Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 19STCV13960, Date: 2023-03-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV13960    Hearing Date: March 7, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

Plaintiff Cynthia Shelton (Plaintiff) sued Defendants Los Angeles International Airport aka LAX and City of Los Angeles (collectively, Defendants) based on injuries Plaintiff allegedly sustained when she tripped and fell while descending down stairs at LAX. 

On May 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed an amendment to her Complaint naming Aerovías del Continente Americano S.A. (Aerovías) as Doe Defendant 1.  Aerovías moves for judgment on the pleading on Plaintiff’s Complaint.  Plaintiff opposes the motion.  Aerovías replies.

ANALYSIS

A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer, but may be made after the time to demur has expired. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (f).)  “Like a demurrer, the grounds for the motion [for judgment on the pleadings] must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Civic Partners Stockton, LLC v. Youssefi (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1013.)  In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, “[a]ll allegations in the complaint and matters upon which judicial notice may be taken are assumed to be true.” (Rippon v. Bowen (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1313.) 

Aerovías argues that Plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against it based on Plaintiff’s untimely substitution of Aerovías as a Doe defendant after the statute of limitations had expired.  In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges the accident at issue occurred on July 30, 2018. (Complaint, p. 4.)  Hence, under Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1, Plaintiff’s cause of action for premises liability accrued on July 30, 2018 and the applicable statute of limitations lapsed on January 24, 2021.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1 [statute of limitations on a cause of action for negligence is two years]; see also Judicial Council Emergency Rules of Court, rule 9 (hereafter Rule 9).  Rule 9 provides: “Notwithstanding any other law, the statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action that exceed 180 days are tolled from April 6, 2020 until October 1, 2020. Notwithstanding any other law, the statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action that are 180 days or less are tolled from April 6, 2020, until August 3, 2020.”  

The Court notes Plaintiff filed the Amendment to Complaint naming Aerovías as Doe 1 (hereinafter Doe Amendment), after the statute of limitations lapsed, on May 2, 2022.   

“When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint, or the affidavit if the action is commenced by affidavit, and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly . . . .”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 474.) 

Code of Civil Procedure section 474 permits a plaintiff to amend complaints by adding parties as Doe defendants when the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant at the time the complaint is filed. The purpose of section 474 is to enable a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations when he or she is ignorant of the identity of the defendant. The cases discussing section 474 deal with whether the plaintiff was truly ignorant of the identity of the person brought into the case as a Doe defendant because if that requirement is met, the amendment to the complaint relates back to the date the complaint was filed and the statute of limitations is preserved.

(Davis v. Marin (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 380, 386–387 [cleaned up].)  And as stated in Weil & Brown:

Where a complaint is amended after the statute of limitations has run to identify a fictitiously-named defendant, and to assert a cause of action against that defendant not included in the original complaint, the amended complaint will be given relation back effect, so as to avoid the statute of limitations, provided:

·        the original complaint stated a valid cause of action against the now-identified “Doe” defendant; and

·        plaintiff was “genuinely ignorant” of the defendant's identity or the facts rendering defendant liable when the original complaint was filed; and

·        the amended complaint, identifying the defendant, is based on the “same general set of facts” as the original and refers to the “same accident and same injuries.” (Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 600-601; San Diego Navy Broadway Complex Coalition v. California Coastal Comm'n (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 563, 579; Eghtesad v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 406, 415.)

(Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2022), ¶ 6:740, emphasis added (hereafter Relation Back Doctrine).)  A Doe defendant bears the burden to prove that the plaintiff was aware of the identity of the Doe defendant at the time the plaintiff filed the initial complaint. (See Breceda v. Gamsby (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 167, 179.)

            Yet, “Even a person whose identity was known to the plaintiff when the action was filed may be brough in under section 474 as a ‘Doe’ defendant if the plaintiff was initially unaware of that person’s true relationship to the injuries upon which the action was based; or if a change in law has indicated that persons not originally joined might also be held liable.  But in each of the cases allowing late joinder of known persons under section 474, there has been some showing that at the time the original complaint was filed the plaintiff was ignorant of something having a bearing upon the liability of the newly-summoned party.”  (Miller v. Thomas (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 440, 445.) 

Here, Aerovías argues that Plaintiff’s Doe Amendment is defective because Plaintiff was at all times aware, or should have been aware, of Aerovías’ identity.  However, Aerovías fails to point to any allegations within the Complaint which would indicate Plaintiff knew or should have known of Aerovías’ identity at the time of filing.  Nor has Aerovías filed a request for judicial notice in support of its contention regarding Plaintiff’s knowledge of Aerovías as a potential defendant. 

Further the Court notes that Aerovías relies extensively on the declaration of its counsel which advances excerpts of Plaintiff’s deposition testimony.  However, the Court cannot consider declarations and exhibits outside of the four corners of the complaint on motion for summary judgment, which functions as a general demurrer. “The purpose of a general demurrer is to determine the sufficiency of the complaint and the court should only rule on matters disclosed in that pleading.” (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) As such, “in reviewing the ruling on a demurrer, a court cannot consider, as Mercury would have us do, the substance of declarations, matter not subject to judicial notice, or documents judicially noticed but not accepted for the truth of their contents.” (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)  Aerovías itself even acknowledges it is inappropriate to advance evidence in support of a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  (See Aerovías’ Motion, p. 4, stating “. . . since this is a motion for judgment on the pleadings and not a motion for summary judgment, Avianca will not attach to this motion evidence . . .”)

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Looking solely at the four corners of the pleadings, the Court finds Aerovías has failed to establish that Plaintiff’s cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.  Therefore, the Court denies Aerovías’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. 

Aerovías shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.