Judge: Michael C. Kelley, Case: 20AVCV00816, Date: 2022-08-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20AVCV00816    Hearing Date: August 30, 2022    Dept: A15

Background

This premises liability action was filed by Plaintiff Randy Arkey against Defendants City of Lancaster, County of Los Angeles, Damon Donald Halliday, and Cindy Ann Halliday. Plaintiff alleges he was in the yard of the real property located at 1141 W Jackson Street, in the city of Lancaster, when a large branch from a nearby tree fell onto him.

Plaintiff filed the operative complaint on November 12, 2020. He alleges two causes of action for (1) premises liability and (2) negligence. Defendant City of Lancaster filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Defendants County of Los Angeles, Damon Donald Halliday, and Cindy Ann Halliday. Defendants Damon Donald Halliday and Cindy Ann Halliday (collectively, the “Hallidays”) filed answers to Plaintiff’s Complaint and to City of Lancaster’s Cross-Complaint, as well as their own cross-complaint against City of Lancaster for (1) indemnification, (2) apportionment of fault, and (3) declaratory relief.

Defendant County of Los Angeles has not appeared, and there is no indication it has been served.

City of Lancaster timely filed and served the instant Motion for Summary Judgment to Plaintiff’s Complaint and the Hallidays’ Cross-Complaints on June 14, 2022. No oppositions were filed.

Plaintiff dismissed his complaint as to City of Lancaster on July 18, 2022, rendering the Motion for Summary Judgment partially moot.

Analysis

Motion for Summary Judgment— A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).)  To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (c).)  

Here, City of Lancaster moves for summary judgment to Plaintiff’s complaint, which is now moot; and for summary judgment to the Hallidays’ cross-complaint, which consists of causes of action for (1) indemnification, (2) apportionment of fault, and (3) a declaratory judgment stating City of Lancaster is obligated to indemnify them for their responsible portion of damages.

Claims for Indemnification, Apportionment of Fault, and Declaratory Relief

Before dismissing City of Lancaster, Plaintiff had asserted causes of action for premises liability and negligence. “The elements of a negligence cause of action are the existence of a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury. [Citation.] The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.” (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)

“The elements of a cause of action for indemnity are (1) a showing of fault on the part of the indemnitor and (2) resulting damages to the indemnitee for which the indemnitor is contractually or equitably responsible.” (Expressions at Rancho Niguel Ass'n v. Ahmanson Developments, Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1139.)

“Equitable indemnity principles govern the allocation of loss or damages among multiple tortfeasors whose liability for the underlying injury is joint and several . . . Under comparative indemnity principles, a full range of allocations is possible, from no indemnity to complete indemnity for the amounts paid by the indemnitee.” (Expressions at Rancho Niguel Ass'n v. Ahmanson Developments, Inc., supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at 1139–1140.)

Here, City of Lancaster argues it is not liable for Plaintiff’s premises liability and negligence claims, and is therefore not liable to the Hallidays under theories of equitable indemnity and apportionment. It argues it is not liable for premises liability or negligence because it had no duty to maintain or warn of the tree; and it had no duty to maintain or warn of the tree because the tree is located on private, rather than municipal property.

City of Lancaster has produced undisputed evidence that the tree whose branch fell onto Plaintiff is not on City of Lancaster’s property. It has produced the declaration of its Landscape Maintenance District Coordinator, Jason Palumbo, who attests that the subject tree is “on private property.” (Decl.  Palumbo Supp. Mot. Summ. Judg. ¶ 7.)

None of the parties have raised any disagreement with this. Thus, City of Lancaster has sufficiently shown it had no control over or responsibility for the property on which the tree was located, and therefore there is no triable issue of fact as to whether it had a duty to maintain or warn of the tree. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot show City of Lancaster’s liability for his claims, and in fact dismissed City of Lancaster. Therefore, the Hallidays cannot show City of Lancaster is liable to them for indemnity or apportionment of fault for Plaintiff’s injuries. Similarly, the Hallidays are not entitled to the declaratory relief they requested.

Conclusion