Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 22STCV20692, Date: 2025-01-16 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22STCV20692    Hearing Date: January 16, 2025    Dept: F47

Dept. F47

Date: 1/15/25                                                                TRIAL DATE: 7/28/25

Case #22STCV20692

 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 

Motion filed on 10/11/24.

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Traffic Management Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Robert Parco, individually and as successor-in-interest to Decedent Stellina Parco; John Parco; Maria Parco and Johnny Parco

NOTICE: ok

 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting summary judgment* in favor of Defendant Traffic Management Inc. and against Plaintiffs Robert Parco, individually and as successor-in-interest to Decedent Stellina Parco; John Parco; Maria Parco and Johnny Parco (collectively, Plaintiffs) on Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. 

 

*The notice of motion does not indicate that summary adjudication is being sought in the alternative to summary judgment.  However, the separate statement filed in support of the motion sets forth 3 issues for summary adjudication regarding the 2nd, 4th and 5th causes of action.  Since the issues are not set forth in the notice as required by CRC 3.1350, they will not be considered in the alternative to summary judgment.  See CRC 3.1350(b), (h).

 

RULING: The request for summary judgment is granted.

 

SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 

This action arises out of a motor vehicle collision that occurred on September 30, 2021 at the intersection of Lyons Avenue and Avenida Rotella in Santa Clarita (the accident).  Decedent Stellina Parco (Stellina) was a passenger in Defendant/Cross-Defendant/Cross-Complainant Helen Ann Lynn’s (Lynn) vehicle.  The accident occurred as Lynn was attempting to make a left-turn at the subject intersection, and her vehicle was struck by Defendant Alexander Gray Popejoy’s (Popejoy) vehicle.  At the time of the accident, Defendant Henkels & McCoy, Inc. (H&M) was working on a construction project for the benefit of Defendant Southern California Gas Company, Inc. (SCG) at the subject intersection, which required lane closures from the oncoming traffic side heading westbound toward Lynn.  Defendant Traffic Management Inc. (TMI) provided traffic controls at the subject intersection at the time of the accident.  Stellina suffered injuries as a result of the accident and subsequently died on March 5, 2024. 

 

Plaintiffs Robert Parco, individually and as successor-in-interest to Decedent Stellina Parco; John Parco; Maria Parco and Johnny Parco’s (collectively, Plaintiffs) First Amended Complaint  alleges three causes of action against TMI: (1) Negligent Infliction of Personal Injuries (Second Cause of Action), (2) Loss of Consortium (Fourth Cause of Action) and (3) Wrongful Death (Fifth Cause of Action).  As to TMI, Plaintiffs contend TMI failed to ensure proper traffic controls were in place at the intersection causing the vehicle Stellina was in to be involved in the traffic accident.  Specifically, Plaintiffs contend the construction work, road maintenance and traffic control created a visual obstruction in the roadway which, along with the negligence of the drivers, led to the collision between Lynn’s vehicle and Popejoy’s vehicle when Lynn was making a left turn.    

 

On October 11, 2024, TMI filed and served the instant motion seeking an order granting  summary judgment in favor of TMI and against Plaintiffs on Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint.  The notice of motion does not indicate that summary adjudication is being sought in the alternative to summary judgment.  However, the separate statement filed in support of the motion sets forth 3 issues for summary adjudication regarding the 2nd, 4th and 5th causes of action.  Since the issues are not set forth in the notice as required by CRC 3.1350, they will not be considered in the alternative to summary judgment.  See CRC 3.1350(b), (h).

 

Plaintiffs have opposed the motion and TMI has filed a reply to the opposition. 

 

ANALYSIS

 

Plaintiffs’ objections, numbers 1 and 2, are overruled. 

 

TMI’s’ Request for Judicial Notice is granted.

 

TMI’s objections, numbers 1-7, to Plaintiffs’ evidence are overruled.  TMI’s objections, numbers 8-10, to Plaintiff’s evidence (the Gish declaration) are sustained. 

 

*    *    *

 

Standard on Summary Judgment Motion

 

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted “if all papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  CCP 437c(a). 

 

A defendant has met its burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment if the defendant has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.  CCP 437c(p)(2).  If a defendant makes a prima facie showing for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present non-speculative evidence showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.  See Union Bank (1995) 31 CA4th 573, 583; Aguilar (2001) 25 C4th 826, 864; Lee (1996) 49 CA4th 1750, 1756 (speculation and conjecture do not create a triable issue of material fact).  The mere “presence of a factual conflict will not defeat a motion for summary judgment unless the fact in dispute is a material one.”  People ex. rel. Department of Transportation v. Outdoor Media Group (1993) 13 CA4th 1067, 1077; See also McGonnell (2002) 98 CA4th 1098, 1105-1106.   

  

2nd cause of action – Negligent Infliction of Personal Injuries/Negligence 

 

To prevail on a claim of negligence against TMI, Plaintiffs must establish that TMI owed a duty, TMI breached that duty, and the breach caused their damages.  See Conroy (2009) 45 C4th 1244, 1250.  To prove causation, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injury.  See Viner (2003) 30 C4th 1232, 1239; Saelzler (2001) 25 C4th 763, 778.  The mere possibility of causation is insufficient to impose liability on a defendant.  See Ortega 26 C4th 1200, 1205-1206.  On this motion, TMI contends that Plaintiffs cannot establish the element of causation.

 

The evidence establishes that neither Lynn nor Popejoy contend the construction project caused or contributed to the accident.  (Separate Statement (SS) 2, 4, 5).  Lynn, the driver of the vehicle in which Stellina was a passenger, testified multiple times that her view of oncoming traffic was not obstructed, that she could see Popejoy’s vehicle at all relevant times and that she would not have pulled out if her view of approaching traffic was blocked in any way.  (See SS 2, 3, 6).  Popejoy, the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident, testified that he saw Lynn’s vehicle when he was about 90 feet away from the intersection and that Lynn began making her left turn when he was about 50-60 feet from the intersection.  (Nielsen Decl., Ex.4, p.20:4-12).  Popejoy merely speculates that he may have seen Lynn’s vehicle earlier if a truck had not been in the left-hand turn pocket.  (Nielsen Decl., Ex.4, p.24:3-6).  Popejoy went on to state that he told the investigating officer at the scene of the accident that as he was approaching the intersection, Lynn made “what felt like a very unexpected…left into the intersection” resulting in the collision despite Popejoy hitting his brakes really hard.  (Nielsen’s Decl., Ex.4, p.33:1-8).  Additionally, in his written discovery responses, Popejoy indicated that no dangerous condition contributed to the accident.  (SS 4).  Further, the City of Santa Clarita’s Inspector, who visited the intersection on the morning of the accident, did not find any code violations and did not note any issues with the traffic controls in place that day. (SS 7).   

 

As noted by the Court in ruling on prior motions for summary judgment, the fact that Lynn’s written discovery responses, prepared months before her deposition took place, reference an unidentified visual obstruction is insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact as to whether or not her view was obstructed by the construction in the face of her clear deposition testimony that her view was not obstructed and that she would not have made the turn if it was.    

 

Also, the fact that the investigating officer may have thought that there was a visual obstruction for drivers making left-hand turns at the intersection does not create a triable issue of material fact because the totality of the evidence establishes that Lynn saw Popejoy’s vehicle at all relevant times and thought she could safely make the left turn before he reached the intersection, but unfortunately she did not.  Additionally, Plaintiffs’ reliance on the testimony of inspector Viser where he states that “there’s an obstruction until there isn’t” is misleading because he further explained that “[i]f you pull far enough forward, you can see up the road, and you turn when it’s clear, right?  Everyone knows that when you’re making a left turn.”  (Nielsen Decl., Ex.6, p.84:7-11). 

 

Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence which connects TMI’s services at the intersection to the accident.  Mere speculation that TMI could be responsible because it provided traffic control at the site is insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact.  See Ortega, supra.  The assertion that a truck was present at the intersection and might have obscured Lynn’s and/or Popejoy’s view of oncoming traffic does not create a triable issue of material fact regarding TMI’s purported liability.  Even if a large construction truck was parked in the left-hand turn bay of westbound Lyons and created a visual obstruction to eastbound traffic turning left onto Avenida Rotella, such does not create a triable issue of material fact regarding whether TMI caused or contributed to the accident.  (See Plaintiffs’ Addition Fact 16). 

 

First, regardless of whether or not construction was occurring at the intersection, a large truck, which may or may not have obscured the view of other drivers, could have been in the left-hand turn bay to make a turn at the intersection.  In such case, other drivers would be required to take precautions to avoid collisions such as not making a turn if their view was blocked by the truck (which is what Lynn testified she would do if her view had been blocked).  (See TMI, Ex.B, p.59:14-21).  Second, and more importantly, Lynn repeatedly testified that her view of oncoming traffic was not obstructed and that she saw Popejoy’s vehicle before she began her turn.  (See TMI, Ex.B, p.24:10-22, p.29:10-12, p.47:6-10, p.48:2-17, p.51:13-16, p.59:14-21, p.60:14-17).  Even if the declaration of Russell Gish, filed in support of the opposition, is considered, it does not overcome Lynn’s clear testimony that she saw Popejoy’s, and all of the other vehicles, in the lane Popejoy’s vehicle was traveling before beginning the turn.  (Id., p.47:6-p.48:17); (See Evidentiary Objections, above).

 

Plaintiffs’ fail to support their argument that the lack of a written traffic control plan from TMI caused or contributed to the accident.  However, even if such a plan was required and TMI was responsible for creating same does not create a triable issue of material fact in the face of Lynn’s repeated deposition testimony that her view of oncoming traffic was not obstructed and that she saw Popejoy’s vehicle before she began her turn.  As such, Plaintiffs cannot establish that any such failure was a substantial factor in causing the collision. 

 

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff cannot establish the required element of causation against TMI.   

 

4th cause of action – Loss of Consortium

 

The elements of a loss of consortium cause of action are: (1) a valid and lawful marriage between the plaintiff and the person injured at the time of the injury; (2) a tortious injury to the plaintiff’s spouse; (3) loss of consortium suffered by the plaintiff; and (4) the loss was proximately caused by the defendant’s act.  See LeFiell Manufacturing Co. (2012) 55 C4th 275, 284-285; Vanhooser (2012) 206 CA4th 921, 927.  By its nature, a cause of action for loss of consortium depends on the existence of a cause of action for tortious injury to a spouse.  Hahn  (2007) 147 CA4th 740, 746.   

 

Since the underlying tort claim against TMI fails, the claim for loss of consortium which depends on the tort claim also fails. 

   

5th cause of action – Wrongful Death

 

The elements of a wrongful death cause of action are: (1) the underlying tort, (2) a resulting death, and (3) damages.  B.B. (2020) 10 C5th 1, 31.  Again, since the underlying tort claim fails, so does the wrongful death cause of action. 

 

Plaintiffs’ Request for a Continuance

 

Plaintiffs request that if the Court is inclined to grant the motion, that the hearing be continued pursuant to CCP 437c(h) which provides:

 

“If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any other order as may be just. The application to continue the motion to obtain necessary discovery may also be made by ex parte motion at any time on or before the date the opposition response to the motion is due.”

 

Plaintiffs contend that additional facts and evidence exist to support the opposition.  (See Nielsen Decl. ¶¶15-17).  However, no additional evidence Plaintiffs obtain can refute Lynn’s clear testimony that her vision was not obstructed, she saw Popejoy’s vehicle at all times before the accident and she would not have attempted the left turn if her view was obstructed.  (See TMI’s Ex.B, p.47:6-10, p.48:2-17, p.51:13-16, p.59:14-21, p.60:14-17, p.75:12-p.76:3, p.80:3-13).  As such, the Court finds that a continuance is not warranted. 

 

CONCLUSION

 

The request for summary judgment is granted.