Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 23CHCV00876, Date: 2024-06-25 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23CHCV00876    Hearing Date: June 25, 2024    Dept: F47

Dept. F47

Date: 6/25/24

Case #23CHCV00876

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION & STAY OR DISMISS PROCEEDINGS

Motion filed on 11/30/23.

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Mass Automotive Group LLC dba Nissan of Mission Hills, Tom Awada, Fariborz David Massoudi, Shahryar Aliaskari, and Edgardo Vanegas

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff James Kaldawi

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order enforcing the arbitration agreement entered into by Plaintiff James Kaldawi and compelling binding arbitration of this matter. 

RULING: The motion is granted as set forth below. 

SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action arises out of an employment dispute between Plaintiff James Kaldawi (Plaintiff) and Defendant Mass Automotive Group LLC dba Nissan of Mission Hills (Nissan).  On 5/15/21, Plaintiff executed an Applicant’s Statement and Agreement and on 5/18/21, Plaintiff signed an Employee Acknowledgement and Agreement which contains an arbitration provision.  (Ayala Decl., Ex.A, B). 

On 3/28/23, Plaintiff filed this action against Nissan, Tom Awada (Awada), Fariborz David Massoudi (Massoudi), Shahryar Aliaskari erroneously sued as Shahiriar Alo Shari (Aliaskari), and Edgar Venegas (Venegas) (collectively, Defendants) for: (1) Wrongful Termination Due to Employment Discrimination Based on Again in Violation of Government Code 12940, et seq.; (2) Wrongful/Tortious Termination in Violation of Public Policy Protecting Persons from Age Discrimination; (3) Employment Discrimination Based on Medical Condition in Violation of Government Code 12940(a), et seq.; (4) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy Protecting Employees from Discrimination Based on Medical Condition; (5) Harassment in the Workplace in Violation of Government Code 12940(j), et seq.; (6) Breach of Implied Contract or Continued Employment; (7) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and (9) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.  

On 6/6/23, Defendants filed and served a prior motion to compel arbitration which was set for hearing on 10/6/23 based on the 5/15/21 agreement.  In opposition to that motion, Plaintiff denied electronically signing the agreement.  Defendants’ counsel then discovered another arbitration agreement signed by Plaintiff on 5/18/21.  On 9/28/23, Defendants withdrew their prior motion to give the parties additional time to meet and confer regarding arbitration. 

On 10/4/23, Defendants’ counsel advised Plaintiff’s counsel about the additional arbitration agreement.  (Javier Decl. ¶3, Ex.2).  Having received no response, on 10/16/23, Defendants’ counsel emailed Plaintiff’s counsel regarding whether Plaintiff would agree to arbitrate this dispute.  (Id. ¶4, Ex.3).  Again, no response was received.  (Id. ¶5).  Therefore, on 11/30/23, Defendants filed and served the instant motion seeking an order enforcing the arbitration agreement entered into by Plaintiff and compelling binding arbitration of this matter.  Plaintiff has not opposed or otherwise responded to the instant motion. 

ANALYSIS

The arbitration provision in the Employee Acknowledgement and Agreement, signed by Plaintiff on 5/18/21, covers all disputes which may arise out of the employment context.  (Ayala Decl., Ex.A).  Here, all of Plaintiff’s claims arise out of his employment with Nissan.  (See Complaint).

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs arbitration agreements when the agreements “evidence a transaction involving commerce.”  9 U.S.C. §2; Circuit City Stores, Inc. (2001) 532 U.S. 105, 111-119.  As long as a company purchases out of state materials and/or engages in any interstate commerce, the FAA preempts state law.  Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 282; Basura (2002) 98 CA4th 1205, 1214. 

Nissan’s business bears on interstate commerce through the selling of automobiles purchased in interstate commerce to customers, some of whom are from out of state; through the purchase and sale of automotive-related supplies; through the use of various financial and insurance instruments as part of the automobile dealership business; through nationwide and international marketing, etc.  (See Ayala Decl. ¶4).  Therefore, the arbitration agreement between Plaintiff and Nissan falls within the FAA.  See Scott (2016) 248 CA4th 392, 402.  The arbitration agreement itself provides that the signatories “agree that the arbitration and this Agreement shall be controlled by the Federal Arbitration Act.”  (Ayala Decl. ¶8, Ex.A). 

The FAA creates a general presumption in favor of arbitration and requires enforcement of a written arbitration agreement.  9 U.S.C. §2; AT&T Mobility LLC (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 347, n.6; Gilmer (1991) 500 U.S. 20, 26; AT&T Technologies, Inc. (1986) 475 U.S. 643, 650.  Courts consistently uphold arbitration agreements in employment related disputes.  See Circuit City Stores, Inc., supra; EEOC (9^th Cir. 2003) 345 F.3d 742.  A party seeking to compel arbitration under the FAA need only provide a copy of the agreement or recite its terms in the petition/motion to compel arbitration.  Condee (2001) 88 CA4th 215, 218-219; CRC 3.1330.  The opposing party has the burden to prove the agreement is invalid.  Green Tree Financial Corp. (2000) 531 U.S. 79, 91-92. 

Defendants have met their burden by providing a copy of the arbitration agreement signed by Plaintiff.  (Ayala Decl. ¶8, Ex.A).  The non-signatory, individual defendants, can also enforce the arbitration agreement as third-party beneficiaries.  Comer (9^th Cir. 2006) 436 F.3d 1098, 1101.  The agreement expressly provides:

“I and the Company both agree that any claim, dispute, and/or controversy that either party may have against one another . . . which would otherwise require or allow resort to any court or other governmental dispute resolution forum between myself and the Company (or its owners, directors, officers, managers, employees, agents, and parties affiliated with its employee benefit and health

plans) . . .

(Ayala Decl., Ex.A)

Awada is a current director/officer of Nissan, Massoudi is a current owner of Nissan, Vanegas is a current employee of Nissan and Aliaskari is a former employee of Nissan.  (Ayala Decl. ¶5). 

The subject arbitration agreement is also enforceable under California law.  Under the California Arbitration Act, a court must compel arbitration of any controversy covered by the terms of a written to arbitration agreement, except under limited exceptions, none of which have been shown to exist here.  See CCP 1281.2.  California also has a strong policy favoring arbitration.  See United Transportation Union (1992) 7 CA4th 804, 808; Bayscene Resident Negotiators (1993) 15 CA4th 119, 127.  California courts have also liberally held that arbitration agreements encompass actions of any type arising out of an employment relationship.  See Vianna (1994) 27 CA4th 1186, 1190; Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. (1982) 130 CA3d 212, 219.

Under California law, Plaintiff also bears the burden of establishing that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable.  See Armendariz (2000) 24 C4th 83, 114;  Crippen (2004) 124 CA4th 1159,1165.   In California, in order for a court to refuse to enforce an arbitration contract/clause under the doctrine of unconscionability, the agreement must be procedurally and substantively unconscionable.  Armendariz, supra.

In California, arbitration agreements arising out of employment relationships must meet the following requirements: neutrality of the arbitrator, the provision of adequate discovery, a written decision that will permit a limited form of judicial review, and limitations on the cost of arbitration.  Armendariz, supra 103-105,  107, 111-112.  Here, the arbitration agreement meets all of the necessary requirements and Nissan has agreed to pay all costs associated with arbitration.  (Ayala Decl. ¶¶8, 10, Ex.A).  Moreover, Plaintiff has not opposed the motion and, therefore, has not made any showing of unconscionability.

CONCLUSION

The motion is granted.  This action is stayed pending the completion of the arbitration.  CCP 1281.4.