Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 18STCV08834, Date: 2022-10-26 Tentative Ruling


Case Number: 18STCV08834    Hearing Date: October 26, 2022    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPARTMENT

32

HEARING DATE

October 26, 2022

CASE NUMBER

18STCV08834

MOTION 

Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative Motion for Summary Adjudication

MOVING PARTY

Defendant Amazon.com Services LLC

OPPOSING PARTY

Plaintiff Jose Magana Jr.

 

MOVING PAPERS:

 

  1. Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication
  2. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication
  3. Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication
  4. Notice of Lodgment
  5. Declaration of Melissa Harly Rose
  6. Declaration of Clarice Cohn

 

OPPOSITION PAPERS:

 

  1. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Summary Judgment Motion, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of Issues
  2. Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement of Disputed and Undisputed and Additional Material Facts
  3. Declaration of Compendium of Evidence in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication (Declaration of Jose Magana Jr., Declaration Harry Kaloustian, Exhibits)

 

REPLY PAPERS:

  1. Reply in Support of Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

  2. Response to Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement of Material Facts

  3. Evidentiary Objections Plaintiffs’ Evidence

  4. Declaration of Stephanie Habben in Support of Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections to Plaintiff’s Evidence

BACKGROUND

 

On December 17, 2018, Plaintiffs Jose Magana, Jr., Paloma Magana, and Jose Carmel Magana (collectively, Plaintiffs) sued Defendant BlueDot Trading, LLC based on an incident in which Plaintiff Jose Magana Jr. lacerated his hand due to an alleged defect in a Defendant BlueDot Trading, LLC product purchased through the Defendant Amazon.com Services, LLC’s (Moving Defendant) marketplace.  On May 10, 2021, Plaintiffs amended the complaint by substituting Moving Defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant.

 

Moving Defendant moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, on Plaintiffs’ complaint. Plaintiffs oppose the motion and Moving Defendant replies to the opposition.

 

LEGAL STANDARDS –SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

 

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Ibid.)  

 

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.  Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”  (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)  Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.”  (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].) 

 

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty if that party contends that there is no merit to the cause of action, defense, or claim for damages, or if the party contends that there is no duty owed.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)  “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”  (Ibid.)  A cause of action has no merit if: (1) one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established, even if that element is separately pleaded, or (2) a defendant establishes an affirmative defense to that cause of action.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (n); Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 583.)  Once the defendant has shown that a cause of action has no merit, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2); Union Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 583.) 

 

EVIDENCE

 

            With respect to Defendant’s evidentiary objections, the Court rules as follows:

 

  1. Sustained (Lack of Foundation)

  2. Overruled

  3. Sustained (Irrelevant)

  4. Sustained (Irrelevant)

  5. Sustained in part:  “BlueDot is its own separate, California entity” (Lack of Foundation).  Overruled as to the balance.

  6. Overruled

 

DISCUSSION

 

            Plaintiffs’ amended complaint asserts the following causes of action against Moving Defendant: (1) Products Liability, and (2) Products Liability ¿ Bystander Emotional Distress.  Moving Defendant moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, on the amended complaint on the grounds that as to Moving Defendant, the causes of action fail as a matter of law because they are barred by the two-year statute of limitations imposed by Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1. Further, Moving Defendant argues Plaintiffs’ Amendment to the Complaint substituting Moving Defendant as a Doe does not relate back to the date of the Complaint.

 

  1. Statute of Limitations for Products Liability Claims

 

Moving Defendant first argues that the amended complaint, as to Moving Defendant, is barred by the statute of limitations. 

 

The running of the statute must appear “clearly and affirmatively” from the face of the complaint. (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4h 32, 42.) The statute of limitations on a cause of action for products liability is two years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1.) The cause of action for negligence accrues and the statute of limitations accrues upon occurrence of the last act necessary to complete the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 312; see generally Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 34 Cal. 4th 797, 806-809.)  “Where the operative facts are undisputed, the question of the application of the statute of limitations is a matter of law, and summary judgment is proper where the facts shown the action is time-barred as a matter of law.”  (Velasquez v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 712, 717.) 

 

Moving Defendant advances Plaintiffs’ original Complaint filed on December 17, 2018, Plaintiffs’ Amendment to the Complaint, the Declaration of Melissa Harly Rose to assert the following: the incident in question occurred on November 23, 2017, beginning the statute of limitations period.  Plaintiffs filed the original Complaint on December 17, 2018, naming Blue Dot Trading, LLC as the only named defendant, as well as Does 1 to 100.  The statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ claims expired on November 23, 2019.  Plaintiffs did not file the Doe Amendment naming Moving Defendant until May 10, 2021.  Plaintiffs do not dispute the foregoing facts.  (See Notice of Lodgment, Exhibits 1-2.) 

           

In viewing the evidence most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court finds that Plaintiffs filed the Doe Amendment naming Moving Defendant 1.5 years after the statute of limitations had already passed.

           

  1. The “Relation-Back” Doctrine

 

Moving Defendant further argues that Plaintiffs’ amendment to the complaint (naming Moving Defendant) does not relate back to the date of the original complaint, asserting that Plaintiffs were not genuinely ignorant of Moving Defendant’s identity at the time they filed their original complaint.

 

“The general rule is that an amended complaint that adds a new defendant does not relate back to the date of filing the original complaint and the statute of limitations is applied as of the date the amended complaint is filed, not the date the original complaint is filed.  A recognized exception to the general rule is the substitution under section 474 of a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant named in the original complaint as to whom a cause of action was stated in the original complaint.  If the requirements of section 474 are satisfied, the amended complaint substituting a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant filed after the statute of limitations has expired is deemed filed as of the date the original complaint was filed.”  (Woo v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 176.) 

 

“Among the requirements for application of the section 474 relation back doctrine is that the new defendant in an amended complaint be substituted for an existing fictitious Doe defendant named in the original complaint.”  (Woo v. Superior Court, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 176.)  “A further and nonprocedural requirement for application of the section 474 relation-back doctrine is that [Plaintiff] must have been genuinely ignorant of [Defendant Doe’s] identity at the time she filed her original complaint.  The omission of the defendant’s identity in the original complaint must be real and not merely a subterfuge for avoiding the requirements of section 474.  Furthermore, if the identity ignorance requirement of section 474 is not met, a new defendant may not be added after the statute of limitations has expired even if the new defendant cannot establish prejudice resulting from the delay.  However, if the plaintiff is actually ignorant of the defendant’s identity, the section 474 relation-back doctrine applies even if that ignorance is the result of the plaintiff's negligence.”  (Id. at p. 177; see also Optical Surplus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 776, 779-782.) 

 

Moving Defendant submitted undisputed material facts (UMFs) establishing the following.  Amazon had Defendant BlueDot Trading, LLC’s product listed for sale on the Amazon store called, “BlueDot Trading Square Shade Sail Hardware Kit.” (UMF No. 1.)  Amazon sold the Hardware Kit to Plaintiff Jose Magana, Jr. and he received a receipt for the sale that states the Hardware Kit was “Sold By: Amazon.com Services, Inc.” (UMF No. 2.)

 

The Court finds Moving Defendant has met its burden.  The evidence shows Plaintiffs knew of Moving Defendant’s involvement in the transaction of the product which caused their injuries and thus knew its potential for being a defendant in this action starting on the date of the incident.

 

In sum, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ causes of action against Moving Defendant began on the date of the incident, November 23, 2017. Thus, Plaintiffs’ May 10, 2021 naming of Moving Defendant as a Doe defendant did not relate back to the December 17, 2018 filing of the complaint. The burden shifts to Plaintiffs.

 

In opposition, Plaintiffs first argue they were not aware that Moving Defendant was the retail seller of the product at issue and thus did not think Moving Defendant’s involvement with the transaction was sufficient to hold them liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries.  Plaintiffs submit the following evidence in support of this contention:

 

 

 

In reply, Moving Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to dispute the fact that Plaintiff Jose Magana Jr. purchased the product at issue from the Amazon website (see PAMF No. 9), and received/produced the purchase receipt of the product at issue which states product was “Sold By: Amazon.com Services, Inc”; both of which sufficiently put Plaintiffs on notice of Moving Defendant’s involvement in the transaction and potential liability for their injuries.  Because Plaintiffs do not dispute these facts, they have failed to meet their burden in creating a triable issue of material fact.

 

Additionally, Plaintiffs argue in opposition there was no legal precedent to hold Moving Defendant liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries at the time of filing of the original Complaint.  Plaintiffs advance the following evidence in support of this contention:

 

 

 

Further, Plaintiffs cite to the following case law in support of their argument that Plaintiffs did not have facts to support a cause of action against Moving Defendant at the time of the original filing of the Complaint, and thus the amendment to the Complaint relates back. 

 

 

In reply, Moving Defendant asserts that precedent regarding the theory of strict liability, which Plaintiffs could have asserted against them in their original Complaint, has remained the same since its institution in 1964. (See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. (1964) 61 Cal. 2d 256, 263.)  The Court further notes that Bolger and Loomis acknowledge the basis of their decisions rested on underlying principles of the doctrine of strict products liability, rather than the expansion or disruption of existing law. (See Bolger v. Amazon.com, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 439 [“Under established principles of strict liability, Amazon should be held liable if a product sold through its website turns out to be defective”]; Loomis v. Amazon.com, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 480 [“We conclude Bolger has properly applied well-established strict liability law to the facts of its case and was correctly decided”].)  As such, Plaintiffs’ contention that the law of strict liability had “changed” since Plaintiffs’ filing of the original Complaint is baseless.

 

Thus, the Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to advance sufficient competent evidence indicating they were genuinely ignorant of Moving Defendant’s identity or role in the commercial transaction that placed the alleged defective product into the stream of commerce at the time Plaintiffs filed the original Complaint.

 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 

In considering the competent evidence proffered by Defendant and Plaintiffs, and viewing said evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden of production to make a prima facie showing that triable issues of material fact exist.  The Court determines as a matter of law that Plaintiffs knew of Moving Defendant’s identity, and the facts which indicated Moving Defendant’s potential liability for Plaintiffs’ injuries, at the time of the incident.  Thus, Plaintiffs’ Doe defendant amendment naming Moving Defendant after the statute of limitations had lapsed does not relate back to the original complaint.  Because Plaintiffs’ failed to bring Moving Defendant into the suit before the statute of limitations had elapsed, Plaintiffs’ claims alleged against Moving Defendant are time-barred.

 

Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of the same.