Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 23CHCV00326, Date: 2023-06-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV00326    Hearing Date: August 29, 2023    Dept: F47

Dept. F47

Date: 8/29/23

Case #23CHCV00326

 

DEMURRER & MOTION TO STRIKE TO THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

 

Demurrer & Motion to Strike filed on 7/17/23.

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant General Motors LLC

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff David Wallenstein

NOTICE: ok

 

Demurrer is to the 5th cause of action:

            1.  Violation of Civil Code 1793.2(d)

            2.  Violation of Civil Code 1793.2(b)

            3.  Violation of Civil Code 1793.2(a)(3)

            4.  Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability (Civil Code 1791.1, 1794, 1795.5)

            5.  Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment

 

RELIEF REQUESTED IN MOTION TO STRIKE: An order striking the prayer for punitive damages. 

 

RULING: The demurrer is overruled and the motion to strike is denied.  Answer is due within 20 days. 

 

SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 

This action arises out of Plaintiff David Wallenstein’s (Plaintiff) purchase of a 2014 Chevrolet Volt on or about 11/21/14.  (FAC ¶6).  On 2/3/23, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant) and Does 1-10 for: (1) Violation of Civil Code 1793.2(d); (2) Violation of Civil Code 1793.2(b); (3) Violation of Civil Code 1793.2(a)(3); (4) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability (Civil Code 1791.1, 1794, 1795.5) and (5) Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment.  In response to a demurrer and motion to strike to the original complaint, on 6/15/23, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint alleging the same 5 causes of action. 

 

With regard to the 5th cause of action for Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment, the cause of action is essentially based on claim that Defendant General Motors LLC (GM) did not disclose to Plaintiff prior to the sale of the vehicle and during the repair process that it had “defects” of which GM was aware.  (FAC ¶¶24-27, 42, 67-80). 

 

After meet and confer efforts failed to resolve the issues GM had with the First Amended Complaint, on 7/17/23, GM filed and served the instant demurrer to the 5th cause of action for Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment on the ground that the pleading fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for fraudulent inducement based on concealment.  CCP 430.10(e).  Additionally, GM filed and served the instant motion to strike seeking an order striking the prayer for punitive damages.  Plaintiff has opposed the demurrer and motion to strike and GM has filed replies to the oppositions. 

 

ANALYSIS

 

DEMURRER

 

A complaint that does not allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action is subject to demurrer.  CCP 430.10(e).  A demurrer challenges defects that appear on the face of the complaint or matters outside the pleadings that are subject to judicial notice.  Blank (1985) 39 C3d 311, 318; Donabedian (2004) 116 CA4th 968, 994.  In ruling on a demurrer, all properly pled material facts are deemed true, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.   Kamen (2001) 94 CA4th 197, 201; Moore (1990) 51 C3d 120, 125.

 

GM contends that Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement – concealment cause of action fails to state a claim because: (1) it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, (2) it is not pled with the requisite specificity and (3) it does not plead a transactional relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose. 

 

Statute of Limitations

 

In order to sustain a demurrer based on the ground that a claim is time-barred, the statute of limitations defense must be shown on the face of the complaint.  See Union Carbide Corp. (1984) 36 C3d 15, 25; E-Fab, Inc. (2007) 153 CA4th 1308, 1315-16.

 

The three-year statute of limitations set forth in CCP 338 governs a fraud cause of action.  CCP 338(d) provides:

 

“An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in that case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” 

 

GM has failed to establish that Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement – concealment claim is barred on the face of the First Amended Complaint.  GM argues that because Plaintiff has alleged that he purchased the vehicle on or about 11/21/14, he had to file his fraud claim no later than November 2021.  (See Demurrer, p.7:4-8).  It is not clear why GM claims the statute of limitations expired 7 years after the purchase date.  Regardless, GM contends that the filing of this action on 2/3/23 is over 5 years too late.  (Demurrer, p.7:8-9).

 

The delayed discovery rule tolls the applicable statute of limitations if the plaintiff is unable to discover the cause of action with reasonable diligence.  Hobart (1945) 26 C2d 412, 437; Johnson (1934) 1 C2d 136, 137; Jolly (1988) 44 C3d 1103, 1110; Fox (2005) 35 C4th 797, 807; Glue-Fold, Inc. (2000) 82 CA4th 1018, 1029.  In the moving papers, GM makes the conclusory argument that Plaintiff cannot invoke the delayed-discovery rule because Plaintiff has alleged that the defects in the vehicle manifested within the applicable express warranty period.  (See Demurrer, p.7:10-12 and p.7:19-22 citing FAC ¶13).  In the reply, Defendant mispresents that paragraph 8 in the First Amended Complaint alleges that “information about the alleged transmission, engine, and/or electrical defects was abundant (and publicly available on the internet).”  (See Reply, p.1:17-18).

 

Paragraph 8 of the First Amended Complaint actually alleges the opposite:

 

“Prior to purchasing Subject Vehicle, Plaintiffs (1) saw GM’s TV commercials for the 2014 Chevrolet Volt, (2) researched the 2014 Chevrolet Volt on GM’s website and (3) reviewed the

Monroney label affixed to Subject Vehicle. Had these GM marketing materials / product disclosures disclosed to Plaintiffs - prior to purchase - that Subject Vehicle had a Battery Defect, Plaintiffs would not have purchased it.” (emphasis added).

 

Plaintiff also alleges that GM and its agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, affiliates, and/or authorized dealerships concealed the defects which provides another basis for tolling the statute of limitations.  (FAC ¶44); See Aryeh (2013) 55 C4th 1185, 1192; Karoutas (1991) 232 CA3d 767, 771.

 

Further, when a plaintiff reasonably should have discovered facts for the purposes of the accrual of a cause of action is generally a question of fact and can only be decided as question of law (i.e., on demurrer) if the allegations in the complaint and facts subject to judicial notice can support only one reasonable conclusion.  Broberg (2009) 171 CA4th 912, 921. 

 

Based on the allegations in the First Amended Complaint, it cannot be determined as a matter of law that Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement – concealment claim is time-barred.  (See FAC ¶¶24-27, 29-30, 32, 72, 75a-75b).      

 

Specificity

 

The elements of a cause of action for fraud based on concealment are: (1) the defendant  concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant had a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he/she/they did if he/she/they had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff sustained damage.  Jones (2011) 198 CA4th 1187, 1198, quoting Kaldenbach (2009) 178 CA4th 830, 850.  Since concealment is a species of fraud, it must be pled with specificity.  Blickman Turkus LP (2008) 162 CA4th 858, 878.  However, the specificity requirement is “relaxed when it is apparent from the allegations that the defendant necessarily possesses knowledge of the facts.”  Quelimane Co. (1998) 19 C4th 26, 27.  Similarly, actions for fraud based on omission or concealment do not have the same specificity requirement.  Alfaro (2009) 171 CA4th 1356, 1384. 

 

There are four circumstances where nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.  Bigler-Engler (2017) 7 CA5th 276, 311-312.  The last three require evidence of some transaction (i.e. direct dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant).  Id.; Dhital (2022) 84 CA5th 828, 843-844 (review granted on the issue of economic loss rule) citing Hoffman (2014) 228 CA4th 1178, 1186-1187.

 

Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a transactional relationship with GM based on the allegation that GM issued the warranty on Subject Vehicle through Plaintiff’s purchase of same through an authorized GM dealer. (FAC ¶¶6-7); Dhital, supra.  Additionally, the concealment claim is based on superior knowledge and intentional and knowing concealment.  (FAC ¶¶72, 75a-75b, 76).  A claim for fraudulent inducement-concealment can be based on facts known only to a defendant, defendant knows Plaintiff does not know these facts and cannot reasonably discover them, and where the defendant actively conceals discovery from Plaintiff.  Warner Construction Corporation (1970) 2 C3d 285, 294; See also Valencia (N.D. Cal. 2015) 119 F. Supp.3d 1130, 1137-1138; Gutierrez (2018) 19 CA5th 1234, 1261-1262; In re MyFord Touch Consumer Litigation (N.D. Cal. 2014) 46 F.Supp.3d 936, 959-960; Mui Ho (N.D.Cal. 2013) 931 F.Supp.2d 987, 997-998, 999. 

 

Under the relaxed requirements for a fraud claim based on concealment, the Court finds that Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to state the claim.  (See FAC ¶¶6, 8-9, 36, 38, 44-45, 70-73, 75- 77, 80); See Alfaro, supra at 1384.  Similarly, based on the circumstances of the purchase of the Subject Vehicle, Plaintiff’s reliance on the alleged misconduct could have been reasonably expected which is sufficient to satisfy the intent to induce reliance element of the claim.  See Lovejoy (2001) 92 CA4th 85, 93, 96.

 

MOTION TO STRIKE

 

Punitive damages may be recovered where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is guilty of fraud, oppression or malice.  See Civil Code 3294(a), (c)(3).  Since Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged his fraud claim, the First Amended Complaint alleges a sufficient basis to support a claim for punitive damages.    

 

CONCLUSION

 

Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is overruled and the motion to strike is denied.  Answer is due within 20 days.