Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 24CHCV03056, Date: 2025-04-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24CHCV03056    Hearing Date: April 11, 2025    Dept: F47

Dept. F47

Date: 4/11/25

Case #24CHCV03056

 

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

 

Motion filed on 11/8/24.

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Hyundai Motor America

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Christina Barton-Torp and Joseph Torp

NOTICE: ok

 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order: (1) compelling Plaintiffs to arbitrate all of their claims in accordance with the arbitration agreement; and (2) staying this action pending the outcome of arbitration.

 

RULING: The motion is granted. 

 

SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 

This action arises out of Plaintiffs Christina Barton-Torp and Joseph Torp’s (Plaintiffs) purchase of a 2022 Hyundai Ioniq 5 (the Vehicle) on 7/9/22.  The Vehicle came with an express written warranty provided by Defendant Hyundai Motor America (Defendant) which is located in Plaintiffs’ Owner’s Handbook & Warranty Information (Warranty).  (Ameripour Decl., Ex.3).  The Warranty included a binding arbitration provision.  Id.  Additionally, on 7/9/22, Plaintiffs enrolled the Vehicle in Defendant’s Bluelink services.  (Rao Decl. ¶5).  To enroll in Defendant’s Bluelink services, customers must agree to the then-effective Bluelink Connected Services Agreement (CSA), the terms and conditions of which also include a binding arbitration provision.  (Rao Decl. ¶4, Ex.2). 

 

Plaintiffs contend that the Vehicle suffers from defects and nonconformities to warranty which substantially impair its use, value and/or safety; that Plaintiffs delivered the Vehicle to Defendant’s authorized repair facility for repair and Defendant was unable to conform the Vehicle to the applicable express warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts.  (See Complaint ¶¶10-14, 22, 27-28).  Further, Plaintiffs allege that despite the foregoing, Defendant has failed to replace the Vehicle and/or provide Plaintiffs with restitution as required under the Song-Beverly Act.  (Complaint ¶29).  Therefore, on 8/23/24, Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendant for: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act  - Breach of Express Warranty, (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty and (3) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Civil Code 1793.2. 

 

On 11/8/24, Defendant requested that Plaintiffs stipulate to arbitration; however, Plaintiffs have not agreed to submit their claims to arbitration.  (Ameripour Decl. ¶3).  Therefore, on 11/8/24, Defendant filed and served the instant motion seeking an order compelling Plaintiffs to arbitrate all of their claims pursuant to the arbitration agreement(s) and staying this action pending the outcome of the arbitration.  Plaintiffs have opposed the motion and Defendant has filed a reply to the opposition.

 

ANALYSIS

 

Defendant’s request that the Court take judicial notice of Plaintiffs’ complaint is denied.  Since the complaint is part of the Court record, taking judicial notice of same is unnecessary. 

 

Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice is granted. 

 

Plaintiffs’ objections, numbers 1-2, to the declaration of Ali Ameripour are overruled.

 

Plaintiffs’ objections, numbers 3-4, to the declaration of Vijay Rao are overruled. 

 

* * *

 

Defendant moves to compel arbitration based on the agreements to arbitrate contained in the Owner’s Handbook & Warranty Information (Warranty) and in the Bluelink Connected Services Agreement  (CSA).  

 

WARRANTY

 

The Warranty contains the following arbitration provision under the section titled “BINDING ARBITRATION FOR CALIFORNIA VEHICLES ONLY”:

 

“PLEASE READ THIS SECTION IN ITS ENTIRETY AS IT AFFECTS YOUR RIGHTS THIS SECTION DOES NOT PRECLUDE YOU FROM FIRST PURSUING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION THROUGH BBB AUTO LINE AS DESCRIBED IN THE ‘ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION’ PROVISION IN SECTION 3 OF THIS HANDBOOK.

 

If you purchased or leased your Hyundai vehicle in the State of California, you and we, Hyundai Motor America, each agree that any claim or disputes between us (including between you and any of our affiliated companies) related to or arising out of your vehicle purchase, advertising for the vehicle, use of your vehicle, the performance of the vehicle, any service relating to the vehicle, the vehicle warranty, representations in the warranty, or the duties contemplated under the warranty, including without limitation claims related to false or misleading advertising, unfair competition, breach of contract or warranty, the failure to conform a vehicle to warranty, failure to repurchase or replace your vehicle, or claims for a refund or partial refund of your vehicle's purchase price (excluding personal injury claims), but excluding claims brought under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, shall be resolved by binding arbitration at either your or our election, even if the claim is initially filed in a court of law. If either you or we elect to resolve our dispute via arbitration (as opposed to in a court of law), such binding arbitration shall be administered by and through JAMS Mediation, Arbitration and ADR Services (JAMS) under its Streamlined Arbitration Rules & Procedures, or the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its Consumer Arbitration Rules.

 

We will pay all fees for any arbitration except for the initial filing fee of $250 for JAMS or $200 for AAA. The arbitration will be held in the city or county of your residence. To learn more about arbitration, including the applicable rules and how to commence arbitration, please contact:

 

JAMS at www.jamsadr.org; 800-352-5267; or AAA at www.adr.org; 800-778-7879.

 

This agreement to arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted and to make all disputes and claims between us (including our affiliated companies) relating to or arising out of your vehicle purchase, use or performance of your vehicle, or the vehicle warranty subject to arbitration to the maximum extent permitted by law. The arbitrator (and not a court) shall decide all issues of interpretation, scope, and application of this agreement.

 

Notwithstanding the above, either you or we may file a lawsuit in small claims court for any claims that otherwise require binding arbitration, if the small claims court has jurisdiction. In addition, either you or we may invoke any JAMS Streamlined Arbitration Rules & Procedures or AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules that allow you or we to have a small claims court decide any claims that otherwise require binding arbitration. This agreement evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. Judgment upon any award in arbitration may be entered in any court having jurisdiction.

 

IF YOU PURCHASED OR LEASED YOUR VEHICLE IN CALIFORNIA, YOUR WARRANTY IS MADE SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THIS BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION. BY USING THE VEHICLE, OR REQUESTING OR ACCEPTING BENEFITS UNDER THIS WARRANTY, INCLUDING HAVING ANY REPAIRS PERFORMED UNDER WARRANTY, YOU AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THESE TERMS. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH THESE TERMS, PLEASE CONTACT US AT OPT-OUT@HMAUSA.COM WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF YOUR PURCHASE OR LEASE TO OPT-OUT OF THIS ARBITRATION PROVISION.”

 

(Ameripour Decl., Ex.3, pp.12-14).

 

Bluelink Connected Services Agreement

 

Defendant’s Bluelink services refers to a connected car system that includes various functions and features.  (Rao Decl. ¶3).  To enroll in Defendant’s Bluelink services, customers must agree to the then-effective Connected Services Agreement (CSA).  (Id. at ¶4).  Defendant makes a copy of the CSA available to every customer who enrolls in the Bluelink services plan.  Id.

 

In order for Plaintiffs to have enrolled in Defendant’s Bluelink services, they would have had to click a box to acknowledge that they “read and agree[d] to the Blue Link Terms & Conditions” and then click the “Complete” button.  (Id. at ¶6).  The phrase “Terms & Conditions” included a hyperlink to the CSA.  Id.  As presented to Plaintiffs, the box acknowledging the Terms & Conditions would not have been “prepopulated” with a check mark.  Id.  Plaintiffs would have had to click that box to acknowledge assent to the CSA.  Id.  A customer cannot activate Bluelink services through the Dealer-Assisted Enrollment process unless they complete the step requiring them to click the box acknowledging they agree to the Bluelink Terms and Conditions.  Id.  On 7/9/22, Plaintiffs enrolled the Vehicle in Bluelink services.  (Id. ¶5).

 

The CSA that was in effect at the time of Plaintiffs’ purchase of the Vehicle includes an “Arbitration Agreement” which provides:

 

“(a) Hyundai and you agree to arbitrate any and all disputes and claims between us arising out of or relating to this Agreement, Connected Services, Connected Services Systems, Service Plans, your Vehicle, use of the sites, or products, services, or programs you purchase, enroll in or seek product/service support for, whether you are a Visitor or Customer, via the sites or through mobile application, except any disputes or claims which under governing law are not subject to arbitration, to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law. This agreement to arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted and to make all disputes and claims between us subject to arbitration to the fullest extent permitted by law.

 

[…]

 

The agreement to arbitrate otherwise includes, but is not limited to: claims based in contract, tort, warranty, statute, fraud, misrepresentation or any other legal theory; claims that arose before this or any prior Agreement (including, but not limited to, claims relating to advertising) […]”

 

(Rao Decl., Ex.2, pp.17-20). 

 

 “[F]or purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.”  Condee (2001) 88 CA4th 215, 218.  Rather, the Court must only find that the agreement exists, not make an evidentiary determination of the agreement’s validity.  Id. at 219.  The Court finds that Defendant has properly established the existence of the agreements to arbitrate through the Ameripour and Rao declarations and the fact that Plaintiffs do not state that a copy of the Owner’s Handbook and Warranty Information booklet (Warranty) which includes one of the arbitration agreements at issue was not received upon purchase of the Vehicle and/or that they did not enroll in Bluelink Connected Services through the CSA which includes the other arbitration agreement at issue.  Rather, Plaintiff Joseph Torp vaguely and confusingly states that the Owner’s Handbook “was presumably delivered to [Plaintiffs]; however, “[t]o the best of [his] memory, [Plaintiffs] were never personally provided with a copy of any Owner’s Handbook and Warranty Information booklet when we purchased the Subject Vehicle.”  (See  J. Torp Decl. ¶¶4-5).  It is not clear what is meant by the foregoing.  Presumably, it means that the Owner’s Handbook and Warranty Information booklet was  provided to Plaintiffs with the purchase of the Vehicle, but was not separately/personally handed to Plaintiffs.  Further, there is no declaration from co-Plaintiff Christina Barton-Torp stating that she did not receive a copy of the Owner’s Handbook and Warranty Information booklet, personally or otherwise.  Rather, co-Plaintiff Joseph Torp improperly attempts to speak on behalf of both Plaintiffs.  (See J. Torp Decl., generally).  Joseph Torp does not mention the Bluelink Connected Services Agreement (CSA) in his declaration and, as noted above, Christina Barton-Torp has not submitted a declaration in support of the opposition.  (See J. Torp Decl., generally).       

 

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies to a written arbitration agreement in a contract involving commerce.  See 9 U.S.C. §2.  Here, the arbitration provisions are written in the Warranty and CSA and automotive sale contracts necessarily involve interstate commerce because even when used intra-state, “cars are themselves instrumentalities of interstate commerce.”  See United States v. Oliver (9th Cir. 1995) 60 F.3d 547, 550; Sanchez  (2015) 61 C4th 899, 906; (Ameripour Decl., Ex.3, p.13; Rao Decl., Ex.2, p.18).  Additionally, as noted above, the Warranty specifically states that “This Binding Arbitration Agreement shall be governed by and interpreted under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. sections 1-16” and the CSA states that “This Agreement evidences a transaction in interstate commerce, and thus the Federal Arbitration Act governs the interpretation and enforcement of this arbitration provision.”   (Ameripour Decl., Ex.3, p.13; Rao Decl., Ex.2, p.18).  As such, the FAA controls.  See Rodriguez (2006) 136 CA4th 1110, 1122.  Under the FAA, an arbitration agreement is “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  9 U.S.C. § 2.  Here, no grounds exist to revoke the arbitration agreement(s).

 

Under California law, the arbitration agreements are also valid.  On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written arbitration agreement and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate the subject controversy, the court shall order arbitration if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate exists.  CCP 1281.2.  Again, written agreements to arbitrate exist and Plaintiffs have refused Defendant’s request to submit this matter to arbitration.  (Ameripour Decl. ¶¶2-3, Ex.3; Rao Decl., Ex.2).  Under California law, the Court must compel arbitration unless it finds that the right to compel arbitration has been waived by Defendant or grounds exist for revocation of the agreement.  See Condee (2001) 88 CA4th 215, 219.  Here, there is no evidence that Defendant has waived its right to arbitration nor is there evidence of any ground for revocation of the agreements. 

 

As such, Defendant may move to compel arbitration under the FAA (9 U.S.C. §§1-16) and the California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP 1281, et seq.).

 

Both Defendant and Plaintiffs have agreed to arbitrate the disputes which are the subject of this action.  Defendant provided the Warranty, which gives rise to Plaintiffs’ claims, directly to Plaintiffs in connection with their purchase of the Vehicle.  The Warranty expressly provides:

 

“IF YOU PURCHASED OR LEASED YOUR VEHICLE IN CALIFORNIA, YOUR WARRANTY IS MADE SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THIS BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION. BY USING THE VEHICLE, OR REQUESTING OR ACCEPTING BENEFITS UNDER THIS WARRANTY, INCLUDING HAVING ANY REPAIRS PERFORMED UNDER WARRANTY, YOU AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THESE TERMS.”

 

(Ameripour Decl., Ex.3, p.14)

 

The Warranty further provides: “Hyundai Motor America (HMA) warrants your new 2022 Hyundai vehicle pursuant to the limited warranties described in this Owner's Handbook.” (Id. at p.17).  Since Plaintiffs purchased the Vehicle in California, are bringing this action pursuant to the Warranty, and have alleged that repairs have been performed under the Warranty, the arbitration provision applies.  (See Complaint ¶¶4, 8, 10-14, 27-28).

 

Defendant may also compel arbitration under the doctrine of equitable estoppel which applies to a written agreement containing an arbitration clause when a party must rely on the terms of the written agreement in making its claims.  The argument in the opposition that Plaintiffs did not accept the arbitration provision in the Warranty and/or are not making their claims under such warranty are without merit.  Plaintiffs’ complaint includes a cause of action for breach of written warranty and alleges that the causes of action therein “arise out of warranty and repair obligations of HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA in connection with a vehicle Plaintiffs purchased and for which HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA issued a written warranty. The warranty was not issued by the selling dealership.”  (See Complaint ¶4; J. Torp Decl. ¶7).  Plaintiffs cannot use the Warranty to support their claims but then avoid the application of the arbitration provision contained therein.  See Felisilda (2020) 53 CA5th 486, 496; Metalclad Corp. (2003) 109 CA4th 1705, 1714; Civil Code 1589.  Similarly, the fact that Plaintiffs did not sign the Warranty which contains the arbitration provision, does not preclude the enforcement of the arbitration provision since they are seeking to enforce the other terms of the Warranty.  See Boucher (2005) 127 CA4th 262, 269, 272; Stiner (9th Cir. 2020) 810 F.App’x 531, 534; JSM Tuscany, LLC (2011) 193 CA4th 1222, 1239-1240.

 

The Bluelink CSA also provides a basis for Defendant to compel Plaintiffs to arbitrate their disputes.  A customer accepts a “clickwrap” or “clickthrough” agreement’s terms, even in the absence of evidence that the customer has read the terms of the agreement.  See Wiseley (9th Cir. 2017) 2017 WL 4150341; Ftjea (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 841 F.Supp.2d 829, 837; Berman (9th Cir. 2022) 30 F.4th 849, 856-857; Oberstein (9th Cir. 2023) 60 F.4th 505, 513; Foster (8th Cir. 2021) 15 F.4th 860, 863.  As noted above, Plaintiffs do not dispute that they signed up for the Blue Link Connected Services.  (See Rao Decl.; J. Torp Decl.).  Further, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, the Bluelink CSA applies to Plaintiffs’ claims.    

 

As noted above, all of Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the Vehicle’s Warranty.  The arbitration provision in the Bluelink CSA states that the parties agree to arbitrate any and all disputes and claims between them relating to the Vehicle and that the agreement is “intended to be broadly interpreted and to make all disputes and claims between us subject to arbitration to the fullest extent permitted by law” and that the arbitration provision includes claims based in contract, statute, and warranty, including those that arose prior to the execution of the CSA.  (See Rao Decl., Ex.2, p.17).  Plaintiffs’ argument that the Bluelink CSA illegally allows Defendant to recover attorney’s fees is without merit.  The provision merely states that the parties would be entitled to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to the same extent as in court.  Therefore, if Defendant would be precluded from recovering attorney’s fees in a court action, the same law would apply in arbitration. 

 

Plaintiffs have failed to establish that either of the arbitration agreements at issue are unconscionable.  To invalidate a contract based on unconscionability, Plaintiffs must establish both procedural and substantive unconscionability.  Armendariz (2000) 24 C4th 83, 114. 

 

The agreements are not procedurally unconscionable.  Contracts of adhesion are generally deemed to be procedurally unconscionable.  See OTO, L.L.C. (2019) 8 C5th 111, 126.  Plaintiffs’ claim of lack of notice fails because they make claims based on the express written warranty.  There is no requirement that Defendant highlight the arbitration agreement or specifically point it out to Plaintiffs.  See Sanchez (2015) 61 C4th 899, 914.  Additionally, with regard to the arbitration agreement in the Warranty, Plaintiffs had the option to opt-out within 30 days of the purchase of the Vehicle.  (Ameripour Decl., Ex.3, p.14).  Further, Plaintiffs did not have to purchase Defendant’s vehicle as there are many other vehicle brands available.  See Sanchez, supra at 932.    

 

Nor are the agreements substantively unconscionable.  Public policy favors arbitration.  See Brodke (2008) 160 CA4th 1569, 1577.  Moreover, arbitration agreements have been held to be valid and enforceable with regard to claims under the Song-Beverly Act.  Sanchez, supra at 909-910.  Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, the fact that discovery may be more limited in arbitration does not make an agreement to arbitrate unconscionable.  See Ramirez (2024) 16 C5th 478, 503-507.

 

Plaintiffs’ argument that the Magnuson-Moss Act precludes arbitration of their claims is also without merit.  First, Plaintiffs have not brought a claim under the Magnuson-Moss Act.  It has also been held that the Magnuson-Moss Act does not preclude binding arbitration of claims pursuant to a valid binding arbitration agreement, which the court must enforce pursuant to the FAA.  See Walton (5th Cir. 2002) 298 F.3d 470, 478-479; Davis (11th Cir. 2002) 305 F.3d 1268, 1274-1280; In re Apple Iphone 3G Products Liability Litigation (N.D. Cal. 2012) 859 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1091.

 

Finally, enforcing the arbitration agreements would not violate the anti-waiver provision of the Song-Beverly Act as Plaintiffs are not waiving any rights under the Song-Beverly Act by having to arbitrate their claims.

 

CONCLUSION

 

The motion is granted.  The action is stayed pending the outcome of the arbitration.  9 U.S.C. §3; CCP 1281.4. 

 

The Court notes that in violation of CRC 3.1110(f)(4) Defendant and Plaintiffs have failed to electronically bookmark some or all of the exhibits attached to their respective papers.  Defendant has only electronically bookmarked one of the two exhibits attached to each of Ameripour and Rao declarations.  Plaintiffs have not electronically bookmarked any of the exhibits/attachments to their Request for Judicial Notice.  Counsel for the parties are warned that failure to comply with this rule in the future may result in matters being continued so that papers can be resubmitted in compliance with the rule, papers not being considered and/or the imposition of sanctions. 

 

The Court also notes that Defendant’s reply memorandum exceeds the 10 page limit set forth in CRC 3.1113(d) by 4 pages without prior court approval.  See CRC 3.1113(d)-(g).  Counsel for the parties are warned that future similar violations will result in the court not considering the arguments included in the pages which exceed the page limit.  CRC 3.1113(g); CRC 3.1300(d).