Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig, Case: YC072542, Date: 2022-08-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: YC072542 Hearing Date: August 30, 2022 Dept: F47
Dept. F-47
Date: 8/30/22
Case #YC072542
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’
FEES
Motion filed on 6/15/22.
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Cross
Creek Village Homeowners Association
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Alexandar Cvetkovich
NOTICE: ok
RELIEF REQUESTED: Orders (1) determining that Plaintiff Cross Creek
Village Homeowners Association is the prevailing party in this civil lawsuit
against Defendant Alexander Cvetkovich, (2) awarding attorneys’ fees to
Plaintiff as the prevailing party in this civil lawsuit in the amount of
$291,684.50 against Defendant, (3) awarding costs to Plaintiff as the
prevailing party in this civil lawsuit in the amount of $28,922.86 against
Defendant, and (4) amending the Judgment entered on May 13, 2022, to include
the award of attorneys’ fees and costs in the total amount of $320,607.36.
RULING: The motion is granted, in part, and denied,
in part, as set forth below.
This action arises out of a dispute between Plaintiff
Cross Creek Village Homeowners Association (Plaintiff) and one of its members,
Defendant Alexander Cvetkovich (Defendant).
On 12/15/17, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant for: (1)
Breach of Contract, (2) Breach of CC&Rs and Rules, (3) Nuisance and (4)
Fraud. Just prior to trial, Plaintiff
dismissed its nuisance and fraud causes of action. (See Statement of Decision,
p.1:17-19).
On 5/13/22, after a court trial, judgment for damages in
the amount of $1,100.00 was entered in favor of Plaintiff and against
Defendant. (See Judgment;
Statement of Decisionp.5:15-17). The
Court’s Statement of Decision indicates that attorneys’ fees will be awarded
pursuant to a duly noticed motion and costs will be awarded pursuant to a
memorandum of costs. (See
Statement of Decision p.5:18-23).
On 5/23/22, Plaintiff filed and served its Memorandum of
Costs seeking costs in the total amount of $28,922.86. On 6/15/22, Plaintiff filed and served the
instant motion seeking the following orders, pursuant to Civil Code 5975(c) and
Civil Code 1717(a): (1) determining that Plaintiff Cross Creek Village
Homeowners Association is the prevailing party in this civil lawsuit against
Defendant Alexander Cvetkovich, (2) awarding attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff as
the prevailing party in this civil lawsuit in the amount of $291,684.50 against
Defendant, (3) awarding costs to Plaintiff as the prevailing party in this
civil lawsuit in the amount of $28,922.86 against Defendant, and (4) amending
the Judgment entered on May 13, 2022, to include the award of attorneys’ fees
and costs in the total amount of $320,607.36.
Defendant has filed an untimely opposition to the motion.
It is not clear whether Plaintiff is claiming that it did
not timely receive the opposition. The
reply concedes the opposition was due by 8/17/22. (See Reply p.1:10). The proofs of service attached to the
opposition documents indicate that they were served by email on 8/17/22,
although they were not filed until 8/22/22 and 8/23/22. (See Proofs of Service attached to
Opposition documents). Plaintiff never
specifically states that the opposition was not timely served or received by
Plaintiff, but Plaintiff does claim that it only had one day to review the opposition
and draft the reply which implies that the opposition was not timely received. (See Reply p.1:6-15). The ruling on the motion would be the same
with or without consideration of the opposition. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff was
not prejudiced by the late-filed documents.
Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s Requests for Judicial Notice
(RJN) are granted.
Plaintiff’s Governing Documents include its Declaration
of Restrictions Covenants (CC&Rs) which constitute a contract between
Plaintiff and its members such as Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s CC&Rs provide that the prevailing party in a lawsuit to
enforce the CC&Rs is entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees and
costs. (Plaintiff’s RJN, Ex.4 pp.58-59).
Civil Code 5975(c) provides that “[i]n an action to
enforce the governing documents, the prevailing party shall be awarded
reasonable attorney's fees and costs.”
Civil Code 1717(a) provides, in relevant part:
In any action on a contract, where
the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are
incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the
parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be
the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party
specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's
fees in addition to other costs.
. . .
Reasonable attorney's fees shall be
fixed by the court, and shall be an element of the costs of suit.
The Davis-Stirling Act (Civil Code 4000, et seq.) does
not define “prevailing party.” Champir,
LLC (2021) 66 CA5th 583, 590. Under
California law, “[t]he analysis of who is a prevailing party under the fee-shifting
provisions of the Act focuses on who prevailed ‘on a practical level’ by
achieving its main litigation objectives.”
Id. citing Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Association
(2016) 2 CA5th 252, 260. The test for
determining who is the prevailing party is a “pragmatic one, namely whether a
party prevailed on a practical level by achieving its main litigation
objectives.” Almanor Lakeside Villas
Owners Association (2016) 246 CA4th 761, 773; See also Castro
(2004) 116 CA4th 1010, 1020; Hsu (1995) 9 C4th 863, 877.
Similarly, in determining who is the prevailing party
under Civil Code Section 1717, “the trial court is to compare the relief
awarded on the contract claim or claims with the parties’ demands on those same
claims and their litigation objectives as disclosed by the pleadings, trial
briefs, opening statements, and similar sources.” Cussler (2012) 212 CA4th 356, 366
citing Hsu, 9 Cal.4th at 876. The
trial court has “discretion in determining who, if anyone, is the prevailing
party for purposes of attorney fees.” Id.
citing Blickman Turkus, LP (2008) 162 CA4th 858, 894. “[A] party who obtains an unqualified victory
on a contract dispute … is entitled as a matter of law to be considered the
prevailing party for purposes of section 1717.”
DisputeSuite.com, LLC (2017) 2 C5th 968, 973.
CCP 1032(a)(4) provides:
“Prevailing party” includes the
party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is
entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief,
and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief
against that defendant. If any party recovers other than monetary relief
and in situations other than as specified, the “prevailing party” shall be as
determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its
discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may
apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to
rules adopted under Section 1034.
CCP 1033(a) provides:
Costs or any portion of claimed
costs shall be as determined by the court in its discretion in a case other
than a limited civil case in accordance with Section 1034 where the
prevailing party recovers a judgment that could have been rendered in a limited
civil case.
See also Dorman
(1995) 35 CA4th 1808, 1815; Steele (1997) 59 CA4th 326.
COSTS
Pursuant to the Court’s Statement of Decision, Plaintiff
was awarded court costs pursuant to a memorandum of costs. (See Statement of Decision, p.5:21-23);
CCP 1032(b). As noted above, Plaintiff
filed and served its memorandum of costs on 5/23/22. If Defendant wanted to challenge those costs,
Defendant was required to file and serve a properly noticed and timely motion
to strike or tax such costs. See
CRC 3.1700(b). Defendant did not timely file
and serve such a motion. Therefore, the Court
finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover its costs as set forth in its
memorandum of costs.
ATTORNEY FEES
Based on CCP 1033(a) which, as noted above, gives the
Court discretion to determine costs, or any portion of claimed costs (i.e.,
attorney fees), where the prevailing party recovers a judgment that could have
been rendered in a limited civil case and the above-cited case law regarding
the determination of the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorneys’
fees under Civil Code 5957 and Civil Code 1717, the Court finds that an award
of attorneys’ fees in not warranted in this case.
The judgment of $1,100.00 in damages awarded to Plaintiff
in this case is nowhere near the $25,000.00 jurisdictional limit of this court
and could have been obtained in a limited civil case.
Plaintiff contends that it “filed this lawsuit to compel
Defendant to stop harassing then-Association employee Kodi Mattox.” (See Notice of Motion, p.2:2-3; See
also Motion p.13:14-17). The Court
recognizes that the permanent injunctive relief requested by Plaintiff in its
complaint could not have been obtained in limited jurisdiction. However, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion,
while its complaint did mention Defendant’s harassment of its manager (Kodi
Mattox), such harassment was not the only conduct Plaintiff complained about in
its complaint. Plaintiff also alleged
that Defendant had angrily confronted neighbors and visitors, and accused contractors
and vendors of fraud, incompetence, dishonesty and conspiracy. (See Complaint ¶¶17-19). With regard to the injunctive relief sought,
Plaintiff specifically sought a “permanent injunction to prevent Defendants
from contacting the Association’s vendors and threatening them and defaming the
Association and its officers and directors” and/or a “permanent injunction
preventing Defendants from communicating with or giving instructions to vendors
of the Association, or from making false and defamatory statements to third
parties about the Association or its directors.” (See Compl. ¶22, Prayer
¶9). Plaintiff’s complaint did not
specifically seek an injunction preventing harassment of its manager by Defendant.
Even if injunctive relief protecting Kodi Mattox had been
sought in the complaint and even though such injunctive relief was no longer
available at the time of trial because Mattox was no longer employed by
Plaintiff, Plaintiff fails to address the fact that it also failed to obtain the
injunctive relief sought regarding the other conduct complained of in the
complaint. (See Compl. ¶¶17-19,
22, Prayer ¶9; Motion p.13:14-28). Therefore,
Plaintiff’s claim that because it “obtained a monetary judgment against
Defendant for violation of its Governing Documents, [it] achieved the aims of
its litigation and is the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorneys’
fees and costs” is without merit. (See
Notice of Motion, p.2:3-5). If obtaining
the $1,100.00 in damages was Plaintiff’s main objective in bringing this
action, Plaintiff should have filed a limited civil action, if not a small
claims action, against Defendant.
Even if the Court found that Plaintiff was entitled to
recover attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party on the 2nd cause of
action, the amount of fees requested is grossly excessive warranting denial of
the claim altogether. See Serrano
(Serrano IV) (1982) 32 C3d 621, 635; Meister (1998) 67 CA4th 437, 447-448.
CONCLUSION
With regard to the orders requested by Plaintiff:
As to requests 1 and 3: Pursuant to CCP 1033(a), the
Court determines that Plaintiff is the prevailing party entitled to recover its
costs, other than attorneys’ fees.
Plaintiff is awarded $28,922.86 pursuant to its memorandum of costs.
As to request 2: Pursuant to CCP 1033(a), the Court
awards Plaintiff no attorneys’ fees.
As to request 4: The Judgment will be amended to include
an award of costs in the amount of $28,922.86.