Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 23CHCV02194, Date: 2023-12-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV02194    Hearing Date: December 7, 2023    Dept: F47

Dept. F47

Date: 12/7/23

Case #23CHCV02194

 

DEMURRER & MOTION TO STRIKE TO THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

 

Demurrer & Motion to Strike filed on 10/2/23.

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant August Roa

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Yevgeniya Vanyan, Gohar Mkrtchyan, and Sanasar Grbashyan

NOTICE: ok

 

Demurrer is to the 3rd, 4th and 5th causes of action:

            1.  Motor Vehicle Negligence

            2.  General Negligence

            3.  Negligence Per Se (Vehicle Code 22107, 22350, 20001)

            4.  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Violation of Vehicle Code 20001 – Hit-and-Run)

            5.  Malice and Oppression

 

RELIEF REQUESTED IN MOTION TO STRIKE: On order striking certain portions of Plaintiffs’ complaint regarding punitive damages and the 3rd, 4th and 5th causes of action.

 

RULING: The demurrer is sustained, without leave to amend, in part, and with leave to amend, in part.  The motion to strike is moot, in part, granted, in part, and denied, in part. 

 

SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 

This action arises from a traffic collision that occurred on 3/18/22 at approximately 12:20 p.m. on Roscoe Blvd. in Northridge, California.  It appears that Plaintiffs Yevgeniya Vanyan, Gohar Mkrtchyan, and Sanasar Grbashyan (Plaintiffs) allege the accident occurred because Defendant August Roa made an unsafe lane change. 

 

On 7/24/23, Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants August Roa (Roa) and Noellie Ledesma Fields (Fields) for: (1) Motor Vehicle Negligence; (2)   General Negligence; (3) Negligence Per Se (Vehicle Code 22107, 22350, 20001); (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Violation of Vehicle Code 20001 – Hit-and-Run); and (5) Malice and Oppression.  After meet and confer efforts failed to resolve the issues Roa had with the complaint, on 10/2/23, Roa filed and served the instant demurrer to the 3rd, 4th and 5th causes of action and motion to strike certain portions of Plaintiffs’ complaint regarding punitive damages and the 3rd, 4th and 5th causes of action.  (See Nelson Decl.).  Plaintiffs have filed a combined opposition to the demurrer and motion to strike and Roa has filed a reply to the opposition. 

 

 

 

ANALYSIS

 

In the opposition, Plaintiffs concede that that their 3rd and 5th causes of action should be stricken and otherwise oppose the demurrer and motion to strike as to the 4th cause of action and claim for punitive damages.  (See Opposition, p.1:24-28, p.2:21-25). 

 

The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotion distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.  See Potter (1993) 6 C4th 965, 1001.  For conduct to be considered outrageous it must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community and the defendant must have engaged in conduct intended to inflict injury or engaged in conduct with the realization that injury will result.  Id.; Berkley (2007) 152 CA4th 518, 533-534; Chang (2009) 172 CA4th 67, 86.

 

Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to support a finding that Roa’s conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community and/or that Roa intended to inflict injury or engaged in conduct with the realization that injury would result.  Plaintiffs merely allege that Roa made an unsafe lane change and failed to immediately stop his vehicle after the collision as required by law.  Additionally, Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to show that they suffered the type of severe or extreme emotional distress necessary to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.    

 

Similarly, Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that Roa is guilty of fraud, oppression or malice in order to state a claim for punitive damages.  See Civil Code 3294; G.D. Searle & Company (1977) 49 CA3d 22; Dawes (1980) 111 CA3d 82; Brousseau (1977) 73 CA3d 864, 872.

 

Given the liberal policy of allowing leave to amend and since this is only the original complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiffs should have the opportunity to try to cure these defects in their pleading.

 

Roa includes paragraphs 37 and 39 in his motion to strike.  The Court finds those paragraphs do not include any improper allegations relating to intentional infliction of emotional distress or punitive damages. 

 

The Court notes that the end of the memorandum of points and authorities for the demurrer argue that all of Plaintiffs’ causes of action are inadequate as to Defendant Noellie Ledesma Fields.  (See Demurrer, p.8:3-11).  However, neither the notice of demurrer nor notice of motion to strike indicate that they are being made on behalf of this defendant.  (See Demurrer, p.1:27; Motion to Strike, p.1:27).  Further, the demurrer only addresses the 3rd, 4th and 5th causes of action as to Defendant August Roa.  (See Demurrer, p.3:1-22).  The reply also indicates that it is made on behalf of Roa.  Therefore, neither the demurrer nor the motion to strike was properly made on behalf of Defendant Noellie Ledesma Fields and the ruling does not apply to that defendant.   

  

CONCLUSION

 

Based on Plaintiffs’ concession that the Court strike the 3rd and 5th causes of action, the demurrer by Defendant August Roa to those causes of action is sustained without leave to amend.  The demurrer by Defendant August Roa to the 4th cause of action is sustained with 30 days leave to amend.  To the extent the motion to strike is not rendered moot by the ruling on the demurrer, it is denied as to paragraphs 37 and 39 and otherwise granted with 30 days leave to amend.