Judge Michael E. Whitaker, Case 19STCV26125 2023-02-06 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 19STCV26125, Date: 2023-02-06 Tentative Ruling

PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged). Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.

Plaintiff Dolly Ponce (Plaintiff) sued Defendant Lauren Vickery (Defendant) based on injuries Plaintiff alleges she sustained in a motor vehicle collision. Defendant moves to quash the subpoenas issued by Plaintiff to Pomona Valley Hospital (Pomona), County of Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD), and Mercury Insurance Company (Mercury). Plaintiff opposes the motion. Defendant replies.

Foremost, the Court notes that Defendant is requesting monetary sanctions in connection with the instant motion. However, Defendant failed to include her request for monetary sanctions in her notice of motion as is required per Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.040, and thus has not provided proper notice of her request. As such the Court shall deny Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions.

In opposition to Defendant’s motion to quash the subject subpoenas, Plaintiff argues that the motion is untimely filed because it was filed after the dates of production for the subject subpoenas. However, as is established in Slagle v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1309, there is no authority to suggest that a court lacks jurisdiction to consider a motion to quash if it is brought after the date set forth in the subpoena for production. (Id. at p. 1312.)

If a subpoena requires the production of documents, the court may quash the subpoena entirely or modify it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).) In ruling on a motion to quash, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)

Current discovery standards hold that, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged[1], that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1039 (hereafter Board of Nursing).) “To meet this [test], a party seeking to compel [the] production of records . . . must articulate specific facts justifying the discovery sought; it may not rely on mere generalities.” (Ibid.; see Johnson v. Superior Court (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 829, 837 [finding that a subpoena was “insufficient” to compel production because it was “based wholly on the [party’s] alleged information and belief without any statement of supporting facts”].) However, “[e]ven if information is otherwise discoverable, it may be protected by a constitutional or statutory privilege[,] [including] the right to privacy . . . .” (Board of Nursing, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.)

“The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right to privacy. Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern. . . . The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.^{^[2]} The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [cleaned up].)

“Legally recognized privacy interests [include] interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information (‘informational privacy’) . . . .” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.) “A particular class of information is [sensitive or confidential] when well-established social norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over its dissemination and use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity.” (Ibid.)

It is “well-settled” that “patients have a right to privacy with respect to information contained in . . . [their] medical records.” (Grafilo v. Wolfsohn (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1024, 1034.) Indeed, a patient’s right to privacy “is protected by case law as well as state and federal statutes and regulations.” (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 621, 641 (hereafter, County of Los Angeles).) Additionally, “[t]he privacy interest in psychiatric records is particularly strong, and in some respects, entitled to more robust protection than other types of medical records.” (Grafilo v. Soorani (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 497, 507.)

“As one court explained in discussing the examination of medical records vis-à-vis the right to privacy: the information that may be recorded in a doctor’s files is broad-ranging. The chronology of ailments and treatment is potentially sensitive. Patients may disclose highly personal details of lifestyle and information concerning sources of stress and anxiety. These are matters of great sensitivity going to the core of the concerns for the privacy of information about an individual.” (County of Los Angeles, 65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 641–642 [cleaned up].)

In Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859, it was recognized that “the filing of a lawsuit may implicitly bring about a partial waiver of one’s constitutional right of . . . privacy.” However, the California Supreme Court held that “the scope of such ‘waiver’ must be narrowly rather than expansively construed.” (Ibid.) In other words, “while [a plaintiff] may not withhold information which relates to any physical or mental condition which they have put in issue by bringing this lawsuit, they are entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past.” (Ibid.) Therefore, it follows that a patient cannot reasonably expect certain matters to remain private if they are related to the specific issues that the patient has himself brought before a court. On the other hand, it is objectively reasonable to expect health care records that are unrelated to a current legal dispute to remain private.

All medical records and reports, all lab records and reports, and all writings including but not limited to office, emergency room, impatient, outpatient, hospital charts and records, as well as all electronically stored documents and files pertaining to the care, treatment and examination of LAUREN ELLEN VICKERY aka Lauren Vickery D.O.B. 9/14/1993 for date of service: March 22, 2018.

Defendant argues the medical records sought are protected by her right to privacy. Further, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to establish direct relevance between Defendant’s medical records and the issues being litigated in the underlying case. Defendant is not making any injury claim in this action, thus Defendant concludes that her injury status is not relevant.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues the subpoenas served on Pomona and LAFD were intended to discover statements Defendant made to healthcare providers about how the collision occurred.

In reply, Defendant argues the subpoena for medical records are overbroad and unnecessary in light of the fact that Plaintiff has already taken Defendant’s deposition where many questions were asked about the accident. Defendant also points out that she has already admitted fault for the accident.

The Court agrees with Defendant that the subpoenas as currently drafted are overbroad in nature, unduly burdensome, and infringe on Defendant’s constitutional right to privacy, as the subpoenas seek medical records, and Defendant’s injuries are not at issue in the underlying case.

All insurance records, including but not limited to claim files, photographs, video and audio recordings, written statements, property damage estimates and repair bills, traffic collision reports, and case numbers for all traffic collisions reported under policy number 04010910233787 and involving LAUREN ELLEN VICKERY aka Lauren Vickery D.O.B. 09/14/1993 for the time period beginning March 22, 2015 to present.

Defendant argues her pre-and post-collision insurance information are also protected by her right to privacy. Further, Defendant argues that her insurance records are completely irrelevant, especially because Defendant has already admitted fault for the cause of the accident.

In opposition, Plaintiff fails to outline any arguments as to why the insurance information sought in the subject deposition is relevant to the underlying action.

The Court agrees with Defendant that the subpoena as currently drafted is overbroad in nature, unduly burdensome, and infringes on Defendant’s constitutional right to privacy, as the subpoena seeks “[a]ll insurance records.”

Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to quash the subject subpoenas served on Pomona, LAFD and Mercury.

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.

[1] “A patient has a statutory privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, any confidential communication between the patient and a physician, or between the patient and a psychotherapist, absent waiver or some statutory exception to the privilege. These privileges apply to discovery as well as to trial, and they preclude disclosure to the court as well as to the parties.” (Simek v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 169, 173 [cleaned up].) Specifically, the Evidence Code holds that “[t]he patient, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between patient and physician . . . .” (Evid. Code, § 994; see also Evid. Code, § 1014 [“the patient, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between patient and psychotherapist”].) However, the Evidence Code provides that “there is no privilege under this article as to any communication relevant to an issue concerning the condition of the patient if such issue has been tendered by” the patient or a patient-related party. (See Evid. Code, § 996; see also Evid. Code, § 1016 [regarding a patient’s emotional or mental condition].)

[2] “This initial inquiry is necessary to permit courts to weed out claims that involve so insignificant or de minimis an intrusion on constitutionally protected privacy interests as not even to require an explanation or justification by the defendant.” (Lewis v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 561, 571 [cleaned up].)

DEPARTMENT	32
HEARING DATE	February 6, 2023
CASE NUMBER	19STCV26125
MOTION	Motion to Quash Subpoenas
MOVING PARTY	Defendant Lauren Vickery
OPPOSING PARTY	Plaintiff Dolly Ponce