Judge: Michael D. Washington, Case: 37-2021-00019499-CU-BC-NC, Date: 2024-03-22 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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SOUTH BUILDING TENTATIVE RULINGS - March 21, 2024

03/22/2024  01:30:00 PM  N-31 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Michael D Washington

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Civil - Unlimited  Breach of Contract/Warranty Motion Hearing (Civil) 37-2021-00019499-CU-BC-NC LOPEZ VS ECOM CAPITAL INC [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Amended Motion, 02/08/2024

There are three motions on-calendar in this matter: two crossing motions for attorney fees, and one motion to tax costs. Each will be addressed, in turn, below.

Disposition of All Three Motions The Motion for Attorney Fees brought by plaintiff/cross-defendant Alejandro Lopez (Plaintiff or Lopez) is GRANTED in the amount of $68,402.08 (for attorney fees) and $20,362.25 (for costs).

The Motion for Attorney Fees brought by defendant Jessica DeGennaro (DeGennaro) is DENIED An appearance is necessary on the Motion to Tax Costs brought by Mr. Lopez to discuss the viability of the 'unity of interest' doctrine, and, if it is not viable, the best methods for conducting an apportionment analysis with regard to the remaining costs.

Factual Background This is a business dispute regarding the sale of succulents and cacti. There are two businesses involved in the dispute. The first is the business that actually grows the succulents and cacti, which is Valley Center Lopez Cactus & Succulents, which is a fictitious business name for plaintiff Alejandro Lopez (hereinafter, Plaintiff, Lopez, or the Cactus Business). The other business is an online retailer that markets and sells succulents and cacti primarily (though not necessarily exclusively) via Amazon. That online retailed is defendant Ecom Capital, Inc. (Ecom). The evidence indicates that Ecom is under the primary control of defendant Jessica DeGennaro (DeGennaro).

The facts indicate that the two businesses had an existing relationship prior to the events that gave rise to this lawsuit. That relationship was of buyer and seller. The Cactus Business, i.e. Lopez, would grow the succulents and Ecom would purchase them in large quantities to fill the orders that Ecom took online. Back in those days, though Ecom came to be a large client, the Cactus Business continued to sell to other buyers as well – Ecom was not its only client.

However, Ecom's online business appears to have grown rapidly and exponentially, such that Ecom came to have larger and larger demands for succulent products. It appears, however, that Mr. Lopez had limited capacity to continue meeting these growing demands. It is out of these changing market conditions that the parties appear to have begun negotiations that would alter their business relationship with an eye toward increasing the capacity of Mr. Lopez' output so that it could meet the growing demands of Ecom. Another apparent motivation for changing the business relationship, was Ecom's interest in cutting out any other buyers that Mr. Lopez might have so that Ecom could gain exclusive Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3091580 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  LOPEZ VS ECOM CAPITAL INC [IMAGED]  37-2021-00019499-CU-BC-NC rights to all of the succulent products Mr. Lopez could produce.

The negotiations appear to have taken place over a period of about six months and began in late 2018.

Ecom claimed that Mr. Lopez had people present during the negotiations who could translate for him and also that Ecom repeatedly offered to hire a lawyer for Mr. Lopez to review the contracts (and with Mr. Lopez purportedly turning that offer down). Ecom claimed that Mr. Lopez was able to negotiate the actual payments terms, as his ultimate consideration for the transaction was for a greater salary ($150,000.00 instead of the original $120,000.00 that was offered by Ecom) and a greater ownership stake in Ecom (15% instead of the original 10% that was offered by Ecom).

There also appeared to be specific negotiations over how taxes were to be handled, with Mr. Lopez indicating that he never drew a direct salary, per se, from the Cactus Business, but, rather, that he would simply draw money from the accounts of the Cactus Business as needed and file his personal taxes accordingly. Ecom claimed that its agent represented to Mr. Lopez that he could continue to make those types of draws from the 'business' accounts even after the transaction – a transaction in which it was contemplated that Ecom would buy the Cactus Business. This, of course, would change the tax nature of such draws, as moving money from a business account owned by Ecom and into a personal account owned by Mr. Lopez would trigger different tax consequences from previously when Mr. Lopez was effectively moving money around between accounts that he owned individually or as a sole proprietor. It appears that during negotiations, Mr. Lopez indicated that he did not want to be responsible for any business taxes – he wanted Ecom to handle business taxes going forward. In fact, according to Ecom, Mr. Lopez did not even want to receive certain tax forms. In any event, the parties appear to have discussed an alternative to actually having Mr. Lopez own shares in Ecom – the use of 'phantom stock.' According to Black's Law Dictionary, a 'phantom stock plan' is defined as '[a] long-term benefit plan under which a corporate employee is given units having the same characteristics as the employer's stock shares... It is termed a 'phantom' plan because the employee does not actually hold any shares but instead holds the right to the value of those shares.' Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), phantom stock plan. The parties ultimately signed an agreement, and Mr. Lopez did not dispute that he signed it –he disputed its enforceability and his understanding of the terms ultimately contained within the four corners of the agreement that was signed.

At a preliminary injunction hearing, this Court noted that: 'It appears to the Court at this stage and on this evidentiary record that there may have been a lack of meeting of the minds when the contract was signed, as it appears that Mr. Lopez was under the impression that he would be able to continue to operate as usual – i.e. would continue withdrawing money from what he thought of as his 'business' account and would continue growing out his business and producing succulents on a larger scale.' (ROA 40, p. 4.) Some of the confusion seemed to be in Mr. Lopez's understanding that, having sold his business to Ecom, Ecom would have priority in terms of the right to his (or rather its) products, when Mr.

Lopez's presumption was that he could continue to operate as usual – including to continue to sell his product to other buyers as well.

Mr. Lopez claimed that Ecom never paid him the $150,000.00 that he was allegedly owed as an annual 'salary,' that $165,000.00 was never deposited into 'his' business account within 24 hours as required by the contract, and that he never actually received 15% of the shares of Ecom. Ecom painted a different picture. Ecom claimed that it deposited $311,704.00 into what was previously Lopez's 'business' account (an account that, under the sale agreement would technically belong to Ecom now). It further claimed that Mr. Lopez received $300,000.00 out of that bank account – essentially by making bi-weekly or monthly withdrawals. Somewhat confusingly, despite the discussion regarding issuing Mr. Lopez a 'phantom stock plan,' Ecom claimed that it gave Lopez a 15% shareholder/ownership interest in Ecom, which was confusing because Ecom simultaneously claimed that Mr. Lopez did not want to deal with a K-1 form and that Ecom's tactic to satisfy Mr. Lopez' request during negotiations was to utilize a 'phantom stock plan' (which would mean Mr. Lopez would not actually receive any actual shares, just a right to equivalent value as if he had had shares). Ecom also then claimed that the ultimate agreement did not implement this 'phantom stock plan' – essentially going against Mr. Lopez' express wishes during the negotiations and reflecting additional concerns about whether the contract in question Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3091580 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  LOPEZ VS ECOM CAPITAL INC [IMAGED]  37-2021-00019499-CU-BC-NC accurately reflected a meeting of the minds of the parties. Mr. Lopez, for his part, claimed that he does not read or write English, such that he did not understand the terms of what he was signing – only the spoken and verbal terms of the agreement.

The agreement was signed in April 2019. For about two years thereafter, things went smoothly between the parties with Ecom making deposits to what was formerly Mr. Lopez' 'business' account (and with Mr.

Lopez giving Ecom the passwords to access that account) and with Mr. Lopez growing his business and producing increased product to Ecom. However, it eventually came to Ecom's attention that Mr. Lopez was continuing to make sales to other buyers on the side and, allegedly, pocketing the money for those sales for himself – not depositing them into the 'business' account that was now owned by Ecom.

This side-dealing action triggered Ecom, via its principal, Jessica DeGennaro, to attempt to take product from Mr. Lopez' locations – an act that Mr. Lopez characterized as theft, but that Ecom characterized as taking its own product since it fully owned Mr. Lopez' business. These events resulted in multiple incidents in which the Sheriff has been called to Mr. Lopez' business locations and in which Ms.

DeGennaro has attempted to serve 'letters' on employees who work at Mr. Lopez' business locations in an effort to put those employees on notice that they were assisting Mr. Lopez in a theft of product that allegedly belongs to Ecom.

Relevant Procedural History As noted in Mr. Lopez' opposition to one of the pending motions, 'each side was racing to court tile their lawsuits against each other,' and 'Plaintiff [Mr. Lopez] filed his action only a few days prior to Defendants filing their complaint in Riverside County. Plaintiff's action had priority and the two matters were consolidated in this one action. Defendants Riverside Complaint was then deemed the Cross-Complaint in this matter.' (ROA 192, p. 3:22-25.) Mr. Lopez filed the instant lawsuit on April 30, 2021 alleging the following causes of action against Ecom and DeGennaro: (1) breach of contract – damages (2) breach of contract – rescission (3) conversion (4) declaratory relief (5) temporary and permanent injunction (6) fraud and deceit (7) common counts The claims by Ecom that was consolidated into the instant action as a cross-complaint included the following: (1) breach of contract – agreement (2) conversion (3) trespass to chattels (4) claim and delivery (replevin) (5) breach of fiduciary duty (6) unfair competition (7) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage (8) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage The case proceeded to trial in October of 2023. At the close of Plaintiff's case, DeGennaro made a motion for nonsuit. (ROA 125.) The Court granted that motion – thereby dismissing Ms. DeGennaro from the case. (ROA 129.) On November 6, 2023, the jury returned a verdict making the following (condensed) findings: Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3091580 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  LOPEZ VS ECOM CAPITAL INC [IMAGED]  37-2021-00019499-CU-BC-NC On Mr. Lopez's Complaint --in favor of Mr. Lopez and against Ecom for rescission of contract --in favor of Mr. Lopez and against Ecom for common counts ($101,831.50) --in favor of Ecom and against Mr. Lopez for conversion --in favor of DeGennaro and Ecom and against Mr. Lopez for fraud On Ecom's Cross-Complaint --in favor of Mr. Lopez and against Ecom on breach of contract --in favor or Mr. Lopez and against Ecom on conversion --in favor of Mr. Lopez and against Ecom on breach of fiduciary duty (ROA 139.) The Court thereafter entered judgment in accordance with the verdict.

Now, Mr. Lopez brings a motion seeking attorney fees on the contracts he successfully argued were rescinded. Conversely, Ms. DeGennaro seeks attorney fees on a theory that she prevailed in this case when nonsuit was entered in her favor. Ms. DeGennaro also seeks costs of suit (via a Memorandum of Costs she previously filed), and Mr. Lopez seeks to tax those costs.

Merits of Motion – Mr. Lopez' Request for Attorney Fees Mr. Lopez seeks attorney fees in the amount of $68,402.08 against Ecom. The proverbial 'elephant in the room' in this case is that there was virtually no daylight between the interests of Ecom and the interests of DeGennaro – the two were in complete alignment throughout this litigation, and, although there was no express allegation or finding of alter ego such that the parties remain technically separate, from a softer analysis in terms of motives, goals, a strategies in this lawsuit the interests of Ecom were the interests of DeGennaro and vice versa. Taking this view, the Court FINDS that the interests of DeGennero were ancillary in this lawsuit – in much the way that an argument or claim can be made in the alternative of 'just in case.' Ultimately, however, because of the underlying plate tectonics of this case, Plaintiff sued both Ecom and DeGennaro.

In defending against the claim for attorney fees being made by Mr. Lopez, Ecom essentially concedes that Mr. Lopez is entitled to attorney fees from Ecom. As such, Ecom's only argument in defense against the claim for attorney fees is that Mr. Lopez is seeking all of his attorney fees incurred to litigate this action without parsing or apportioning those attorney fees that were incurred to litigate against DeGennaro. The Court does not find it necessary to apportion the attorney fees in this regard because the overall unity of interests between Ecom and DeGennaro make litigation against them almost entirely overlapping.

To the extent that there may have been some small amount of DeGennaro-specific litigation (such as an briefing or argument about the 'disclosed agent rule' whereby an agent (such as DeGennaro) cannot be liable for business of its principal (such as Ecom) when acting on behalf of that principal, the Court FINDS that such litigation was de minimis – amounting to approximately three hours of time to brief and argue the 'disclosed agent rule' at trial when the entirety of hours billed in this case was 253.97 (i.e.

about 0.0118% of the total hours incurred).

As such, the Court declines to reduce the award of attorney fees that Ecom owes to Mr. Lopez under Civil Code § 1717.

Merits of Motion – Ms. DeGennaro's Request for Attorney Fees Ms. DeGennaro seeks attorney fees in the amount of $171,032.50 against Mr. Lopez. From a technical perspective, Ms. DeGennaro was dismissed from this lawsuit and 'prevailed' in that sense. However, given the near-total alignment between the interests of Ms. DeGennaro and Ecom (which all parties agree was not the prevailing party in this action) additional unpacking is needed.

Ms. DeGennaro was sued for a number of causes of action, which, for clarity, bear repeating: Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3091580 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  LOPEZ VS ECOM CAPITAL INC [IMAGED]  37-2021-00019499-CU-BC-NC (1) breach of contract – damages (2) breach of contract – rescission (3) conversion (4) declaratory relief (5) temporary and permanent injunction (6) fraud and deceit (7) common counts Again, all of these causes of action were alleged against both Ecom and Ms. DeGennaro, so Ecom, which is essentially Ms. DeGennaro's company that she owns and controls, had to incur litigation expenses to defend these claims anyway. There is almost nothing to indicate legal fees that were incurred uniquely to research and litigate the claims against Ms. DeGennaro only (other than, as addressed above, the de minimis time to bring a motion for nonsuit on the 'disclosed agent rule' at trial).

Ms. DeGennaro's position is that because she was sued by Mr. Lopez for breach of a contract that contained an attorney fee clause, there is a reciprocity that now applies such that Mr. Lopez must honor the terms of the contract that he was claiming Ms. DeGennaro breached. Under Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 877: in determining litigation success, courts should respect substance rather than form, and to this extent should be guided by 'equitable considerations.' For example, a party who is denied direct relief on a claim may nonetheless be found to be prevailing party if it is clear that the party has otherwise achieved its main litigation objective.

From an equitable standpoint, the notion that Ms. DeGennaro should be considered the 'prevailing party' and entitled to $171,032.50 in attorney fees almost defies credulity. Ms. DeGennaro's interests in this lawsuit were completely aligned with those of her company, Ecom, and although she prevailed in a technical dismissal (because the contract at issue was between her company and Mr. Lopez and she was not a party to it), her company did not. The attorney fees that Ms. DeGennaro is seeking appear to be for all of the litigation that was done on behalf of her and her company, and, as the vast majority of that legal work was done on issues that Ecom would have had to do anyway, to award Ms. DeGennaro for those attorney fees would, in a de facto sense, be the equivalent of award attorney fees to the losing party since Ecom incurred the vast majority of the fees at issue to defend itself, and lost. As such, to the extent that the 'prevailing party' inquiry allows for equitable analysis, the Court does not FIND Ms.

DeGennaro to be a 'prevailing party.' She is a 'technical' prevailing party, but not an equitable one.

On the technical issue, Ms. DeGennaro cites the case of Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 877 for the proposition that a 'simple, unqualified win' removes much of a trial court's discretion when it come to determining the prevailing party. The Court does not find Ms. DeGennaro's 'win' to be one that is 'simple' or 'unqualified' due to the linkage of interests between her company, Ecom, and her own interests. Nevertheless, to the extent that Ms. DeGennaro is to be treated as an entirely separate entity – i.e. if equitable considerations are to be limited to only the claims between Ms. DeGennaro and Mr.

Lopez and not involving Ecom – then the result would be the same.

Simply put, even if Ms. DeGennaro were to be determined to be the 'prevailing party' as between herself and Mr. Lopez due to the technical nature of her dismissal from the case on nonsuit, her own argument in the related attorney fees motion by Mr. Lopez is that attorney fees must be apportioned. As set forth above, the Court FINDS that the portion of the attorney fees incurred to litigate as to Ms.

DeGennaro only were de minimis. Despite that de minimis nature, Ms. DeGennaro seeks to combine all attorney fees and requests that Mr. Lopez pay an excessive amount of $171,032.50. This number is egregious and almost shocks the conscience in this context.

First, Mr. Lopez' own attorney fees to litigate this matter only totaled $68,402.08, which means it cost Mr.

Lopez about $0.40 on the dollar to litigate this case as compared to how much it cost Ms. DeGennaro and Ecom to litigate theirs. That alone makes Ms. DeGennaro's request well out of proportion and Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3091580 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  LOPEZ VS ECOM CAPITAL INC [IMAGED]  37-2021-00019499-CU-BC-NC unreasonable. Second, the amount of the jury verdict in this case was $101,831.50. While there are times when it is appropriate that legal fees eclipse the amount in controversy in the underlying lawsuit, there is something unique about when these two numbers (Mr. Lopez' legal bills and the underlying judgment against Ecom) are combined: they add up to $170,233.58 – a number that is surprisingly close to the $171,032.50 that Ms. DeGennaro now seeks in legal fees. To put it directly, Ms. DeGennaro's failure to apportion strikes the Court as a thinly-veiled attempt at a 'backdoor win' in this lawsuit – an effort to wipe out all of Mr. Lopez' wins. The Court does not necessarily find the amount sought by Ms.

DeGennaro for attorney fees to be credible – and that is all the more so in light of Ms. DeGennaro's failure to apportion the attorney fees she incurred versus the attorney fees Ecom incurred.

To be clear, the Court is mindful that in the above motion by Mr. Lopez it concluded that apportionment was not necessary by Mr. Lopez to parse out the work that was done on claims against Ecom from work that was done on claims against Ms. DeGennaro. This was because the Court FINDS that the legal work as to Ms. DeGennaro only was de minimis. In stark contrast, of the attorney fees sought by Ms.

DeGennaro, the failure to apportion is exactly the opposite – the work done as to Ms. DeGennaro was de minimis such that her failure to apportion results in a request that is vastly greater than what would be appropriate even if she were held to be the 'prevailing party.' Mindful of this technicality, however, the Court notes the following authority: If... the Court were required to award a reasonable fee when an ... unreasonable one has been asked for, claimants would be encouraged to make unreasonable demands, knowing that the only unfavorable consequences of such misconduct would be reduction of their fee to what they should have asked in the first place. To discourage such greed, a severer reaction is needful... Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635.

In the instant fee request by Ms. DeGennaro, even if she were technically the 'prevailing party' from a technical standpoint, such that she is entitled to the de minimis amount of time required to litigate those issues that were unique to her and that did not overlap with Ecom, her request for such high attorney fees is so unreasonable that under the authority set forth in the Serrano case, a 'severer reaction' would be 'needful' and that 'severer reaction' would be to reduce the relatively minor attorney fees that were incurred to litigate her unique matters down to zero.

Merits of Motion – Mr. Lopez' Request to Tax Costs 'Even though contract-based attorney fees are 'costs' (see CCP § 1033.5(a)(10)), it is critical to recognize that the determination of the 'prevailing party' for purposes of CCP § 1032 (the costs statute) is not the same as the determination of the 'party prevailing on the contract' under Civil Code § 1717.' Pearl, California Attorney Fee Awards (3d ed Cal. CEB) § 4.68. Thus, the analysis above with regard to 'prevailing party' does not necessarily apply to the costs issue (as opposed to the attorney fees issued).

Ms. DeGennaro again asserts that she is the prevailing party in this action and sought her costs by appropriately and timely filing a Memorandum of Costs. (ROA 144.) In said Memorandum of Costs, Ms.

DeGennaro seeks $13,259.98. Mr. Lopez now moves to tax those costs on two grounds: (1) that Ms.

DeGennaro is, again, not the 'prevailing party' for purposes of costs, and (2) that even if she is, the costs she that overlap between her and Ecom should be taxed.

With regard to the 'prevailing party' analysis, Mr. Lopez argues that Ms. DeGennaro does not qualify as a 'prevailing party' under the costs statute, which provides as follows: (4) 'Prevailing party' includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the 'prevailing party' shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3091580 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  LOPEZ VS ECOM CAPITAL INC [IMAGED]  37-2021-00019499-CU-BC-NC rules adopted under Section 1034. (Code of Civil Procedure § 1032(a)(4) (bold added).) As such, Ms. DeGennaro is a 'prevailing party' under the costs statute. However: Where coparties jointly incurred costs and fewer than all coparties prevail at the conclusion of trial, the court must apportion costs between the parties based on the reason the costs were incurred and whether the costs were reasonably necessary to the prevailing coparties' conduct of the litigation. The court may not simply divide the total costs jointly incurred by all coparties by the number of prevailing coparties.

(Fairbank, et al., California Practice Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence (The Rutter Group, 2023) ¶ 17:279, citing Charton v. Harkey (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 730, 743-745.) Denial of costs to prevailing codefendant having 'unity of interest' with nonprevailing codefendants? The prior version of CCP § 1032 contained language that evolved into the 'unity of interest' concept: Where jointly represented codefendants presented a unified defense and fewer than all codefendants prevailed, the court had discretion to deny costs to the prevailing defendants. This language was omitted when § 1032 was repealed and replace in 1986 as part of a major overhaul of the statutes governing recovery of costs. Consequently, courts still disagree on whether the 'unity of interest' concept remains viable. (Fairbank, et al., California Practice Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence (The Rutter Group, 2023) ¶ 17:280 (string citation omitted).) Given the lack of clarity as to the status of the viability of the 'unity of interest' doctrine in this area of law, an appearance is necessary to discuss the following: --for each party to argue, as necessary, whether or not the 'unity of interest' doctrine remains viable (in which case, in light of the above analysis on the other two pending motions it should be relatively clear that the Court would be inclined to hold that the doctrine applies as between Ecom and Ms. DeGennaro) --in the alternative, if the Court concludes that the 'unity of interest' doctrine is no longer viable, for each party to discuss an appropriate method for the Court to conduct an apportionment analysis.

To that end, Ms. DeGennaro is ORDERED to bring a copy of a breakdown of the supporting documentation for her costs (or to email such to Mr. Lopez' counsel the morning of the hearing if her counsel intends to appear remotely), the case will be called early on the calendar, and the parties will be directed to engage in meet and confer regarding the precise costs that are to be apportioned. The guiding light of such analysis will be that those costs that those costs that Ms. DeGennaro did not incur for herself (such as any costs at trial after she was dismissed) must be taxed; those costs that were incurred on behalf of Ms. DeGennaro and Ecom equally must be split 50-50; and those costs that were incurred solely for Ms. DeGennaro shall not be taxed at all. As to the 50-50 split, the Court is mindful of the authority cited above that '[t]he court may not simply divide the total costs jointly incurred by all coparties by the number of prevailing coparties' (Fairbank, et al., California Practice Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence (The Rutter Group, 2023) ¶ 17:279, citing Charton v. Harkey (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 730, 743-745 (emphasis added)), but after parsing out those costs that were uniquely for Ms. DeGennaro and those costs that were uniquely for Ecom, a 50-50 split of the remainder is not a 'simple' across-the-board split and thus is not improper.

Finally, the Court notes that of the $13,259.98 in total costs that Ms. DeGennaro seeks, Mr. Lopez has already indicated a willingness to pay $5,043.67, such that the difference between the parties is $8,216.31. As such, the Court intends to keep the procedure for allocating said costs economical and anticipates that a short meet and confer, with the aid of this Court's guidance above and the proffer of supporting documents, should result in the parties either reaching agreement on the final apportionment of costs, or the parties being able to bring to the Court a pared-down itemized list of costs to discuss when the matter is recalled at the end of the law and motion calendar.

Unless the ruling(s) above indicate that an appearance is necessary, parties who wish to submit, who are satisfied with the above tentative ruling(s), and/or who do not otherwise wish to argue Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3091580 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  LOPEZ VS ECOM CAPITAL INC [IMAGED]  37-2021-00019499-CU-BC-NC the motion(s) are encouraged to give notice to the Court and each other of their intention not to appear.

Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

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