Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 20SMCV00474, Date: 2024-05-09 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 20SMCV00474    Hearing Date: May 9, 2024    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPARTMENT

207

HEARING DATE

May 9, 2024

CASE NUMBER

20SMCV00474

MOTION

Motion for Summary Adjudication

MOVING PARTIES

Defendants Park Overland Apartments LLC and Moss and Company, Inc.

OPPOSING PARTY

Plaintiff Lauren Kutasi

 

MOVING PAPERS:

 

  1. Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Adjudication; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of Douglas L. Day
  2. Volume of Exhibits
  3. Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts

 

OPPOSITION PAPERS:

 

  1. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion for Summary Adjudication
  2. Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
  3. Declaration of Lauren Kutasi

 

REPLY PAPERS:

 

  1. Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Adjudication
  2. Evidentiary Objections

 

BACKGROUND

 

Plaintiff Lauren Kutasi (“Plaintiff”) filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging causes of action for (1) Tortuous [sic] Breach of Warranty of Habitability; (2) Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; (3) Nuisance; (4) Business & Professions Code § 17200; (5) Negligence; (6) Breach of Contract; (8)[1] Intentional Interference with Estate (Civ Code 789.3); and (9) Violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, stemming from allegedly uninhabitable conditions in the residential property Plaintiff leased from Defendants from January 1, 2012 through February 27, 2020.  (FAC ¶ 2.) 

 

Defendants Park Overland Apartments, LLC and Moss and Company, Inc. (“Defendants”) now move for summary adjudication “on the grounds that all of Plaintiff’s claims for damages for physical injury arising from her tenancy at the Subject Property are barred by the statute of limitations, that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, and that Defendants are entitled to summary adjudication as a matter of law.”  (Notice of Motion and Motion.)

 

Plaintiff opposes the motion and Defendants Reply.

 

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

 

            The Court rules as follows with respect to the Defendants’ objections to Plaintiff’s evidence:

 

  1. Overruled
  2. Overruled
  3. Overruled
  4. Overruled

 

LEGAL STANDARDS – MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

 

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty if that party contends that there is no merit to the cause of action, defense, or claim for damages, or if the party contends that there is no duty owed.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)  “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”  (Ibid., emphasis added)  A cause of action has no merit if: (1) one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established, even if that element is separately pleaded, or (2) a defendant establishes an affirmative defense to that cause of action.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (n); Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 583.)  Once the defendant has shown that a cause of action has no merit, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2); Union Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 583.) 

 

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” ¿(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (hereafter Aguilar).) ¿“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” ¿(Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].)  Further, in line with Aguilar, “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise.  If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.”  (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.) 

 

Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.”  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].) 

 

DISCUSSION

 

            Defendants move for summary adjudication of all Plaintiff’s claims for damages from physical injuries, on the basis that they are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.  However, “a motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)  Therefore, the Court reviews the allegations of the First Amended Complaint to determine which causes of action, if any, will be disposed of by virtue of Plaintiff’s claims for damages from physical injuries.

 

            The first cause of action alleges, “As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ breach of the warranty of habitability, Plaintiffs [sic] has sustained special, general and property damage in amounts to be determined at trial.”  (FAC ¶ 25.)  Therefore, summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s request for damages arising from physical injury would not completely dispose of the first cause of action.

 

            The second cause of action alleges “As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, the value of the leasehold held by Plaintiff has been materially diminished.  Consequently, Plaintiffs [sic] has been damaged in an amount to be established at trial” and “As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff has sustained general, special and property damages, civil penalties, with amounts to be determined at trial.”  (FAC ¶¶ 30-31.)  Therefore, summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s request for damages arising from physical injury would not completely dispose of the second cause of action.

 

            The third cause of action alleges, “As a direct and proximate result thereof, Plaintiff has sustained general, special and property damage in amounts to be determined at trial.”  (FAC ¶ 38.)  Therefore, summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s request for damages arising from physical injury would not completely dispose of the third cause of action.

 

            The fourth cause of action alleges, “Plaintiff was harmed as a result of said practices by paying full monthly rent for the unit with material deficiencies and ongoing construction, harassment and nuisance” and “As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned acts and omissions, the Defendants have been unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs are entitled to restitution in an amount to be proven at trial.”  (FAC ¶¶ 42, 44.)  Therefore, summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s request for damages arising from physical injury would not completely dispose of the fourth cause of action.

 

            The fifth cause of action alleges, “As a proximate result of the above-mentioned conduct, Plaintiff suffered general damages, including, but not limited to property damage, emotional distress and pain, suffering, and inconvenience.”  (FAC ¶ 49.)  Therefore, summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s request for damages arising from physical injury would not completely dispose of the fifth cause of action.

 

            The sixth cause of action realleges and incorporates by reference all above allegations and seeks damages for Defendants’ alleged breach of the lease agreement.  The prior allegations indicate Defendants continued to charge Plaintiff rent but failed to provide Plaintiff a habitable property in return.  (FAC ¶¶ 53-57.)  Therefore, summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s request for damages arising from physical injury would not completely dispose of the sixth cause of action.

 

            There is no seventh cause of action alleged. 

 

            The eighth cause of action alleges, “Plaintiffs [sic] was harmed as a result of said behavior because it caused and continues to cause him [sic] severe emotional distress.”  (FAC ¶ 67.)  Therefore, summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s request for damages arising from physical injury would not completely dispose of the eighth cause of action.

 

Similarly, the ninth cause of action alleges, “As a proximate result of the above-mentioned conduct, Plaintiff suffered general damages, including, but not limited to emotional distress and pain, suffering, and inconvenience.”  (FAC ¶ 76.)  Therefore, summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s request for damages arising from physical injury would not completely dispose of the ninth cause of action.  (See Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 396–397 [“recovery may be had for emotional distress alone without resulting physical disability.”]; Bikkina v. Mahadevan (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 70, 88 [“Shame, humiliation, embarrassment, or anger can constitute emotional distress, but it must be severe and not trivial or transient.”])

 

Nor does Defendants’ motion dispose of a claim for damages.  Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(1) explains, “A party may move for summary adjudication […] as to one or more claims for damages […] if the party contends […] that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code[.]”  Section 3294 of the Civil Code pertains to exemplary or punitive damages in cases where there has been oppression, fraud, or malice.  Defendants do not seek to dispose of Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.

 

Nor would Defendants’ motion dispose of Plaintiff’s claim for special damages, which includes rent wrongfully paid, or Plaintiff’s claim for general damages, which includes emotional distress.

           

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 

Because Defendants have not identified a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for damages, or issue of duty that would be completely disposed by Defendants’ motion, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication.

 

Defendants shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file the notice with a proof of service regarding the same. 

 

 

 

 

 

DATED:  May 9, 2024                                                           ___________________________

                                                                                          Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court

 



[1] The FAC does not list a Seventh Cause of Action.