Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 19SMCV02157, Date: 2023-09-13 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 19SMCV02157    Hearing Date: September 13, 2023    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING

 

 

DEPARTMENT         207

HEARING DATE      September 13, 2023

CASE NUMBER       19SMCV02157

MOTION                    Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Dismissal

MOVING PARTY      Plaintiff Shawn Dreamer

OPPOSING PARTIES            Defendants Ray Consulting Group Ventures, Inc.; Rayco Electronic Manufacturing, Inc. [erroneously sued as Rayco Electronics Manufacturing, Inc.]; Suraj Development Corp.; Usha Patel; Mayan Patel; Brenda Jaime; and Stephanie Preciado

 

 

BACKGROUND

 

Plaintiff Shawn Dreamer (“Plaintiff”) brought suit on December 16, 2019, against the various owners and managers of the dwelling he leased:  defendants Ray Consulting Group Ventures, Inc (“Defendant Ray”); Rayco Electronic Manufacturing, Inc. [erroneously sued as Rayco Electronics Manufacturing, Inc.]; Suraj Development Corp.; Usha Patel; Mayan Patel; Brenda Jaime; and Stephanie Preciado (collectively, “Defendants.”)  On January 9, 2023, Defendant Ray filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff. 

 

  On July 7, 2023, the Court held a status conference, which neither Plaintiff nor counsel for Plaintiff attended.  As a result, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause Re: Why Sanctions Should Not Be Issued Against Plaintiff’s Counsel for Failure to Appear on July 7, 2023 and an Order to Show Cause Re: Why the Case Should Not be Dismissed for Failure to Prosecute.  The Court set the hearings regarding the Orders to Show Cause on August 9, 2023.  (July 7, 2023 Minute Order.)

 

At the August 9, 2023 hearings, again, neither Plaintiff nor counsel for Plaintiff appeared.  As a result, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint and Ray’s cross-complaint against Plaintiff without prejudice.  (August 9, 2023 Minute Order.)

 

Plaintiff now moves to vacate and set aside the dismissal on the basis that the failure to appear the status conferences was due to attorney mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect stemming from “a mishap during the course of transferring the case file from previous counsel to new counsel.”  (Motion at 1:1-4.)  Defendants have opposed the motion.

 

LEGAL STANDARD – SECTION 473 RELIEF

 

            Code of Civil procedure section 473 “includes a discretionary provision, which applies permissively, and a mandatory provision, which applies as of right.” (Minick v. City of Petaluma (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 15, 25 (hereafter Minick).)  “Section 473 is a remedial statute to be “applied liberally” in favor of relief if the opposing party will not suffer prejudice.  Because the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default.  Unless inexcusable neglect is clear, the policy favoring trial on the merits prevails.”  (Minick, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 24 [cleaned up].) 

 

The party or the legal representative must seek such relief “within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b); see Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980 [“because more than six months had elapsed from the entry of default, and hence relief under section 473 was unavailable”]; People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2011) 200 Ca.App.4th 712, 721 [motion for relief under section 473 must be brought “within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months”]).  “The six-month limit is mandatory; a court has no authority to grant relief under section 473, subdivision (b), unless an application is made within the six-month period.”  (Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 340, citations omitted.) 

 

1.      DISCRETIONARY RELIEF

 

Per Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), a court may “relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”

 

2.      MANDATORY RELIEF

 

Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney's sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.

 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)  “In considering whether the trial court properly denied relief under section 473(b), the first question is the sufficiency of defendants' showing of attorney fault, if believed, to trigger the mandatory relief provisions of that statute.”  (Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Winbond Electronics Corp. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 868, 896, disapproved on other grounds by Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830 (hereafter Standard).)  “Under section 473(b), a party is entitled to relief from a default and resulting judgment whenever, on timely application for relief, his attorney ‘attest[s] to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect’ in connection with the default or the judgment.”  (Ibid.) 

 

            In Standard, counsel for the defendants attested that he believed the service of the summons on defendants was defective and informed defendants that they were not required to answer the summons under the laws of the United States.  Defense counsel also did not advise the defendants to take any affirmative action, for example move to quash the service of the summons.  Defense counsel also indicated that he expected to “receive notice of any application for entry of default before default was entered so that we could respond.”  “He also acknowledged that he was responsible for advising defendants in connection with, and preparing, the first motion for relief from the default; that in doing so he “believed that the Court would set aside any default because of an invalid service of process”; and that he omitted “any argument showing that there was a ‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect’ in WEC and Winbond Israel's motions.” Although he did not separately point it out, he also indisputably omitted from defendants' first motion any invocation of the mandatory relief provisions of section 473(b), and the required showing to support such an invocation.”  (Standard, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 897.)  

 

            After considering the record before the trial court, the appellate court held that “Counsel's mistakes, in contrast, entitled them to relief . . . .  [defense counsel's] affidavit and the record as a whole overwhelmingly established that the default and ensuing judgment were the products of attorney fault.”  (Standard, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 900.)  

 

            Further, “[t]he court's determination of whether the default was caused by the attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect is in part a credibility determination.  Credibility is an issue for the fact finder, we do not reweigh evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses.. When the evidence gives rise to conflicting reasonable inferences, one of which supports the findings of the trial court, the trial court's finding is conclusive on appeal.”  (Cowan v. Krayzman (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 907, 915 [cleaned up].) 

 

ANALYSIS

 

            Although Defendants have characterized the attorney declarations of Lennon Slatter (Plaintiff’s former counsel) and Mathew Russell (Plaintiff’s current counsel) submitted in support of Plaintiff’s motion as “riddled with inaccuracies,” (Opp. at 1:3-8), the parties do agree on the basic timeline of events as follows:

 

·         April 27, 2023 – Plaintiff retains Lennon Slatter as counsel (Slater Decl. ¶ 2.)

 

·         May 15, 2023 – Mr. Slatter introduces himself as Plaintiff’s new counsel to Sandra Block, counsel for Defendants (Block Decl. ¶ 6.)

 

·         May 22, 2023 – Mr. Slatter appears at the status conference and requests additional time to fully review the large case file.  Plaintiff’s deposition is rescheduled for June 21, 2023 to allow Mr. Slatter additional time to get up to speed on the case file, and the status conference is continued to July 7, 2023.  (Slatter Decl. ¶ 5; Block Decl. ¶ 8.)

 

·         May 30, 2023 – Mr. Slatter files a substitution of attorney.

 

·         June 12, 2023 – Mr. Slatter left a message for Ms. Block, rescheduling Plaintiff’s deposition due to Mr. Slatter undergoing dental surgery.  (Slatter Decl. ¶ 6; Block Decl. ¶ 9.)

 

·         July 3, 2023 – Mr. Slatter contacts Ms. Block, informing her that he will not be able to attend the July 7 status conference, and asks if she will submit a statement informing the Court of the new deposition date so the status conference will be taken off calendar.  (Slatter Decl. ¶ 7 and Ex. 1.1; Block Decl. ¶ 10.)

 

·         July 5, 2023 – Mr. Slatter and Ms. Block have a phone call where Mr. Slatter informs Ms. Block that new counsel will be substituting in the case for Mr. Slatter, and Ms. Block indicated she or someone from her office would inform the Court of Mr. Slatter’s absence, the new deposition date, and inform the court that new counsel for Plaintiff would be taking over.  (Slatter Decl. ¶¶ 8-9 and Ex. 1.2; Block Decl. ¶ 10 and Ex. D.)

 

·         July 7, 2023 – neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s counsel appear at the status conference and the Court issues, in part, an Order to Show re: Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute.

 

·         August 9, 2023 – neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s counsel appear at the Order to Show re: Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute hearing, and the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint and Ray’s cross-complaint against Plaintiff.

 

·         August 10, 2023 – Plaintiff’s new counsel files a substitution of attorney form. (Russell Decl. ¶¶ 18-19.)

 

Defendants argue that the attorney declarations do “not actually attest to any mistake inadvertence, or neglect” but instead “blame the dismissal on opposing counsel.”  (Opp. at 6:8-10.)  However, the Block declaration acknowledges, “Despite being well aware that no substitution of attorney had been filed, Mr. Slatter failed to appear [at the August 9, 2023 status conference].”  (Block Decl. ¶ 18.)

 

Thus, the Court finds that the declarations of Mr. Slatter and Mr. Russell establish that the failure to appear was due to counsel’s mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect.  In particular, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to appear at the August 9 hearing was result of an apparent miscommunication between Mr. Slatter and Mr. Russell about the timing of Mr. Russell substituting into the action, which did not occur until August 10, and as such, which attorney/law firm would appear on August 9 based upon Mr. Slatter’s understanding that as of July 2, 2023 Plaintiff had retained new counsel, BD&J. 

 

Although better management of the action, and communication among Mr. Slatter and Mr. Russell (and their respective law firms) would have forestalled the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court finds that such missteps on the part of Plaintiff’s counsel should not deprive Plaintiff of a trial on the merits, especially when Defendants fail to establish prejudice in the Court granting Plaintiff’s request for relief. 

 

Defendants’ Request for Attorney Fees and Costs

 

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) provides: “The court shall, whenever relief is granted based on an attorney's affidavit of fault, direct the attorney to pay reasonable compensatory legal fees and costs to opposing counsel or parties.”

 

Defendants seek $1,230 in fees and Court costs associated with opposing Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate/Set Aside the Dismissal and attending the hearing, representing 5 hours of attorney time to prepare the Opposition and 1 hour of attorney time to attend the hearing at a rate of $205 per hour, plus $35 for the filing fee.  (Glantz Decl. ¶ 4.)

 

The Court finds three and one half (3.5) hours to be a reasonable time to spend drafting the opposition, and one hour to be reasonable to attend the hearing.  Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $957.50, representing a total of 4.5 hours of attorney time at $205 per hour plus the $35 filing fee.

 

Conclusion

 

            Based upon the record, the Court finds that Plaintiff has set forth a factual basis for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 due to attorney mistake, inadvertence, and neglect. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the dismissal of the complaint and orders the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint and of Defendant Ray Consulting Group Ventures, Inc.’s cross-complaint against Plaintiff, entered on August 9, 2023, vacated.

 

The Court further orders counsel for Plaintiff (former and current), Slatter Law Firm, APC and BD&J, PC, jointly and severally, to pay, through counsel for Defendants, Defendants’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $957.50 on or before October 4, 2023.    

 

In addition, the Court sets a Further Case Management Conference on October 16, 2023 at 8:30 A.M.  All parties and counsel shall comply with California Rules of Court, rules 3.722, et seq. regarding the Further Case Management Conference.  In particular, all parties shall adhere to the Duty to Meet and Confer (Rule 3.724) and to the requirement to prepare and file Case Management Statements (Rule 3.725). 

 

            Plaintiff shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service regarding the same.

 

DATED: September 13, 2023                                                 ___________________________

Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court