent as a private person and the public entity is vicariously liable for any injury which its employees cause to the same extent as a private employer. See C.A. (2012) 53 C4th 861, 868; Government Code 815(b), 815.2(a), 820(a). The District and all of its employees have a special relationship with the District’s students which mandate adequate supervision for the protection of the students. See Lawndale, supra at 125-126; M.W. (2003) 110 CA4th 508, 524-525; J.H. (2010) 183 CA4th 123, 139.

The duty of care owed by school personnel to students includes the duty to use reasonable measures to protect students from foreseeable injury by third parties acting negligently or intentionally, including injuries to a student as a result of a teacher’s sexual assault. Lawndale, supra at 126. School administrators have a duty to protect students from sexual abuse by school employees, even if the school does not have actual knowledge of a particular employee’s history of committing, or propensity to commit, such abuse. Id. at 119.

The negligence standard for hiring, supervising or retaining an assaultive employee is “knew or should have known” or “know or have reason to know.” See Roe v. Hesperia Unified School District (Hesperia) (2022) 85 CA5th 13, 26 citing C.A., supra. Therefore, liability is imposed on a school district on the basis of supervisory personnel’s constructive knowledge that an employee is prone to harm students. Id. Constructive knowledge may be shown by circumstantial evidence which is one or more inferences which arise reasonably form a series of proven facts. Id. With regard to a claim for negligent supervision of students, a plaintiff must show that school personnel failed to exercise “ordinary prudence.” Id. at 29.

“Administrators who fail to notice, identify, and respond to warning signs that suggest an employee is sexually abusing or will sexually abuse a student bear some moral responsibility for the abuse.” Lawndale, supra at 135. “In the school context, such monitoring may include implementing reasonable measures to keep track of employee-student interactions to identify potentially problematic situations and inappropriate relationships, even before school administrators know a specific employee has engaged in sexual misconduct.” Id. at 136.

Here, Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of material fact as to whether school personnel had constructive notice of an inappropriate relationship between Plaintiff and Lagnado and/or whether school personnel exercised ordinary prudence with regard to same. (See Stephens Decl.). For example, Plaintiff has provided evidence that school personnel were aware that Lagnado was giving preferential treatment to Plaintiff, that she was driving him to and from school, that she was taking him off campus during the school day, and that she was frequently spending lunch in her classroom alone with the Plaintiff with the door closed. (Plaintiff’s Additional Material Disputed Facts (PAMDF) 6-28, 45-57, 59-60). Lagnado testified that she did not try to hide the sexual relationship with Plaintiff and that “the rest of the world knew” about the relationship. (PAMDF 59-60). In turn, a triable question of material fact exists as to whether the District breached its duty to Plaintiff by failing to protect Plaintiff from Lagnado’s abuse.

Issue 3: The District was not negligent regarding its hiring of Lagnado (3^rd cause of action).

As noted above, Plaintiff concedes that the 3^rd cause of action is based on the school/the District employees’ failure to adequately respond to inappropriate behavior and red flags of sexual abuse. (See Opposition, p.8:9-11). Plaintiff does not argue or provide any evidence that the District acted negligently in its hiring of Lagnado. Rather, in a footnote, Plaintiff argues that the negligent hiring of Lagnado cannot be separately adjudicated because a motion for summary adjudication cannot adjudicate a portion of a cause of action. (See Opposition, p.8, fn.1 citing CCP 437c(f)(1) and Rooz (1997) 55 CA4th 573, 593-594).

However, it has been held that the legislative intent of CCP 437c(f) “is effectuated by applying the section in a manner which would provide for the determination on the merits of summary adjudication motions involving separate and distinct wrongful acts which are combined in the same cause of action. To rule otherwise would defeat the time and cost saving purposes of the amendment and allow a cause of action in its entirety to proceed to trial even where, as here, a separate and distinct alleged obligation or claim may be summarily defeated by summary adjudication.” Hindin (2004) 118 CA4th 1247, 1256 citing Lilienthal & Fowler (1993) 12 CA4th 1848, 1854-1855.

Therefore, the Court finds that it is appropriate to summarily adjudicate Issue 3, or the negligent hiring claim contained within the 3^rd cause of action, in favor of the District.

Issue 2: The District did not breach any duty to report Lagnado’s sexual misconduct because its employees had no reasonable suspicion that Lagnado was sexually abusing Plaintiff (4^th cause of action).

Under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (CANRA), school employees are mandated reporters of child abuse. Penal Code 11166, et seq. “CANRA requires a ‘mandated reporter,’ which includes teachers and certain other school employees, ‘to make a report to law enforcement agency or a county welfare department ‘whenever the mandated reporter, in his or her professional capacity or within the scope of his or her employment, has knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect.” Lawndale, supra at 138. “A mandated reporter has a ‘reasonable suspicion’ when ‘it is objectively reasonable for a person to entertain a suspicion, based upon facts that could cause a reasonable person in a like position, drawing, when appropriate, on his or her training and experience, to suspect child abuse or neglect.’” Hesperia, supra at 32. “‘Reasonable suspicion’ does not require certainty that child abuse or neglect has occurred nor does it require a specific medical indication of child abuse or neglect; any ‘reasonable suspicion’ is sufficient.” Id.; See also Lawndale, supra at 143.

Here, Plaintiff has presented evidence that several school employees were aware that Lagnado was giving Plaintiff preferential treatment, that she was spending significant time alone with him behind closed doors, and that she was taking him off campus in her car. (See PAMDF 13-14, 18-20, 24-27, 36, 44-47, 49, 58-59). The evidence also shows that Lagnado’s frequent writing of late passes for Plaintiff and for Jeff Selph, who was not even in her class, also raised suspicions with teachers, who failed to report their suspicions pursuant to their mandatory duty. (PAMDF 51, 53-57).

The foregoing creates a triable issue of material fact with regard to Issue 2 and/or Plaintiff’s 4^th cause of action.

Issue 4: The District properly trained its employees, including Lagnado, that sexual interactions with a minor are unlawful (6^th cause of action); and Issue 5: Plaintiff’s claim that the District failed to warn Plaintiff about the potential dangers posed by Lagnado must fail because the District had no knowledge of any such danger (6^th cause of action).

Plaintiff has not addressed Issues 4 and 5 in the opposition and, as noted above, Plaintiff has agreed to dismiss the 6^th cause of action. (See Opposition, p.7:24-25). Therefore, if Plaintiff has not dismissed the claim by the time of the hearing, the District is entitled to summary adjudication in its favor of Issues 4 and 5, or as to the 6^th cause of action in Plaintiff’s complaint.

CONCLUSION

The request for summary judgment is denied. The request for summary adjudication is granted as to Issues 4 and 5, or as to the 6^th cause of action. The request for summary adjudication is granted as to Issue 3 with regard to the claim for negligent hiring, only, contained within the 3^rd cause of action. The request for summary adjudication is denied as to Issues 1 and 2, or as to the claims for negligent supervision and retention of an unfit employee in the 3^rd cause of action, and as to the entirety of the 4^th and 5^th causes of action.