Judge Melvin D. Sandvig, Case PC058730 2022-09-07 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: PC058730, Date: 2022-09-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: PC058730 Hearing Date: September 7, 2022 Dept: F47

Dept. F-47

Date: 9/7/22

Case #PC058730

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT

(CCP § 629)

Motion filed on 7/25/22.

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Jeffrey Drummen

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants Gregory Samples and Leanna Samples; Larry Cambell and Colleen Montgomery

NOTICE: N/A

RELIEF REQUESTED: Unclear. Plaintiff does not state the exact judgment he would like the Court to enter—just that he would like the Court to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict in general. Presumably, for the Court to enter judgment against both sets of defendants for the full amount of damages pled ($83,000) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 629.

RULING: The motion is denied.

On 8/21/18 Plaintiff filed this action for breach of contract and negligence. Plaintiff alleges that defendants breached a settlement agreement between Plaintiff and former Defendant Julia Surtshin (“Surtshin”) concerning the maintenance of trees on the property located at 17550 Prairie Street, Northridge, California (“Prairie Property”). Plaintiff owned—and on 4/16/18 sold—an adjacent property located at 9264 Shoshone Avenue, Northridge, California (“Shoshone Property”). Defendant Julia Surtshin sold the Prairie Property to Defendants Gregory and Leanna Samples (“the Samples”) on 6/2/09, and the Samples sold the property to Defendants Larry Cambell and Colleen Montgomery (“Cambell and Montgomery”) on 11/20/17. Plaintiff alleged that all defendants, as the successive owners of the Prairie Property, were contractually obligated by the settlement he agreed to with Surtshin to trim and otherwise maintain the trees on the Prairie Property to prevent them from encroaching on his adjacent Shoshone Property, and that each defendant breached this agreement. Plaintiff also alleged that each defendant was negligent in not maintaining the trees on the Prairie Property.

On 2/19/29 the Court sustained Surtshin’s demurrer to both causes of action, and on 11/25/19 the Court sustained the Samples’ demurrer to the first cause of action for breach of contract. The cause of action for negligence was tried before a jury, and on 7/7/22 the jury returned a verdict finding Cambell and Montgomery not liable and the Samples liable for damages amounting to $13,799.98. Plaintiff now moves for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Code Civ. Pro. § 629 states: “The court, before the expiration of its power to rule on a motion for a new trial, either of its own motion, after five days’ notice, or on motion of a party against whom a verdict has been rendered, shall render judgment in favor of the aggrieved party notwithstanding the verdict whenever a motion for a directed verdict for the aggrieved party should have been granted had a previous motion been made.”

Given the constitutional right to jury trial, a trial court's discretion in granting a JNOV motion is severely limited. Fountain Valley Chateau Blanc Homeowner's Assn. v. Department of Veterans Affairs (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 743, 750. A judge may grant a motion for JNOV only if there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict. Lopez v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 244, 253. Conflicting evidence is resolved against the moving party. The party in whose favor the verdict was rendered is “entitled to the benefit of every favorable inference which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence and to have all conflicts in the evidence resolved in his favor.” Castro v. State of Calif. (1981) 114 CA3d 503, 507. “The court may not weigh evidence, draw inferences contrary to the verdict, or assess the credibility of witnesses. The court must deny the motion if there is any substantial evidence to support the verdict.” Begnal v. Canfield & Assocs., Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 66, 72.

Here, Plaintiff moves for judgment notwithstanding the verdict against the Cambell and Montgomery Defendants and the Sample Defendants for the amount of damages pled in their First Amended Complaint. The Court finds substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

The jury found Cambell and Montgomery not liable for negligence. Plaintiff himself testified in his deposition that he can’t recall ever speaking to Cambell or Montgomery about anything—much less the alleged negligence relating to (or nuisance created by) the encroaching tree on the Prairie Property. Drummen Depo., 51:11-24. Furthermore, the evidence shows that Cambell and Montgomery owned the Prairie Property for at most five months before the alleged injury occurred in the form of a reduced sale price for the Shoshone Property. Cambell Depo. 40:7-14. When drawing inferences against Plaintiff as the moving party, the Court finds there is substantial evidence suggesting that minimal tree growth—and thus liability to Cambell and Montgomery—could have occurred in five months. If it had, one would expect Plaintiff to have said something to Cambell or Montgomery and there is substantial evidence indicating he did not.

As for the Samples, the jury found liability and determined damages to be $13,799.98. Plaintiff claims damages from a decrease in the value of the Shoshone Property as determined by the price ultimately obtained in the 4/16/18 sale. Defendants offered evidence that the initial listing price of the Shoshone Property was for $899,000. Exhibit 204. However, after a few weeks Plaintiff only received one offer for $840,000. Exhibit 205. This would indicate that the Shoshone property was worth significantly less than the value claimed by Plaintiff. Defendants introduced further evidence suggesting that Plaintiff and the ultimate buyer of the Shoshone Property agreed to reduce the final sale price by $10,000 to account for any possible tree-related damage. See Exhibits 209, 211. The Court does not decide actual damages—the jury does. On a motion for JNOV the Court only determines if there is evidence to justify the jury’s findings, and there is evidence in this case to justify finding $13,799.98 in damages caused by negligence on the part of the Samples.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is denied.

Dept. F-47

Date: 9/7/22

Case #PC058730

MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE NEW TRIAL

(CCP § 657)

Notice of intent to file motion filed on 7/22/22. Motion filed on 8/11/22.

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Jeffrey Drummen

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants Gregory Samples and Leanna Samples; Larry Cambell and Colleen Montgomery

NOTICE: ok. However, this motion was filed late. Pursuant to CCP § 659(a), Moving Plaintiff had ten days from 7/22/22—the date Plaintiff filed notice of intent to move for a new trial—to file the instant motion. The instant motion was due 8/1/22, but Plaintiff did not file until 8/11/22.

RELIEF REQUESTED: For the Court to order a new trial with respect to liability for the Cambell and Montgomery Defendants and/or damages for the Sample Defendants unless the defendants agree to additional damages in the amount of $102,000.

RULING: The motion is denied.

As a procedural matter, Plaintiffs motion for a new trial is late. CCP § 659(a) mandates that within 10 days of filing notice of intent to move for a new trial, the moving party shall serve upon all other parties and file any brief and accompanying documents, including affidavits in support of the motion. Pursuant to CCP § 659(a), Moving Plaintiff had ten days from 7/22/22—the date Plaintiff filed notice of intent to move for a new trial—to file the instant motion. Thus, the instant motion was due 8/1/22, but Plaintiff did not file until 8/11/22. Nonetheless, the Court will consider the merits of Plaintiff’s motion.

CCP § 657 states:

The verdict may be vacated and any other decision may be modified or vacated, in whole or in part, and a new or further trial granted on all or part of the issues, on the application of the party aggrieved, for any of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of such party:

1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.

2. Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by a resort to the determination of chance, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.

3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.

4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.

5. Excessive or inadequate damages.

6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or the verdict or other decision is against law.

7. Error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the application.

Plaintiff claims grounds 1, 6, 7 as the basis for his motion. In the supporting memorandum of points and authorities, however, Plaintiff effectively argues for a new trial on grounds 5 and 6—inadequate damages and insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict. Since Plaintiff does not identify any irregularities in the proceedings (ground 1) or errors in law (ground 2), the Court will assess Plaintiff’s motion on inadequate damages and insufficiency of evidence grounds.

With respect to inadequate damages or insufficient evidence, CCP § 657 states:

A new trial shall not be granted upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, nor upon the ground of excessive or inadequate damages, unless after weighing the evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision.

Id. (emphasis added).

A judge's discretion when ruling on a motion for a new trial is very broad. Barrese v. Murray (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 494, 503. “The cases make it clear that in ruling on the new trial motion the trial court can—and should—consider credibility independently of the jury's conclusions.” Id. at 504. Nevertheless, “Code of Civil Procedure section 657 empowers the trial court to grant a new trial only when after independently evaluating the evidence the court concludes the jury's verdict is “clearly” wrong. The court cannot grant a new trial simply because it would have found differently than the jury.” Huy Fong Foods, Inc. v. Underwood Ranches, LP (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1112, 1126. “The court does not disregard the verdict, or decide what result it should have reached if the case had been tried without a jury, but instead ‘it should consider the proper weight to be accorded to the evidence and then decide whether or not, in its opinion, there is sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict.’” Dominguez v. Pantalone (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 201, 215 (quoting People v. Robarge (1953) 41 Cal.2d 628, 633).

Should the Court find that the jury clearly should have reached a different verdict with respect to damages, CCP § 662.5(a) states, “trial court may in its discretion…issue a conditional order granting the new trial unless the party against whom the verdict has been rendered consents to the addition of damages in an amount the court in its independent judgment determines from the evidence to be fair and reasonable.”

In this case, there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings on liability. The jury found the Samples to be liable for negligence and thus the Court assumes Plaintiff is not challenging this finding. But the jury found Cambell and Montgomery not liable for negligence. However, Plaintiff himself testified in his deposition that he can’t recall ever speaking to Cambell or Montgomery about anything—much less the alleged negligence relating to (or nuisance created by) the encroaching tree on the Prairie Property. Drummen Depo., 51:11-24. Furthermore, the evidence shows that Cambell and Montgomery owned the Prairie Property for at most five months before the alleged injury occurred in the form of a reduced sale price for the Shoshone Property. Cambell Depo. 40:7-14. There is sufficient credible evidence for the jury to find that very minimal tree growth—and thus liability to Cambell and Montgomery—could have occurred in five months. Regardless, there is evidence indicating that Plaintiff never said anything about the tree growth to Cambell or Montgomery and therefore Cambell and Montgomery did not have a duty to act.

There is also sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination that damages amounted to $13,799.98. Plaintiff claims damages from a decrease in the value of the Shoshone Property as determined by the price ultimately obtained in the 4/16/18 sale. Plaintiff’s evidence consists of testimony from a real estate agent valuing the Shoshone Property at $915,000 and Plaintiff’s own opinion that the property was worth $925,000. However, defendants offered evidence that the actual listing price of the Shoshone Property was for $899,000, and after a few weeks Plaintiff only received one offer for $840,000. Exhibit 204, 205. And this was before Plaintiff disclosed the tree-related damage to the buyer. This would indicate that the Shoshone property was worth significantly less than the value claimed by Plaintiff. Defendants introduced further evidence suggesting that Plaintiff and the ultimate buyer of the Shoshone Property agreed to reduce the final sale price by $10,000 to account for any possible tree-related damage. See Exhibits 209, 211. The Court finds that the free market’s determination of the Shoshone Property’s decreased value due to tree-related damage—in the form of negotiations between Plaintiff and potential buyers—is just as credible as any of the expert opinion offered by Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court cannot find that the jury clearly should have reached a different verdict with respect to damages.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial is denied.