Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 24CHCV00915, Date: 2024-06-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24CHCV00915 Hearing Date: June 27, 2024 Dept: F47
Dept. F47
Date: 6/27/24
Case #24CHCV00915
DEMURRER &
MOTION TO STRIKE TO THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
Demurrer & Motion to Strike filed on 5/21/24.
MOVING PARTY: Defendant General Motors LLC
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Maricio
Murga Rios
NOTICE: ok
Demurrer is to the 3rd cause of action:
1. Violation of the
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Breach of Express Warranty
2.
Violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Breach of Implied
Warranty
3. Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment
RELIEF REQUESTED IN MOTION TO STRIKE: An order striking the prayer for punitive damages.
RULING: The demurrer is sustained and the motion
to strike is granted, both with 30 days leave to amend.
SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action arises out of Plaintiff Maricio Murga Rios’s
(Plaintiff) purchase of a 2020 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 (the Vehicle) on or
about 1/3/20. (Complaint ¶4). On 3/19/24, Plaintiff filed this action
against Defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant) and Does 1-10 for: (1)
Violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Breach of Express
Warranty; (2) Violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Breach of
Implied Warranty and (3) Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment.
After meet and confer efforts failed to resolve the
issues Defendant had with the Complaint, on 5/21/24, Defendant filed and served
the instant demurrer to the 3rd cause of action for Fraudulent
Inducement – Concealment on the ground that the pleading fails to state
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for fraudulent inducement
based on concealment. CCP 430.10(e). Additionally, Defendant filed and served the
instant motion to strike seeking an order striking the prayer for punitive
damages. Plaintiff has opposed the
demurrer and motion to strike and Defendant has filed replies to the
oppositions.
Additionally, on 6/14/24, Plaintiff filed and served a
Motion to Strike Defendant’s Demurrer which is scheduled for hearing on
7/16/24.
ANALYSIS
TIMLINESS OF DEMURRER & MOTION TO STRIKE
Since Plaintiff has opposed the demurrer and motion to
strike on the merits, the Court finds that Plaintiff was not prejudiced by the
1 day delay in the filing and service of the documents. Therefore, the matters will proceed on the
merits.
DEMURRER
A complaint that does not allege sufficient facts to
constitute a cause of action is subject to demurrer. CCP 430.10(e). A demurrer challenges defects that appear on
the face of the complaint or matters outside the pleadings that are subject to judicial
notice. Blank (1985) 39 C3d 311,
318; Donabedian (2004) 116 CA4th 968, 994. In ruling on a demurrer, all properly pled
material facts are deemed true, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law. Kamen (2001) 94 CA4th 197, 201; Moore
(1990) 51 C3d 120, 125.
Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement
– concealment cause of action fails to state a claim because: (1) it is barred
by the applicable statute of limitations, (2) it is not pled with the requisite
specificity and (3) it does not plead a transactional relationship giving rise
to a duty to disclose.
Statute of Limitations
In order to sustain a demurrer based on the ground that a
claim is time-barred, the statute of limitations defense must be shown on the
face of the complaint or from matters of which the court may take judicial
notice. See Union Carbide
Corp. (1984) 36 C3d 15, 25; E-Fab, Inc. (2007) 153 CA4th 1308,
1315-16; Arroyo (2014) 225 CA4th 279, 289.
The three-year statute of limitations set forth in CCP
338 governs a fraud cause of action. CCP
338(d) provides:
“An action for relief on the ground
of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in that case is not deemed to have
accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting
the fraud or mistake.”
Defendant has failed to establish that Plaintiff’s
fraudulent inducement – concealment claim is time-barred on the face of the Complaint. Defendant argues that because Plaintiff has
alleged that he purchased the vehicle on or about 1/3/20 and the defect existed
at the time of purchase, Plaintiff had to file the fraud claim no later than January
2023. (See FAC ¶¶4, 10).
The delayed discovery rule tolls the applicable statute
of limitations if the plaintiff is unable to discover the cause of action with
reasonable diligence. Hobart
(1945) 26 C2d 412, 437; Johnson (1934) 1 C2d 136, 137; Jolly
(1988) 44 C3d 1103, 1110; Fox (2005) 35 C4th 797, 807; Glue-Fold,
Inc. (2000) 82 CA4th 1018, 1029.
Plaintiff’s allegations that: (1) he did not know about the transmission
defect at the time of sale/lease; (2) he did know of the irreparable nature of
the problems at the time of the repair attempts because Defendant and its
agents represented that it was able to fix the vehicle, and/or that there was
not issue and (3) Defendant and its agents concealed the known transmission
defect are sufficient, at the pleading stage, to toll the statute of
limitations based on delayed discovery.
(Complaint ¶¶36, 41-42); See Aryeh (2013) 55 C4th 1185,
1192; Karoutas (1991) 232 CA3d 767, 771.
Additionally, when a plaintiff reasonably should have
discovered facts for the purposes of the accrual of a cause of action is
generally a question of fact and can only be decided as question of law (i.e.,
on demurrer) if the allegations in the complaint and facts subject to judicial
notice can support only one reasonable conclusion. Broberg (2009) 171 CA4th 912, 921. Based on the allegations in the Complaint, it
cannot be determined as a matter of law that Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement
– concealment claim is time-barred.
Specificity
The elements of a cause of action for fraud based on
concealment are: (1) the defendant
concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant had a duty to
disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant intentionally concealed
or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the
plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he/she/they did
if he/she/they had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a
result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff sustained
damage. Jones (2011) 198 CA4th
1187, 1198, quoting Kaldenbach (2009) 178 CA4th 830, 850. Since concealment is a species of fraud, it
must be pled with specificity. Blickman
Turkus LP (2008) 162 CA4th 858, 878.
However, the specificity requirement is “relaxed when it is apparent
from the allegations that the defendant necessarily possesses knowledge of the
facts.” Quelimane Co. (1998) 19
C4th 26, 27; See also Pointe Sand Diego Res. Com., L.P. (2011)
195 CA4th 265, 278, citing Okun (1981) 29 C3d 442, 458. Similarly, actions for fraud based on
omission or concealment do not have the same specificity requirement. Alfaro (2009) 171 CA4th 1356, 1384.
There are four circumstances where nondisclosure or
concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a
fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive
knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant
actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the
defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material
facts. Bigler-Engler (2017) 7
CA5th 276, 311-312. The last three
require evidence of some transaction (i.e. direct dealings between the plaintiff
and the defendant). Id.; Dhital
(2022) 84 CA5th 828, 843-844 (review granted on the issue of economic loss
rule) citing Hoffman (2014) 228 CA4th 1178, 1186-1187.
Under the relaxed requirements for a fraud claim based on
concealment, the Court finds that Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to state
the claim. See (Complaint ¶¶14,
37, 40, 42-43, 44-45); Alfaro, supra at 1384. Similarly, based on the circumstances of the
purchase/lease of the Vehicle, Plaintiff’s reliance on the alleged misconduct
could have been reasonably expected which is sufficient to satisfy the intent
to induce reliance element of the claim.
See Lovejoy (2001) 92 CA4th 85, 93, 96.
However, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a transactional
relationship which is required since Defendant was not in a fiduciary
relationship with Plaintiff. Without
citing any allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff contends the “complaint has
identical allegations to the plaintiffs in Dhital, namely, that the car
was bought from an authorized dealership, that the dealership was an agent of
GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, and that there was an express warranty in place.” (See Opposition, p.7:13-6). Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the
complaint does not allege that Plaintiff purchased the Vehicle from an
authorized dealership of Defendant. (See
Complaint, generally). Rather, the complaint
makes only vague agency allegations regarding all defendants. (See Complaint ¶3).
MOTION TO STRIKE
Punitive damages may be recovered where it is proven by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is guilty of fraud, oppression
or malice. See Civil Code
3294(a), (c)(3). Since Plaintiff has not
sufficiently alleged his fraud claim, the Complaint fails to allege a
sufficient basis to support a claim for punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
The demurrer is sustained solely on the basis that
Plaintiff has failed to allege the requisite transactional relationship between
Plaintiff and Defendant to state a claim for fraudulent inducement -
concealment and is otherwise overruled. The
motion to strike is granted.
Due to the liberal policy of allowing leave to amend and
because this is only the original complaint, Plaintiff is given the opportunity
to try to cure the defects in his pleading.
A First Amended Complaint is due to be filed and served within 30 days.