Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 24CHCV01463, Date: 2024-08-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24CHCV01463    Hearing Date: August 8, 2024    Dept: F47

Dept. F47

Date: 8/8/24

Case #24CHCV01463

DEMURRER & MOTION TO STRIKE THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

Demurrer & Motion to Strike filed on 7/3/24.

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Tory McLaurin

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Margaret Gill and Taraya Gill

NOTICE: ok

Demurrer is to the entire complaint:

            1.  Quiet Title

            2.  Declaratory Relief

            3.  Constructive Trust

            4.  Breach of Fiduciary Duties

            5.  Promissory Estoppel

RELIEF REQUESTED IN MOTION TO STRIKE: An order striking various paragraphs of the complaint (¶¶9, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 and 56) relating to title.

RULING: The demurrer is overruled, in part, and sustained with 20 days leave to amend, in part.  The motion to strike is denied, in part, and moot, in part. 

SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action arises from the purchase of real property located at 21137 Placerita Canyon Road in Santa Clarita, California (the Property) in or about May of 2020 by Defendant Tory McLaurin (Defendant), Lisa Gill (Lisa), Gloria Palmer (Gloria) and Plaintiff Taraya Gill (Taraya) (recorded on 3/1/21).  (Complaint ¶9, Ex.1).  Taraya, Plaintiff Margaret Gill (Margaret) and Lisa are sisters and Gloria, who is now deceased, is their mother.  (Complaint ¶8).  According to the Grant Deed, at the time of the purchase, Defendant and Lisa were husband and wife.  (Complaint, Ex.1).  In or about March of 2021, Defendant, Taraya, Lisa and Gloria took out First and Second Trust Deed mortgages secured by the Property.  (Complaint ¶¶11-12, Ex.2 and 3).  On or about 5/12/22, Gloria passed away.  (Complaint ¶10).

Plaintiffs/Taraya and Margaret allege that they along with their sister, Lisa, and their mother, Gloria, agreed to purchase the Property.  (Complaint ¶15).  However, because Margaret’s credit score was too low to obtain a loan, Defendant offered to put himself in Margaret’s place to qualify for the loan to purchase the Property.  (Complaint ¶15).  Plaintiffs allege that Defendant promised that he would hold title for Margaret until she improved her credit score to refinance the loans on the Property.  (Complaint ¶16).  Plaintiffs allege that Margaret contributed $150,000.00 and Lisa contributed $60,000.00 for the down payment on the Property.  (Complaint ¶17).  Plaintiffs allege that Margaret and Lisa paid the mortgage payments on the Property, Defendant never paid the mortgage or any other payments for maintenance on the Property, until March of 2024, and has never lived at the Property.  (Complaint ¶18).

In January of 2024, Defendant commenced eviction proceedings against Margaret (24CHUD00569).  (Complaint ¶19).  In March of 2024, Defendant paid one of the First Deed of Trust mortgage payments for the first time.  (Complaint ¶20).  In July 2024, judgment in the unlawful detainer action was entered in favor of Margaret and against Defendant.  (See 7/10/24 Minute Order in 24CHUD00569).

On 4/19/24, Plaintiffs (Margaret and Taraya) filed this action against Defendant (Tory) and Doe Defendants for: (1) Quiet Title, (2) Declaratory Relief, (3) Constructive Trust, (4) Breach of Fiduciary Duties and (5) Promissory Estoppel.  After meet and confer efforts failed to resolve the issues Defendant had with the complaint, on 7/3/24, Defendant filed and served the instant demurrer to the entire complaint and motion to strike which seeks an order striking various paragraphs of the complaint (¶¶9, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 and 56) relating to title to the Property.  (See Murphy Decl.).  On 7/24/24, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the demurrer and on 7/26/24, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to strike.  However, the oppositions were not timely served resulting in Defendant filing a Notice of Non-Opposition on 7/29/24.  (See Barsegyan Decl. filed 8/1/24).  Thereafter, on 8/1/24, Defendant filed and served a reply.

ANALYSIS

Each cause of action must specifically state the party asserting it if more than one party is represented on the pleading.  See CRC 2.112(3).  Here, the complaint does not specify which plaintiff is asserting each cause of action.  Therefore, it is presumed that each cause of action is being asserted on behalf of both Margaret and Taraya.

1^st cause of action – Quiet Title

Pursuant to CCP 761.020, in order to state a claim for quiet title:

“The complaint shall be verified and shall include all of the following:

(a) A description of the property that is the subject of the action. In the case of tangible personal property, the description shall include its usual location. In the case of real property, the description shall include both its legal description and its street address or common designation, if any.

(b) The title of the plaintiff as to which a determination under this chapter is sought and the basis of the title. If the title is based upon adverse possession, the complaint shall allege the specific facts constituting the adverse possession.

(c) The adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought.

(d) The date as of which the determination is sought. If the determination is sought as of a date other than the date the complaint is filed, the complaint shall include a statement of the reasons why a determination as of that date is sought.

(e) A prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims.”

Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, the complaint is verified by Plaintiffs.  (See Complaint, pp.21-22).  The complaint contains a description of the property.  (Complaint ¶6).  The complaint also sufficiently alleges that Plaintiffs seek a determination of their claimed title to the Property based on their contributions to the down payment, mortgage payments, maintenance payments, etc., Defendant’s lack of contribution to same and Defendant’s adverse claims to the Property.  (See Complaint ¶¶17-24).  Plaintiffs have alleged that they seek to quiet title to the Property as of the date of the execution of the Grant Deed which would be 5/14/20.  (See Complaint ¶28, Ex.1).  Plaintiffs have also included a prayer that title to the Property be quieted in the names of Margaret, Taraya, Lisa and Gloria, now deceased.  (See Complaint Prayer ¶1, p.18:13-15).

As such, the complaint satisfies the pleading requirements for a quiet title claim.  See CCP 761.020.  Whether Plaintiffs will ultimately be able to prove their quiet title claim by the applicable evidentiary standard cannot be determined on demurrer.  However, it is not clear why Taraya is making a claim for quiet title against Defendant as she is already on title to the Property.  (See Complaint, Ex.1).  As such, the claim is uncertain with regard to Taraya.  CCP 430.10(f).

2^nd cause of action – Declaratory Relief

Defendant notes that “[t]he fundamental basis of declaratory relief is the existence of an actual, present controversy over a proper subject. City of Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th 69, 79, 52 P.3d 695, 702 (2002) citing 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, §817, p. 273). In the broadest sense, an action for declaratory relief in a complaint is sufficient if it sets forth facts showing the existence of an actual controversy relating to legal rights and duties of respective parties under a contract and requests that the rights and duties be adjudged. Code Civ. Proc. §1060.”  (See Demurrer Memorandum of Points & Authorities, p.7:25-p.8:4).  Without providing any argument or analysis, Defendant merely concludes that “[e]ven this minimal standard has not been met in Plaintiff’s [sic] case.”

Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, Margaret has adequately alleged an actual controversy exists between her and Defendant regarding their rights to title of the Property.  See CCP 1060 (“Any person interested under a written instrument, excluding a will or a trust, or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property, or with respect to the location of the natural channel of a watercourse, may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract. He or she may ask for a declaration of rights or duties, either alone or with other relief; and the court may make a binding declaration of these rights or duties, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed at the time. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and the declaration shall have the force of a final judgment. The declaration may be had before there has been any breach of the obligation in respect to which said declaration is sought.”).

However, as with the quiet title cause of action, the basis for Taraya’s declaratory relief claim against Defendant is not clear as she is already on title to the Property.  (Complaint, Ex.1).  As such, this cause of action is also uncertain as to Taraya’s claim.  CCP 430.10(f).

3^rd cause of action – Constructive Trust

“A constructive trust is an involuntary equitable trust created by operation of law as a remedy  to compel further transfer of property from the person wrongfully holding it to the rightful owner.”  Campbell (2005) 132 CA4th 904, 920.  Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, the complaint does allege the intent of the parties upon Defendant taking title to the Property with Lisa, Gloria and Taraya.  Plaintiffs allege that because Margaret’s credit score was too low to obtain a loan, Defendant offered to put himself in Margaret’s place to qualify for the loan to purchase the Property and promised that he would hold title for Margaret until she improved her credit score to refinance the loans on the Property.  (Complaint ¶¶15-16).  However, once again, the basis for Taraya’s claim for constructive trust is unclear as she is already on title to the Property and there are no allegations that Defendant was supposed to hold title to the Property for her benefit.  See CCP 430.10(f).

4^th cause of action – Breach of Fiduciary Duties

The elements of a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action are: (1) existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of the fiduciary duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach.  Gutierrez (2011) 194 CA4th 925, 932.  A fiduciary relationship is required for a defendant to owe a plaintiff a fiduciary duty.  Cal Pak Delivery, Inc. (1997) 52 CA4th 1, 11.  Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to establish the existence of a fiduciary relationship between them and Defendant, their former brother-in-law, such that Defendant owed them a fiduciary duty.  (See Complaint ¶42).  Additionally, based on the allegations in the complaint, it appears that Plaintiffs only claim that Defendant owed Margaret a fiduciary duty.  (Complaint ¶¶42-44).  As such, it is not clear if/why Taraya is intended to be a plaintiff on this cause of action rendering the cause of action uncertain as to her.  CCP 430.10(f).    

5^th cause of action – Promissory Estoppel    

The elements of a promissory estoppel cause of action are: (1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) the reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.  Jones (2014) 230 CA4th 935, 945. 

Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, Margaret has alleged a clear promise by Defendant to take title to the Property for her benefit and transfer same back to her when she was able to refinance the Property in her name.  (Complaint ¶¶15-16, 49, 50).  Margaret has also sufficiently alleged her reliance on the promise by contributing $150,000.00 to the down payment on the Property and paying half of the mortgage payments on the Property.  (Complaint ¶¶17-18, 49, 50).  Based on the facts alleged, Margaret’s reliance on the promise was foreseeable.  Whether Margaret’s reliance on Defendant’s alleged promise was reasonable is a question of fact that cannot be determined on demurrer.  Margaret has also sufficiently alleged that she was damaged by the reliance by Defendant’s refusal to return the Property to her and Defendant’s attempt to evict her from the Property.  (Complaint ¶¶19, 49, 52).

While Margaret has adequately pled a claim for promissory estoppel against Defendant, again, the basis for Taraya’s claim is uncertain.  CCP 430.10(f). 

Motion to Strike

Defendant seeks to strike allegations regarding title to the Property on essentially the same grounds he has demurred to each of the causes of action in the complaint.  As noted above, Margaret has sufficiently stated claims related to the title to the Property against Defendant.  However, since Taraya is already on title, the basis for her claims relating to title are unclear. 

CONCLUSION

The demurrer as to the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd and 5^th causes of action by Plaintiff Margaret Gill is overruled.  The demurrer as to the 4^th cause of action by Plaintiff  Margaret Gill is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

The demurrer as to the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th and 5^th causes of action by Plaintiff Taraya Gill is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

The motion to strike is denied as to Plaintiff Margaret Gill and moot as to Plaintiff Taraya Gill based on the ruling on the demurrer as to Taraya Gill.