Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 19STCV40029, Date: 2022-12-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV40029    Hearing Date: December 9, 2022    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

              Plaintiff Jessie Cox (Plaintiff) moves to enforce a settlement agreement with Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Defendant).  Defendant opposes the motion.  Plaintiff replies.

ANALYSIS

Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 provides that “[i]f parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6.)  In ruling on a motion to enter judgment, the court acts as a trier of fact.  The court must determine whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement.  To do so, the court may receive oral testimony in addition to declarations.  (Kohn v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1533.)

Here, Plaintiff advances a stipulation for settlement whereby all claims between the parties were settled for $50,000, signed by Plaintiff, Counsel for Plaintiff, Michael McLachlan, and Counsel for Defendant, Philip Allen on August 4, 2022.  (See Declaration of Michael D. McLachlan, Exhibit 1.) 

Plaintiff next advances a long form release of all claims which Defendant forwarded to Plaintiff for signing, and which Plaintiff argues contains materially different terms from the initial stipulation for settlement agreed upon and signed by the parties.  (See Declaration of Michael D. McLachlan, ¶ 4, Exhibit 2.)  In her reply, Plaintiff outlines the perceived differences between the initial stipulation for settlement and subsequent long form release, which include: (1) the subsequent long form release provides that the $50,000 will be paid to Jessie Fox, rather than to Plaintiff’s Counsel’s trust account; and (2) the subsequent long form release does not contain a timeline for payment of the settlement amount.

Plaintiff then advances a redlined version of the long form release which Plaintiff felt was a consistent reflection of the initial stipulation for settlement agreed upon by the parties.  (See Declaration of Michael D. McLachlan, ¶ 5, Exhibit 3.)  Defendant initially agreed to sign the modified version of the long form release, but then advised that it would only sign the unmodified version.  (See Declaration of Michael D. McLachlan, ¶¶ 5-7.)

In light of the subsequent seemingly irreconcilable dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant regarding the long form release of the claims at issue, Plaintiff seeks enforcement of the initial stipulation for settlement.  Plaintiff argues the initial stipulation for settlement is enforceable because it is a written settlement agreement, signed by all parties, that by its very terms, was intended to “fully and finally settle their disputes.”  (Declaration of Michael D. McLachlan, Exhibit 1.).  The Court agrees, finding the initial stipulation for settlement to be enforceable.

Plaintiff further argues that item # 3 of the stipulation for settlement, which states “Plaintiff further agrees to sign, acknowledge and deliver to defendants a Long Form Settlement Agreement and Release of all such claims and causes of action and to execute a Standard Form Dismissal with Prejudice of the entire action” does not serve as a condition precedent to enforcement of the agreement.  Plaintiff argues that the stipulation for settlement agreement here is similar to that of the agreement discussed in Karpinski v. Smitty’s Bar, Inc., (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 456.  In Kaprinski the settlement agreement provided that Plaintiff would satisfy all liens and indemnify defendant and its attorney with respect to any claim arising under a lien or other obligation.  The Court in Kaprinski concluded that absent a provision either expressly stating or implying that Karpinski had to satisfy the liens before receiving settlement proceeds, a condition precedent was not created. (Id. at p. 464.). The Court finds similarly here there is nothing in the initial stipulation for settlement demonstrating the existence of a condition precedent (e.g., signing of a long form settlement agreement and release) to enforcement of the stipulation for settlement of the action.

In opposition, Defendant argues that it is entitled to have the word “doubtful” included in the subsequent Long Form Release.  To the extent this argument does not address the enforceability of the initial stipulation for settlement agreement, the Court disregards Defendant’s argument.

CONCLUSION

            Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to enforce the stipulation for settlement entered into by Plaintiff and Defendant on August 4, 2022.  

            Plaintiff shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file proof of service of such.