Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 23CHCV01993, Date: 2025-06-05 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 23CHCV01993 Hearing Date: June 5, 2025 Dept: F47
Dept. F47
Date: 6/5/25
TRIAL DATE: 10/27/25
Case #23CHCV01993
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
Motion filed on 3/11/25.
MOVING PARTY: Defendants Providence St.
Joseph Health (PSJH) and Providence
Health System-Southern California dba Providence Holy Cross Medical Center (PHCMC)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Teresa Meza
NOTICE: ok
RULING: The motion is denied in its entirety.
SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action arises out of the care and treatment provided
to Plaintiff Teresa Meza (Plaintiff), a 38-year old pregnant female with an
estimated due date of 4/26/22, at Defendant Providence Health System-Southern
California dba Providence Holy Cross Medical Center (PHCMC). Plaintiff contends that defendants failed to
timely admit her for induction of labor on 4/21/22 and failed to stabilize
and/or transfer her after discovering an emergency medical condition existed,
which resulted in the death of Plaintiff’s child on 4/24/22.
On 7/7/23, Plaintiff filed this action against PHCMC, Providence
St. Joseph Health (PSJH), Farid Yashapour, M.D. and Mahin Amirgholami, M.D.
alleging a cause of action for professional negligence/medical malpractice
against all of the defendants and a cause of action for violation of the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) against PHCMC.
On 3/11/25, PHCMC and PSJH (sometimes collectively
referred to as Defendants) filed and served the instant motion seeking an order
granting summary judgment in favor of PSJH and PHCMC and against
Plaintiff. Alternatively, PHCMC and PSJH
request summary adjudication in their favor and against Plaintiff on the 1st
cause of action for professional negligence/medical malpractice and the 2nd
cause of action for violation of the EMTALA.
Plaintiff has opposed the motion and PHCMC and PSJH have filed a reply
to the opposition.
ANALYSIS
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when the
moving party establishes “that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” CCP 437c(c). “A party may move for summary adjudication as
to one or more causes of action…if the party contends that the cause of action
has not merit.” CCP 437c(f)(1). A cause of action has no merit if it is
shown that one or more elements of a cause of action cannot be established or
that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. CCP 437c(o); See also CCP 437c(p)(2).
1st cause of action – Professional
Negligence/Medical Malpractice
The standard of care in medical malpractice cases
requires that medical professionals exercise in diagnosis and treatment a
reasonable degree of skill, knowledge and care ordinarily possessed and
exercised by members of the medical profession under similar
circumstances. Munro (1989) 215
CA3d 977, 983-984. Whether a
professional duty has been breached is an issue within the knowledge of
experts, and their testimony is required to prove or rebut such an
allegation. See Willard
(1981) 121 CA3d 406. Similarly, in a
medical malpractice action, causation must be proven within a reasonable
medical probability based on competent expert testimony. Bromme (1992) 5 CA4th 1487, 1498; Williams
(1995) 33 CA4th 120, 133.
Based on the conflicting expert declarations of Deborah
Castile, MN, CNS, NE, RNC-OB, C-EFM, presented in support of the motion, and
Alexandra Papatsoris, RNC-OB, presented in support of the opposition. A triable issue of material fact exists as to
whether PHCMC and/or PSJH, through its agents and employees, including nurses
and non-physician staff, met the applicable standard of care and whether the
actions/non-actions of such agents and employees caused, within a reasonable
medical probability, Plaintiff’s injury.
Additionally, with regard to PSJH’s liability for
professional negligence/medical malpractice, the motion states that “PSJH is a Nonprofit
Corporation with its principal place of business in Washington” and cites to PSJH’s
Statement and Designation by Foreign Corporation. (See Ex.AA). The motion goes on to argue that PSJH
“is a parent corporation of PHCMC,
and is not involved in the day-to-day management, decision making, or tasking
at PHCMC. Also, PSJH does not provide medical care or treatment to patients,
and had absolutely no involvement in plaintiff’s care and treatment in April
2022. There is absolutely no mention of PSJH in plaintiff’s medical records
from PHCMC. In addition, as a Washington corporation, PSJH did not employ any
individuals involved in plaintiff’s care and treatment at PHCMC in April 2022.”
(See Motion, p.8:17-22).
However, the motion cites no other evidence or authority
to support the foregoing argument and the facts are not included in the
separate statement. (See Separate
Statement, generally). As such, Defendants have failed to meet their
initial burden of establishing that PSJH is entitled to summary
judgment/adjudication in its favor of the 1st and only cause of
action alleged against it in this action.
See CCP 437c(p)(2).
2nd cause of action – Violation of EMTALA
(42 U.S.C. 1395dd)
Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA),
a hospital must screen a patient for an emergency medical condition, and once
an emergency medical condition is found, the hospital must stabilize the
patient before transferring or discharging the patient. Baker (9th Cir. 2001) 260
F3d 987, 992.
To establish a violation of the EMTALA, a plaintiff must
prove that the hospital did not, within its available staff and facilities,
provide a patient known to be suffering from an emergency medical condition
with medical treatment necessary to assure, within reasonable medical probability,
that no deterioration of the condition would likely occur. Barris (1999) 20 C4th 101, 114. The elements of a civil claim for failure to
stabilize include: (1) the hospital had actual knowledge that a patient was
suffering from an “emergency medical condition” and (2) did not, within the
staff and facilities available at the hospital, provide for necessary
stabilizing treatment before transfer or discharge, i.e., the transfer or
discharge was not medically reasonable under the circumstances; and (3) the
patient suffered personal harm as a direct result. Id. at 110.
An “emergency medical condition” is defined as a medical
condition which, in the absence of immediate medical attention, could
reasonably be expected to result in placing the patient’s health (or in the
case of a pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child) in
serious jeopardy, impairment to bodily functions, or serious dysfunction of any
bodily organ or part. 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(e)(1).
Based on the opinion of Stephen Herbert, M.D., presented
in support of the motion, and the notes of Farid Yashapour, M.D., contained in
Plaintiff’s medical records as well as Dr. Yashapour’s deposition testimony, a
triable issue of material fact exists as to whether PHCMC violated the EMTALA.
While Dr. Herbert is of the opinion that Plaintiff did
not present to PCHMC on 4/21/22 with an emergency medical condition, Dr.
Yashapour’s notes from that same day indicate that Plaintiff “had antepartum
testing done on April 21, 2022 which revealed oligohydramnios with AFI 6.44”
and that the decision to delay induction of labor until 10 pm was not made by
Dr. Yashapour, but was a decision made by hospital nursing staff based on lack
of staffing and available rooms. (Plaintiff’s
Ex.A, p.143). Oligohydramnios is a
significant risk factor for stillbirth and fetal demise. (Plaintiff’s Additional Fact (PAF) 6). Dr. Yashapour also testified at deposition
that: “[i]t was my opinion that [Plaintiff] needs to be induced that day [April
21, 2022].” (Plaintiff’s Ex.E,
p.131:22-23). The foregoing, coupled
with several other known factors which made Plaintiff a high risk pregnancy
create a triable issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff had an
emergency medical condition of which PHCMC had actual knowledge and whether
PHCMC failed to provide stabilizing treatment to Plaintiff within the staff and
facilities available at the hospital. (See
PAF 7-8, 13). A triable issue of
material fact exists as to whether all other patients seen on 4/21/22, after
Dr. Yashapour had ordered induction of Plaintiff’s labor had a higher priority
level and/or whether there were beds available before Plaintiff was finally
called in for induction of labor and her baby’s heart had stopped beating. (PAF 7-8, 13-16, 18).
CONCLUSION
The motion is denied.