Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 19STCV42106, Date: 2022-12-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV42106 Hearing Date: December 12, 2022 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged). Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE RULING
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DEPARTMENT |
32 |
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HEARING DATE |
December 12, 2022 |
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CASE NUMBER |
19STCV42106 |
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MOTION |
Motion for Leave to Conduct Financial Discovery |
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MOVING PARTIES |
Plaintiff Chris Rohrig |
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OPPOSING PARTY |
None |
MOTION
Plaintiff Chris Rohrig (Plaintiff) sued Defendant Julie Lee Gile (Defendant) based on a multiple vehicle collision whereby Defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. Plaintiff moves for leave to conduct discovery into Defendant’s financial condition in order to seek punitive damages. Defendant has not filed a motion in opposition
ANALYSIS
Pursuant to Civil Code section 3295, subdivision (c), upon court order, a plaintiff may conduct discovery into defendant’s financial condition in order to support the claim for punitive damages if the plaintiff can establish that “there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim pursuant to Section 3294.” In making its determination, the court must weigh the evidence of both sides and make a finding that it is very likely that plaintiff will prevail on his claim for punitive damages. (See Jabro v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 754, 758.)
Under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a), a plaintiff may recover punitive damages “where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” As set forth in the Civil Code,
(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. (3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.
(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)-(3), emphasis added.)
Here, Plaintiff brings a claim for punitive damages against Defendant based on Defendant’s alleged act of consuming and/or ingesting alcohol knowing that she would be driving her vehicle.
In Taylor v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held: “We consider whether punitive damages are recoverable in a personal injury action brought against an intoxicated driver. As will appear, we have concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of “malice” under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 892 [cleaned up].) The California high court further held that “[o]ne who voluntarily commences, and thereafter continues, to consume alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing from the outset that he must thereafter operate a motor vehicle demonstrates, in the words of Dean Prosser, “such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton.” (Id. at p. 899.)
Plaintiff advances the following evidence in support of his contention that he will very likely prevail on his claim for punitive damages against Defendant.
Traffic Collision Report generated as a result of the subject collision which documented Defendant’s visible intoxication at the time of the accident and her following admissions: (1) that she had consumed 3-5 alcoholic beverages prior to driving, (2) that she was well over the legal limit to drive a vehicle, and (3) that she knew she should not have been driving her vehicle. (See Declaration of Michael M. Marzban, ¶ 2, Exhibit 1.)
Defendant’s conviction for violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a), driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more. (See Declaration of Michael M. Marzban, ¶ 3, Exhibit 2.)
Defendant’s deposition testimony in which she admits the following: (1) she attended a Christmas party on the day in question knowing she was going to consume alcohol, (2) she did not coordinate an alternate form of transportation, (3) she was aware of the dangers of driving intoxicated, (4) she had driven while intoxicated before, (5) she accepted full responsibility for the car wreck at issue, (6) when she began drinking her only plan was to drive home, and (7) she pled guilty to misdemeanor DUI based on the incident in question. (See Declaration of Michael M. Marzban, ¶ 5, Exhibit 3.)
The Court finds that the foregoing evidence supports a finding that Plaintiff will very likely prevail on his claim for punitive damages.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for leave to conduct discovery in Defendant’s financial condition pursuant to Civil Code section 3295, subdivision (c).
The Court further notes that granting “[s]uch order shall not be considered to be a determination on the merits of the claim or any defense thereto and shall not be given in evidence or referred to at the trial.” (Civ. Code, § 3295, subd. (c).) Thus, the court’s finding here has no bearing on any potential finding by a trier of fact.
The Court orders Plaintiff to give notice of the Court’s order and file proof of service of such.