Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: 24CHCV03075, Date: 2025-05-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24CHCV03075    Hearing Date: May 1, 2025    Dept: F47

Dept. F47

Date: 5/1/25

Case #24CHCV03075

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

Motion filed on 11/20/24.

MOVING PARTY: Defendants 23801 Newhall Avenue LLC; Capstone Services, LLC and International Equity Partners, Inc. (Doe 76)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Sharon Collier

NOTICE: ok

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling Plaintiff Sharon Collier to submit this action to arbitration and staying this action pending the outcome of arbitration.

RULING: The motion is denied. 

SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action arises out of the care and services provided to Plaintiff Sharon Collier (Plaintiff) during her residency at Santa Clarita Post Acute (the Facility), a skilled nursing facility in Santa Clarita, California, from 6/29/23 to 10/3/23.

On 8/26/24, Plaintiff filed this action against alleging causes of action for: (1) Elder Abuse/Neglect; (2) Negligence; (3) Negligent Hiring, Supervision & Retention (CACI 426) and (4) Violation of Residents’ Rights.  The currently named defendants are 23801 Newhall Avenue, LLC; Capstone Services, LLC and International Equity Partners, Inc.  Capstone is a former management group for the Facility.  International Equity Partners is the ownership group of Newhall Avenue Healthcare Center, LLC which took over operations of the Facility as licensee as of the transfer date 6/1/23.  Prior to Newhall Avenue Healthcare Center LLC, 23801 Newhall Avenue, LLC was the licensee.  (See Rousso Decl. ¶3).

Defendants contend that on 7/13/23, several days after her admission to the Facility, Jennifer Melchor, the receptionist and assistant admissions coordinator at the Facility, met with Plaintiff to explain, review and sign the Residency Agreement and all residency-related documents.  (Melchor Decl. ¶9).  The Residency Agreement included a section with an Arbitration Agreement with the ability to rescind the agreement within 30 days.  (Melchor Decl. ¶¶5, 21, Ex.2).

Defendants contend that Plaintiff asked to only sign the front page of the documents and told Ms. Melchor to sign Plaintiff’s initials on the subsequent documents because Plaintiff had pain in her hand and her hand was not functioning correctly.  (Melchor Decl. ¶13).  Defendants contend that Plaintiff reviewed all of the documents, including the Arbitration Agreement, and consented to Ms. Melchor placing Plaintiff’s initials on each of the documents.  (See Melchor Decl. ¶¶14-24).  On the other hand, Plaintiff claims to have no recollection of reviewing and/or giving Ms. Melchor authority to sign her initials to the documents, including the Arbitration Agreement.  (See Collier Decl.). 

The Arbitration Agreement provides that all disputes between Plaintiff and the Facility, including its owners, managers, agents, etc., relating to the provision of care, treatment and services the Facility provided to Plaintiff would be resolved by binding arbitration.  (Melchor Decl., Ex.2, Article 2).  

On 11/20/24, all of the named Defendants filed and served the instant motion seeking an order compelling Plaintiff to submit this action to arbitration and staying this action pending the outcome of arbitration.  Plaintiff has opposed the motion.  Defendants have not filed a reply to the opposition.

ANALYSIS

Under both federal and California law, a written agreement to arbitrate disputes between the parties is a prerequisite to a court order compelling arbitration.  See 9 U.S.C. §2; CCP 1281.2.  The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the initial burden of proving the existence of such an agreement by a preponderance of the evidence.  Rosenthal (1996) 14 C4th 394, 413.  The Court finds that Defendants failed to meet this initial burden. 

First, the Arbitration Agreement, which Defendants concede is a separate document, does not have Plaintiff’s name on it anywhere.  (See Melchor Decl. ¶18).  At the top of the first page of the agreement, where the “Resident’s Name” is supposed to be written, only the date appears.  (See Rousso Decl., Ex.2).  At the bottom of the second page of the agreement, there are two places for signatures – the first concerns arbitration of medical malpractice claims and the second concerns arbitration of all other claims.  Id.  Here, where the “Resident’s Signature” is supposed to be only the initials “SC” appear under the first portion relating to medical malpractice, not the portion regarding all other claims.  (See Rousso Decl., Ex.2).  Plaintiff’s complaint does not include a claim for medical malpractice. 

Second, Defendants admit that Plaintiff did not sign or place her initials on the Arbitration Agreement.  As noted above, Defendants contend that Plaintiff asked Ms. Melchor to initial the Arbitration Agreement on her behalf whereas Plaintiff states that she has no recollection of meeting Ms. Melchor, reviewing the Arbitration Agreement or asking someone to initial it on her behalf.  (Compare Melchor Decl. and Collier Decl.).  Defendants provide no authority for the proposition that a person merely orally asking another person to initial documents on his/her behalf is sufficient to give that person legal authority to do so.  (See Defendant’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities, generally).  Even if the events occurred as Ms. Melchor states in her declaration and Plaintiff does remember because of the medication she was taking at the time and the oral request is legally binding, as noted above, the placement of the initials indicates that Plaintiff only agreed to arbitrate issues of medical malpractice and not all other claims, such as those being asserted in this action.

Because Defendants failed to meet their initial burden of establishing the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate, the Court need not reach the issue of whether the arbitration agreement is unconscionable. 

Finally, even if a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement existed, Defendants have not indicated that they will bear the cost of arbitration which is necessary due to Plaintiff’s indigent circumstances.  See Roldan (2013) 219 CA4th 87, 90, 94, 96; Weiler (2018) 22 CA5th 970, 978-979; (Collier Decl. ¶10).

CONCLUSION

The motion is denied.