Judge: Michael C. Kelley, Case: 20AVUD00259, Date: 2022-09-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20AVUD00259 Hearing Date: September 14, 2022 Dept: A15
Background
This unlawful detainer action was filed by Plaintiff Dansen Lee against Defendants De Ann Johnson and Christa Hicks regarding the residential property located at 38424 Wakefield Place, Palmdale, CA 93551. According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a 1-year rental agreement that began on July 15, 2018. (Compl. ¶ 6.) A monthly rent of $2,550.00 was due on the first day of each month of the rental term. (Ibid.) According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendants owe unpaid rent in the amount of $2,550.00 for the month of April 2022, as well as the monthly rent thereafter.
Plaintiff served a 3-day notice to pay rent or quit on April 16, 2022, but Defendants did not comply. Plaintiff therefore filed the operative Complaint on April 22, 2022.
Defendants filed a Notice of Removal to Federal Court on June 7, 2022, but the case was remanded back to this Court. The Court then denied Defendants’ Motion to Quash Service of Summons. (Min. Ord., dated Jul. 13, 2022.)
Defendants filed the instant Demurrer in propria persona on July 22, 2022. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.
Analysis
Demurrer—Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1170, the defendants to an action for possession of real property may demur to the complaint. A defendant may demur on several grounds, including the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (e).)
“In determining whether or not the complaint is sufficient, as against the demurrer upon the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the rule is that if, upon a consideration of all the facts stated, it appears that the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants, the complaint will be held good . . . .” (Matteson v. Wagoner (1905) 147 Cal. 739, 742.) The demurrer,
admits all material facts that are properly pleaded. Generally, material facts alleged in the complaint are treated as true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. [Citation.] Also taken as true are facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. [Citations.] . . . . In short, the ruling on a demurrer determines a legal issue on the basis of assumed facts, i.e., those properly alleged in the complaint, regardless of whether they ultimately prove to be true.
(C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062.)
Here, Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff’s three-day notice to pay rent or quit was deficient, and (2) Defendants had a pending application for rental assistance.
Sufficiency of Three-Day Notice
According to Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, a tenant is “guilty of unlawful detainer” when “the tenant continues in possession . . . without the permission of the landlord . . . after default in the payment of rent, pursuant to the lease or agreement under which the property is held,” after being given three days' notice of the amount that must be paid. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161.)
The three days’ notice must state, in writing, “the amount that is due, the name, telephone number, and address of the person to whom the rent payment shall be made,” and the methods by which the tenants may pay the landlord. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161(2).)
The policy behind requiring the three-day notice to state the amount due is to ensure that the tenant is “given the proper opportunity to cure and prevent an unlawful detainer action.” (Bevill v. Zoura (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 694, 698.) “[F]airness requires that the landlord demand the precise sum due, so that the tenant will know what he must do to avoid the forfeiture.” (Budaef v. Huber (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 12, 18.)
Here, Defendants argue Plaintiff has insufficiently alleged his cause of action because his three-day notice to pay rent or quit did not “contain the information required by Code of Civil Procedure § 1161(2),” and “overstates the amount of rent due . . . .” (Defs. Demurrer at 2.) Specifically, they argue that the notice stated they owed $2,550.00; and Plaintiff has lodged a copy of the notice, which indeed states that Defendants owe $2,550.00 for the period between April 1 and April 30, 2022. (Compl. at Ex. 2 [PDF p. 12].)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff had actually increased their rent to $2,750.00 beginning on January 1, 2022. Therefore, the three-day notice should have reflected this amount. According to Defendants, the fact that the notice instead states $2,550.00 means the notice is deficient. Defendants allege that Plaintiff told them he only demanded $2,550.00 because he realized the rent increase had not been properly served, and was therefore ineffective. Thus, he was legally only entitled to $2,550.00 for the month of April 2022.
Typically, Section 1161’s requirement to state the “amount that is due” is asserted as a defense to an unlawful detainer when the plaintiff overstates the amount owed. Here, it is the opposite—Defendants argue they owe more than what Plaintiff has demanded. In support of this argument, Defendants have lodged a copy of a notice of rent increase, in which Plaintiff indeed states the rent will be increased to $2,750.00 as of January 1, 2022. (Defs. Demurrer at Ex. 4 [PDF p. 16].)
Plaintiff, having failed to oppose this demurrer, does not direct the Court to any relevant authority, nor is the Court aware of any cases which address whether a notice is deficient if it demands less than what the tenants believe they owe. The case law has only invalidated notices which demanded more than what was lawfully owed. (Levitz Furniture Co. v. Wingtip Communications, Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1035; Bevill v. Zoura, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 694; Johnson v. Sanches (1942) 56 Cal.App.2d 115.)
But, considering that the purpose of the three-day notice requirement is to give tenants the opportunity to cure their deficiency, and the subject notice demands exactly the amount Plaintiff would have been entitled to in order to cure the deficiency, the requirement’s purpose appears to have been satisfied. In fact, if it is true that Plaintiff’s notice of rent increase was only served via email, then the increase to $2,750.00 was indeed unlawful. Civil Code section 827 requires notices of rent increases to be either delivered personally or served by mail; they are not effective when emailed. (Civ. Code, § 827, subd. (b)(1).) Had Plaintiff demanded the new amount of $2,750.00—as Defendants argue he should have—the three-day notice would have demanded an amount in excess of the rent Plaintiff is legally entitled to. This is definitively unlawful, and therefore insufficient to support an unlawful detainer.
Thus, as Plaintiff is only entitled to $2,550.00 in rent, then he was correct to demand only that amount. Contrary to Defendants’ argument, Plaintiff’s notice would have been defective if he had demanded the $2,750.00. Therefore, Plaintiff’s three-day notice actually provided the correct information, and is sufficient to support the unlawful detainer.
Applicability of COVID Relief Laws
Defendants also argue they are protected from eviction under A.B. 2179, which, according to Defendants, prohibits evictions when a tenant’s rental assistance application is still pending.
A.B. 2179 amended the Code of Civil Procedure to “require, prior to the court issuing a summons under these provisions, a plaintiff to file a statement, under penalty of perjury, that a determination is not pending on an application, filed prior to April 1, 2022, for government rental assistance to cover any part of the rental debt demanded from the defendants in the case.” (Assem. Bill No. 2179 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.).) It specifically amended Code of Civil Procedure section 1179.11 to prohibit the issuance of a summons on a complaint for unlawful detainer based on failure to pay rent, between October 1, 2021 and July 1, 2022, unless the complaint includes a statement from the plaintiff verifying the applicability of one of four scenarios regarding applications for rental assistance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1179.11, subd. (a).)
The Court surmises Defendants’ argument (that evictions are prohibited while a rental assistance application is pending) is a reference to the fourth scenario, which requires a landlord to verify that “a determination is not pending on an application, filed prior to April 1, 2022, for government rental assistance to cover any part of the rental debt demanded from the defendants in the case.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1179.11, subd. (a)(4).)
Defendants interpret this provision to mean that, if a timely application for rental assistance was still pending, the tenant may not be evicted. (Defs. Demurrer at 3.) They therefore argue that they “were not in violation of ANY contractual obligations to Plaintiff to perform a rent obligation due to a pending application of rent relief . . . .” (Id. at 2.) They argue that their rental assistance application is still pending because Plaintiff needs to provide them with a rent statement. (Id. at 3.) They have indeed lodged a “Verification of Program Participation,” indicating that they applied for rental assistance, and said application is pending. (Id. at Ex. 2 [PDF p. 10].)
However, this statute is not applicable to the instant matter because it only applies to a pending application when said application is for “government rental assistance to cover any part of the rental debt demanded from the defendants in this case.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1179.11, subd. (a)(4).) As Defendants’ own exhibit indicates, the rental assistance program ended on March 31, 2022: their printout of the COVID-19 Rent Relief Program Portal indicates that the relief program closed on March 31, 2022, “[i]n accordance with SB 115.” (Defs. Demurrer [PDF p. 11].) Since the program closed on March 31, 2022, it is factually impossible for Defendants to have a pending application for assistance with regard to rental debt incurred after March 31, 2022
Here, Plaintiff is only demanding rent from April 1, 2022 and beyond; he is not demanding any rent incurred prior to April 1, 2022. While Defendants do have a pending application, their application is for assistance with rental debt that they incurred prior to April 1, 2022. Their pending application, therefore, is irrelevant to Plaintiff’s attempt to collect rental debt incurred on and after April 1, 2022. Thus, Defendants’ pending application is not a reason to sustain their demurrer to the unlawful detainer.
(Though unnecessary to its ruling, the Court addresses Defendants’ allegation that their rental assistance application has been left pending because Plaintiff has failed to provide a rent statement: according to Defendants’ own Exhibit 5, Plaintiff emailed a ledger to Defendants on July 13, 2022 with the amounts due between July 1, 2021 to July 1, 2022. (Defs. Demurrer at Ex. 5 [PDF pp. 17-18].) Thus, Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff has wrongfully prevented the approval of their application is false.)
Sufficiency of Service of Summons
Defendants also commit a large portion of their memorandum to attacking the sufficiency of the service of summons and complaint. The Court already ruled on this issue when it denied Defendants’ Motion to Quash. It therefore declines to engage with Defendants’ attempt to relitigate this issue.
Conclusion
Defendants have raised two grounds for their assertion that Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state sufficient facts to constitute an unlawful detainer: that Plaintiff’s three-day notice to pay rent or quit was deficient, and that Plaintiff cannot evict Defendants while an application for rental assistance is pending. Neither ground has merit. Plaintiff’s three-day notice was, in fact, sufficient; and a pending rental assistance application will only preclude an unlawful detainer that pertains to the same rental debt the application sought assistance for—which is not the case here, as Defendants’ application pertains to pre-April 2022 rental debt.
Therefore, Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1167.3, Defendants must file their answer within five days.