Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 19STCV15490, Date: 2022-10-20 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 19STCV15490    Hearing Date: October 20, 2022    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPARTMENT

32

HEARING DATE

October 20, 2022

CASE NUMBER

19STCV15490

MOTION

Motions to Compel Further Responses To

Form Interrogatories, Set 2 & Special Interrogatories, Set 2; Request for Admissions, Set 2; Requests for Monetary Sanctions

MOVING PARTY

Plaintiff Natalie Collenette

OPPOSING PARTY

Defendants Far West Farms, Nicholas P. Karazissis & Chris Cervantes

 

In the complaint filed on May 3, 2019, Plaintiff Natalie Collenette (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she was injured after falling on off a horse on property owned, controlled or possessed by Defendants Far West Farm (“Far West”), Nicholas P. Karazissis (“Karazissis”), Karazissis Trust, Karazissis Brothers Inc. and Chris Cervantes (“Cervantes”).  Plaintiff also alleges that the horse was owned and controlled by the defendants.  (See First Amended Complaint, pp. 4-5.)   

 

Plaintiff moves the Court for orders compelling Far West, Karazissis and Cervantes to provide further responses to the following discovery requests:

 

  1. Special Interrogatories, Set 2, Propounded to Far West (Motion A) [1]

    1. Propounded:  April 4, 2022

    2. Responded:  May 6, 2022

    3. Motion Filed:  June 21, 2022

       

  2. Special Interrogatories, Set 2,  Propounded to Karazissis (Motion B) [2]

    1. Propounded:  April 4, 2022

    2. Responded:  May 6, 2022

    3. Motion Filed:  June 22, 2022

       

  3. Form Interrogatories, Set 2, Propounded to Cervantes (Motion C) [3]

    1. Propounded:  April 4, 2022

    2. Responded:  May 6, 2022

    3. Motion Filed:  June 21, 2022

       

  4. Special Interrogatories, Set 2,  Propounded to Cervantes (Motion D) [4]

    1. Propounded:  April 4, 2022

    2. Responded:  May 6, 2022

    3. Motion Filed:  June 21, 2022

       

  5. Request for Admissions, Set 2, Propounded to Cervantes (Motion E) [5]

    1. Propounded:  April 4, 2022

    2. Responded:  May 6, 2022

    3. Motion Filed:  June 21, 2022

       

      Far West, Karazissis and Cervantes have filed oppositions to the motions. 

       

      Procedural Requirements

       

                  Informal  Discovery Conference

       

                  Per the Seventh Amended Standing Order for Procedures in the Personal Injury Hub Courts Effective May 16, 2022 (Revised 05/04/2022), ¶ 9E, “PI Hub Courts will not hear Motions to Compel Further Discovery Responses to Discovery until the parties have engaged in an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) . . . The purpose of the IDC is to assist the parties to resolve and/or narrow the scope of discovery disputes.”   

       

                  Here, the parties complied with the Standing Order in scheduling and attending the IDC on August 18, 2022.   

       

                  Timeliness of Motion

       

                  A notice of motion to compel further responses must be given within 45 days of the service of the responses, or any supplemental responses, or on or before any specific later date to which the parties have agreed in writing. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (c); 2033.290, subd. (c).)  Failure to file such a motion within this time period constitutes a waiver of any right to compel further responses to interrogatories or requests for admission.  (Ibid.)

       

      Here, Plaintiff filed the motions on the dates set forth above.  Far West, Karazissis and Cervantes have not objected to the timeliness of the motions. 

       

                  Meet and Confer

       

                  “A motion to compel must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.040.”  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (b)(1); 2033.290, subd. (b)(1).)  “A meet and confer declaration must state facts showing a reasonable and good-faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.) 

       

                  “The Discovery Act requires that, prior to the initiation of a motion to compel, the moving party declare that he or she has made a serious attempt to obtain an informal resolution of each issue. This rule is designed ‘to encourage the parties to work out their differences informally so as to avoid the necessity of a formal order.  . . .  This, in turn, will lessen the burden on the court and reduce the unnecessary expenditure of resources by litigants through promotion of informal, extrajudicial resolution of discovery disputes.”  (Townsend v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1434-1435 [cleaned  up].)  To comply, “A reasonable and good-faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with [opposing counsel].  Rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.”  (Id. at p. 1439; see also Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294 [to satisfy the attempt at informal resolution required in section 2016.040 opposing parties must do more than try to persuade each other of their errors].)  In short, the Discovery Act “requires that there be a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution.”  (Townsend v. Superior Court, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438.)

       

                  To that end, trial courts are entrusted with discretion and judgment to determine the necessary effort required to satisfy the requirement of an informal resolution. (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) Cal.App.4th 424, 433.)  In determining if parties have satisfied section 2016.040, judges may consider “the history of the litigation, the nature of the interaction between counsel, the nature of the issues, the type and scope of discovery requested, the prospects for success and other similar factors can be relevant.” (Id. at pp. 431-432 [holding that the trial court was correct in determining that sending a letter with oppositions was an insufficient attempt at an informal resolution].)  In sum, meet and confer efforts should go beyond counsel merely sending letters to each other stating each party’s respective positions.

       

                  Here, as set forth in the Declaration of Nicole J. Vartanyan, counsel for Plaintiff, Plaintiff met and conferred with counsel for Defendant, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP, by written communications.  (Declaration of Nicole J. Vartanyan, ¶¶ 9-11, Exhibits 35-40.) 

       

                  Accordingly, the Court finds that the parties engaged in a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of the issues presented in the motions. 

       

                  Separate Statement

       

                  California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345 requires that any motion involving the content of discovery contain a separate statement with the text of each request, the response, and a statement of factual and legal reasons for why an order compelling further responses is warranted. 

       

                  Here, Plaintiff has filed separate statements related to Motions B – E which comply with the Rules of Court.  However, Plaintiff failed to file a separate statement related to Motion A in compliance with the Rules of Court.  Therefore, with respect to Motion A, the Court will deny that motion as procedurally defective. 

       

      Analysis

                 

                  “The purpose of the discovery rules is to enhance the truth-seeking function of the litigation process and eliminate trial strategies that focus on gamesmanship and surprise.  In other words, the discovery process is designed to make a trial less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.”  (Juarez v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 389 [cleaned up].)  

       

                  Where a party objects or responds inadequately discovery requests, a motion lies to compel further responses, and that party has the burden to justify the objections or inadequate responses. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (a) [motion to compel further responses lies “[o]n receipt of a response to interrogatories”]; 203.290, subd. (a) [motion to compel further responses lies “[o]n receipt of a response to requests for admissions”].)  “A trial court's determination of a motion to compel discovery is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  However, when the facts asserted in support of and in opposition to the motion are in conflict, the trial court's factual findings will be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence.” (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733 [cleaned up].)          

RULINGS RE MOTION B:

 

 

 

 

 

RULINGS RE MOTION C:

 

 

 

 

 

Sanctions

           

A trial court may sanction a party for engaging in the misuse of discovery, which includes:  failure to respond or submit to an authorized method of discovery; making an evasive response to discovery; making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery; and making or opposing, unsuccessfully and without substantial justification, a motion to compel or to limit discovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010.)

 

            In addition, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (d) provides: “The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”  (See also Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (d).)

Foremost, per Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.040, “[a] request for a sanction shall, in the notice of the motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought.”  In Plaintiff’s notices of motion, Plaintiff states in pertinent part:  “PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that this Court should impose monetary sanctions on Defendant and/or her counsel in the amount of at least $1,100 as a result of Defendant’s failure to provide full and complete responses respond to Plaintiff’s discovery requests.”  The language of the notices is flawed as it may apply to counsel for Defendants because it fails to identify counsel by name and/or law firm as required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040.)

Second, under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.040, “The notice of motion shall be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities, and accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040.)  Here, Plaintiff advances the declarations of her counsel of record, Nicole J. Vartanyan, in support of the requests for monetary sanctions.  However, the Court finds that the declarations fail to adequately support the monetary sanctions requested against Cervantes or Karazissis.  In paragraphs 13 and 14 of the declarations, counsel for Plaintiff states as follows: 

(See Declarations of Nicole J. Vartanyan, ¶¶ 13-14.)  The Court finds the statements of Plaintiff’s counsel to be lacking in specificity as required by the Discovery Act.  For example, Plaintiff’s counsel does not state the number of hours she expended to complete each motion. 

            Therefore, the Court denies, in part, Plaintiff’s requests for monetary sanctions as procedurally deficient. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDERS

 

Therefore, the Court grants, in part, Plaintiff’s motions to compel further responses (Motions B-E) per Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300 and 2033.280, and orders Defendants Nicholas Karazissis and Chris Cervantes serve further substantive responses to the subject Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories and Requests for Admission within 20 days of notice of the Court’s orders, as set forth above. 

 

Further, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to compel regarding Defendant Far West Farm (Motion A) and grants in part Plaintiff’s requests for monetary sanctions as follows:  Defendant Nicholas Karazissis shall pay $60 ($60 filing fee per motion) in monetary sanctions and Defendant Chris Cervantes shall pay $180 ($60 filing fee per motion) in monetary sanctions to Plaintiff, through counsel for Plaintiff, within 20 days of notice of the Court’s orders.

 

Plaintiff shall provide notice of the Court’s orders and file a proof of service of such.

 

 



[1] Plaintiff failed to file with the Motion the attendant proof of service as to when the subject discovery responses were served.  The date as noted stems from the Declaration of Nicole J. Vartanyan, paragraph 6.  

 

[2] Plaintiff failed to file with the Motion the attendant proof of service as to when the subject discovery responses were served.  The date as noted stems from the Declaration of Nicole J. Vartanyan, paragraph 6.  

 

[3] Plaintiff failed to file with the Motion the attendant proofs of service as to when the subject discovery requests were served and when the subject discovery responses were served.  The dates as noted stem from the Declaration of Nicole J. Vartanyan, paragraphs 4 and 6.  

[4] Plaintiff failed to file with the Motion the attendant proof of service as to when the subject discovery responses were served.  The date as noted stems from the Declaration of Nicole J. Vartanyan, paragraph 6.  

 

[5] Plaintiff failed to file with the Motion the attendant proof of service as to when the subject discovery responses were served.  The date as noted stems from the Declaration of Nicole J. Vartanyan, paragraph 6.  

[6] “Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.  If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible.  If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subds. (a)-(c).)

 

[7] See fn. 6. 

[8] See fn. 6. 

 

[9] “Each answer in a response to requests for admission shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. . . .   If a responding party gives lack of information or knowledge as a reason for a failure to admit all or part of a request for admission, that party shall state in the answer that a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable that party to admit the matter.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subds. (a) & (c).)   Furthermore, a party must undertake a good faith obligation to investigate sources reasonably available to it in responding to a discovery requests.  (See Regency Health Services, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1504 [“a party has a general duty to conduct a reasonable investigation to obtain responsive information and must furnish information from all sources under his or her control].)  However, Cervantes has not established that it has not complied with his general duty to conduct a reasonable investigation in responding to the subject discovery requests.