Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 23CHCV02439, Date: 2025-04-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23CHCV02439 Hearing Date: April 17, 2025 Dept: F47
Dept. F47
Date: 4/17/25
TRIAL DATE: 1/12/26
Case #23CHCV02439
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
Motion filed on 1/6/25.
MOVING PARTY: Defendant American Global Rags
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Estate of Anita
Y. Raphael, Through Its Personal Representative Joseph Rogoff, and Joseph
Rogoff, as Trustee of the Charlotte Marion Raphael Trust, successor-in-interest
NOTICE: ok
RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ Estate of Anita Y.
Raphael, Through Its Personal Representative Joseph Rogoff, and Joseph Rogoff,
as Trustee of the Charlotte Marion Raphael Trust, successor-in-interest entire
First Amended Complaint.
Alternatively,
Defendant American Global Rags requests an order granting summary adjudication
in its favor and against Plaintiffs as to the 1st cause of action
for General Negligence, 2nd cause of action for Products Liability and/or
3rd causes of action for Premises Liability in Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint.
RULING: The request for summary judgment is
granted.
SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action arises out of the death of Anita Y. Raphael
(Decedent). Plaintiffs Estate of Anita
Y. Raphael, Through Its Personal Representative Joseph Rogoff, and Joseph
Rogoff, as Trustee of the Charlotte Marion Raphael Trust, successor-in-interest
(collectively, Plaintiffs) allege that on 10/6/22, Decedent lost her phone in a
donation box/bin owned by Defendant American Global Rages (AGR) while donating
items. (FAC ¶GN-1). Plaintiffs further allege that when Decedent attempted
to retrieve her phone, due to an anti-theft feature in the donation box/bin, the
box/bin closed on Decedent’s head/neck causing her to suffocate and die. Id.
Plaintiffs’ operative First Amended Complaint alleges three causes of
action against Defendant American Global Rags (AGR), and others, for General
Negligence, Products Liability and Premises Liability.
On 1/6/25, AGR filed and served the instant motion
seeking an order granting summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ Estate of Anita Y.
Raphael, Through Its Personal Representative Joseph Rogoff, and Joseph Rogoff,
as Trustee of the Charlotte Marion Raphael Trust, successor-in-interest entire
First Amended Complaint.
Alternatively, Defendant AGR requests an order granting
summary adjudication in its favor and against Plaintiffs as to the 1st cause
of action for General Negligence, 2nd cause of action for Products
Liability and/or 3rd causes of action for Premises Liability in
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint.
Plaintiffs have opposed the motion and AGR has filed a
reply to the opposition.
ANALYSIS
AGR’s objections to the declaration of Ray Taheri, Ph.D.,
P.ENG, numbers 1-9, are sustained.
AGR’s objection to the deposition testimony of Dave
Taylor, objection 10, is sustained.
Standard for Summary Judgment/Summary Adjudication
“A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all
the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CCP 437c(c).
A party may move for summary adjudication, in the alternative to summary
judgment, as to one or more causes of action within an action, if the party
contends the cause of action has no merit.
CCP 437c(f). On a motion for
summary judgment/adjudication, a defendant has met its burden of showing a
cause of action has no merit if: (1) the defendant shows that one or more
elements of the cause of action cannot be established; or (2) the defendant
establishes an affirmative defense to the cause of action. CCP 437c(o), (p)(2). Once the defendant has met its initial
burden, the burden shifts to plaintiff to establish that a triable issue of
material fact exists. CCP 437c(p)(2).
3rd cause of action – Premises Liability
The opposition states that “Plaintiffs do not oppose
AGR’s motion as to their premises liability claim.” (See Opposition, p.6:19-20,
p.25:22-23). Based on the foregoing, the
Court will not address AGR’s argument with regard to the premises liability
cause of action.
1st cause of action – General Negligence
& 2nd cause of action – Products Liability
Civil Code 1714 provides, in relevant part:
“(a) Everyone is responsible, not
only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury
occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the
management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury
upon himself or herself. . . .”
The doctrine of strict products liability imposes fault
on all participants in the chain of distribution of a defective product. Bostick (2007) 147 CA4th 80, 88; Greenman
(1963) 59 C2d 57, 63. A strict products
liability cause of action may be brought against a defendant where the
defendant plays an integral and vital role (i.e., manufacturers, retailers, and
lessors) in disseminating a defective product into the stream of commerce,
which causes plaintiff’s injuries. Greenman,
supra at 62; Price (1970) 2 C3d 245, 253-254. In California, the doctrine of strict
products liability does not extend to transactions where the primary objective
is providing services. Pierson
(1989) 216 CA3d 340, 344; Ferrari (1995) 32 CA4th 248, 258.
Here, the evidence indicates that AGR provided a service
by facilitating the donation of goods rather than a product (the donation bin)
for use by the public. (SS 6-8). Plaintiffs’ reliance on Garcia (1970)
3 CA3d 319 for the proposition that AGR can be held responsible under a strict
products liability theory is unavailing as the cases are factual
distinguishable. Garcia, supra,
held that a laundromat owner could be held liable under a strict products
liability theory when a defective washing machine injured a boy when he was
trying to remove laundry from the machine.
There, the boy/plaintiff was using the washing machine for its intended
and foreseeable purpose when he was injured.
The Garcia court found the defendant laundromat owner to be a
licensor of personal property and the plaintiff a licensee given temporary use of
the washing machine. See Garcia,
supra at 325. In sum, Garcia
involved a business owner charging customers, the end user of the product/washing
machine, for a license to use the machines/products therein. Here, AGR did not charge Decedent or anybody
else to use the donation bin. Rather,
AGR, as the end user of the donation bin, used it to collect and protect donated
items as a means to provide its service of repurposing them for the community. As noted above, Decedent was not using the
donation bin for its intended purpose (donating items) at the time of the
incident. Both AGR and Plaintiffs agree that
Decedent had already donated items when she must have realized she accidentally
dropped her phone inside the bin and decided to retrieve a chair to assist her
in climbing into the bin ultimately resulting in her demise. (SS 1-4).
There is no evidence that Decedent made any attempt to call the phone
number clearly visible on the outside of the donation bin for assistance rather
than attempting to retrieve her phone herself.
(SS 9-10).
Even if AGR could be deemed to have provided a product
(the donation bin) to the public, rather than a service, Plaintiffs’ products
liability and negligence claims fail for other reasons.
A manufacturer, distributor or retailer may be held liable
under a strict liability theory, if a defect in the manufacture or design of
its product causes injury while the product is being used in a reasonably
foreseeable manner. See Soule
(1994) 8 C4th 548, 560. Product misuse
provides a defense to a strict liability claim if the defendant proves: (1) an
unforeseeable misuse of the product after it left the manufacturer and (2) the
misuse was the only reason that the product caused injury. Huynh (1993) 16 CA4th 825, 831. Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing
that Decedent was using the product (the donation bin) in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner at the time of the incident and that Decedent’s
ability to avoid injury was frustrated by the absence of a safety device, or by
the nature of the product’s design. See Perez (2010) 188 CA4th 658,
678, 680; Barker (1978) 20 C3d 413, 431; Campbell (1982) 32 C3d
112, 125-126. A manufacturer of a
product has no duty to prevent injuries which result from unforeseeable product
misuse. See Romito (1995)
38 CA4th 59, 70; Cronin (1972) 8 C3d 121, 126; Dosier (1975) 45
CA3d 74, 79.
Here, the evidence shows that Decedent was not using the
donation bin for its intended purpose (donating items) at the time of the
incident. The parties agree that on the
morning of 10/6/22, while Decedent was donating items in AGR’s donation bin,
Decedent dropped her cell phone into the donation bin. (Separate Statement (SS) 1, 2). The parties further agree that Decedent then attempted
to retrieve her phone by using a chair to scale and partially climb into the
bin and while Decedent’s upper body was wedged in the bin’s donation chute,
Decedent lost her footing on the chair and slipped, causing her body to be
pinned in the chute by the force of gravity and her own body weight which
resulted in her death by asphyxiation.
(SS 3, 4). The intended purpose
of the donation bin is to place items inside to donate, not attempt to retrieve
items out of the bin. (SS 5).
The evidence further indicates that it was not reasonably
foreseeable that an individual would find an outside object to stand on and
scale to hoist his/her body inside the donation bin’s chute. Foreseeability of harm is the main factor to
consider in analyzing whether a duty exists.
See Laabs (2009) 175 CA4th 1260, 1272; Perez, supra
at 680. As noted above, the evidence
shows that AGR’s phone number is displayed on the front of the subject bin which
would allow anyone to call for assistance to retrieve an item mistakenly
dropped in the bin. (SS 9). Therefore, while it is foreseeable that
someone may mistakenly drop something in the bin, AGR accounted for such a
situation by providing a phone number to call for assistance. The fact that a person may not receive “prompt”
assistance upon calling the number does not make it reasonably foreseeable that
someone would choose to find an object to climb on to reach the bin’s opening and
then climb head first into the bin rather than endure the inconvenience of having
to wait for assistance. Decedent’s
actions of finding a chair to stand on in order to climb into the bin was a willful
or negligent intervening act on the part of Decedent that brought the injury
upon herself relieving AGR from liability.
See Civil Code 1714(a); Perez, supra.
Similarly, AGR had no duty to warn because the particular
risk was not known or knowable in light of generally recognized and prevailing
knowledge at the time of the manufacture and distribution and because there is
no evidence that lack of sufficient warnings was a substantial factor in
causing the harm to Decedent. See
Gonzalez (2007) 154 CA4th 780, 793; Anderson (1991) 53 C3d 987,
994; Johnson (2008) 43 C4th 56, 64.
Plaintiffs’ own “expert” tacitly admits that it is intuitive to avoid
climbing into donation bins. (See
Taheri Decl. ¶14). The fact that some people
do it any way for whatever reasons (i.e., because they accidentally dropped
something in the bin; to steal items) does not change the fact that they would
seemingly intuitively know it is wrong and/or dangerous. There is no duty to warn against dangers from
unforeseeable misuses of a product. See
Dosier (1975) 45 CA3d 74, 78; Magee (1963) 214 CA2d 340. Here, the evidence indicates that AGR did not
have knowledge of any injuries, deaths, or anyone being trapped in connection
with the subject donation bin or any other donation bins. (SS 11).
Plaintiffs evidence regarding other similar incidents
does not establish that the bins involved were the same as the one here. (Taheri Decl.). Additionally, Plaintiffs’ expert’s knowledge
concerns donation bins in Canada. Id. Further, Plaintiffs have failed to establish
that the information would have put AGR on notice that the incident was
foreseeable.
CONCLUSION
The request for summary judgment is granted.