Judge Michael E. Whitaker, Case 20STCV15459 2023-04-18 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 20STCV15459, Date: 2023-04-18 Tentative Ruling

PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged). Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.

In the complaint filed on April 23, 2020, Plaintiffs Rafael Reyna (“Plaintiff Rafael”) and Christel Reyna (“Plaintiff Christel”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege Plaintiff Rafael was physically assaulted, while speaking with Plaintiff Christel on the phone and walking to his car in the parking lot of Dodger Stadium. Plaintiffs further allege that the delay in providing assistance to Plaintiff Rafael exacerbated his injuries.

Defendant Los Angeles Dodgers, LLC (“Defendant”) moves the Court for orders compelling Plaintiffs to serve further responses to the following discovery requests:

Plaintiff Rafael has not filed an opposition to Motion A. Plaintiff Christel filed an opposition to Motion B as amended on April 5, 2023; Defendant filed a reply on April 11, 2023.

Per the Eighth Amended Standing Order for Procedures in the Personal Injury Hub Courts Effective October 10, 2022 (Filed September 20, 2022), ¶ 9E, “PI Hub Courts will not hear Motions to Compel Further Discovery Responses to Discovery until the parties have engaged in an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC). PI Hub Courts may deny or continue a Motion to Compel Further Responses to Discovery if parties fail to schedule and complete an IDC before the scheduled hearing on a Motion to Compel Further Responses to Discovery.”

Here, Defendant scheduled and noticed an IDC for January 24, 2023, but Plaintiffs failed to attend. Thus, the Court finds that Defendant has complied with the Eighth Amended Standing Order.

A notice of motion to compel further responses must be “given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which” the parties have agreed in writing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (c).) Failure to file such a motion within this time period constitutes a waiver of any right to compel further responses to demands for production of documents. (Ibid.)

Here, Defendant filed the motions on the date set forth above. Plaintiffs have not objected to the timeliness of the motions.

A motion to compel must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.040. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) A meet and confer declaration must state facts showing a reasonable and good-faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented in the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.)

“The Discovery Act requires that, prior to the initiation of a motion to compel, the moving party declare that he or she has made a serious attempt to obtain an informal resolution of each issue. This rule is designed ‘to encourage the parties to work out their differences informally so as to avoid the necessity of a formal order. . . . This, in turn, will lessen the burden on the court and reduce the unnecessary expenditure of resources by litigants through promotion of informal, extrajudicial resolution of discovery disputes.” (Townsend v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1434-1435, citations omitted [cleaned up].) To comply, “A reasonable and good-faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with [opposing counsel]. Rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.” (Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1439; see also Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294 [to satisfy the attempt at informal resolution required in section 2016.040 opposing parties must do more than try to persuade each other of their errors].) In short, the Discovery Act “requires that there be a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution.” (Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438.)

To that end, trial courts are entrusted with discretion and judgment to determine the necessary effort required to satisfy the requirement of an informal resolution. (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 433.) In determining if parties have satisfied section 2016.040, judges may consider “the history of the litigation, the nature of the interaction between counsel, the nature of the issues, the type and scope of discovery requested, the prospects for success and other similar factors can be relevant.” (Id. at pp. 431-432 [holding that the trial court was correct in determining that sending a letter with oppositions was an insufficient attempt at an informal resolution].) In sum, meet and confer efforts should go beyond merely sending letters to each other stating each party’s respective positions.

Here, as set forth in the Declaration of Leigh P. Robie, counsel for Defendant, the Court finds that Defendant has engaged in a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of the issues presented in the motions. (See Declaration of Leigh P. Robie, ¶¶ 4-9, Exhibits 3 & 5; see also Declaration of Leigh P. Robie (filed with Amended Motion B), ¶ 9.) [1]

California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345 requires that any motion involving the content of discovery contain a separate statement with the text of each request, the response, and a statement of factual and legal reasons for why an order compelling further responses is warranted.

Here, Defendant has filed separate statements related to the motions which comply with Rule 3.1345.

“The purpose of the discovery rules is to enhance the truth-seeking function of the litigation process and eliminate trial strategies that focus on gamesmanship and surprise. In other words, the discovery process is designed to make a trial less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.” (Juarez v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 389 [cleaned up].)

Where a party objects, or responds inadequately, to discovery requests, a motion lies to compel further responses, and that party has the burden to justify the objections or inadequate responses. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255; Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a) [motion to compel further responses lies “[o]n receipt of a response to a demand for inspection”].) “A trial court's determination of a motion to compel discovery is reviewed for abuse of discretion. However, when the facts asserted in support of and in opposition to the motion are in conflict, the trial court's factual findings will be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence.” (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733 [cleaned up].)

With respect to demands for inspection of documents or other items, the Discovery Act provides as follows:

The party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to each item or category of item by any of the following: (1) A statement that the party will comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling by the date set for the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 2031.030 and any related activities. (2) A representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of a particular item or category of item. (3) An objection to the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subd. (a).) “A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. The statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.)

“The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. Protection of informational privacy is the provision’s central concern. . . . The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.^{^[2]} The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [cleaned up].)

“Legally recognized privacy interests [include] interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information (‘informational privacy’) . . . .” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.) “A particular class of information is [sensitive or confidential] when well-established social norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over its dissemination and use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity.” (Ibid.)

It is “well-settled” that “patients have a right to privacy with respect to information contained in . . . [their] medical records.” (Grafilo v. Wolfsohn (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1024, 1034.) Indeed, a patient’s right to privacy “is protected by case law as well as state and federal statutes and regulations.” (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 621, 641 (hereafter County of Los Angeles).) Additionally, “[t]he privacy interest in psychiatric records is particularly strong, and in some respects, entitled to more robust protection than other types of medical records.” (Grafilo v. Soorani (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 497, 507.)

“As one court explained in discussing the examination of medical records vis-à-vis the right to privacy: the information that may be recorded in a doctor’s files is broad-ranging. The chronology of ailments and treatment is potentially sensitive. Patients may disclose highly personal details of lifestyle and information concerning sources of stress and anxiety. These are matters of great sensitivity going to the core of the concerns for the privacy of information about an individual.” (County of Los Angeles, 65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 641–642 [cleaned up].)

In Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859, it was recognized that “the filing of a lawsuit may implicitly bring about a partial waiver of one’s constitutional right of . . . privacy.” However, the California Supreme Court held that “the scope of such ‘waiver’ must be narrowly rather than expansively construed.” (Ibid.) In other words, “while [a plaintiff] may not withhold information which relates to any physical or mental condition which they have put in issue by bringing this lawsuit, they are entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past.” (Ibid.) Therefore, it follows that a patient cannot reasonably expect certain matters to remain private if they are related to the specific issues that the patient has himself brought before a court. On the other hand, it is objectively reasonable to expect health care records that are unrelated to a current legal dispute to remain private.

· Demand No. 2: GRANTED – incomplete response per Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230.

· Demand No. 4: GRANTED – response is unclear as it references items not requested – “documents” as opposed to “pictures”

· Demand No. 5: GRANTED – response is unclear as it references items not requested – “documents” as opposed to “videos”

· Demand No. 6: GRANTED – response is unclear as it references items not requested – “documents” as opposed to “videos”

· Demand No. 7: GRANTED – response is unclear as it references items not requested – “documents” as opposed to “text messages”

· Demand No. 8: GRANTED – response is unclear as it references items not requested – “documents” as opposed to “text messages”

· Demand No. 10: GRANTED – incomplete response per Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230. In particular, Plaintiff Rafael has not indicated whether a reasonable inquiry has been made of his mobile phone carrier for responsive data.

· Demand No. 11: GRANTED – incomplete response per Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230. In particular, Plaintiff Rafael has not indicated whether a reasonable inquiry has been made of his mobile phone carrier for responsive data.

· Demand No. 12: GRANTED – incomplete response per Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230. In particular, Plaintiff Rafael has not indicated whether a reasonable inquiry has been made of his mobile phone carrier for responsive data.

· Demand No. 2: DENIED – Vague and overbroad as to time/scope in violation of Plaintiff Christel’s Right to Privacy

As set forth above, the Court grants in part Defendant’s Motion A per Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, and orders Plaintiff Rafael to serve further verified responses to the subject discovery request within 30 days of notice of the Court’s orders. Further, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion B.

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s orders and file a proof of service of such.

[1] Counsel for Plaintiffs, Brittan N. Cortney, does not dispute the representations of counsel for Defendant regarding the meet and confer efforts. (Declaration of Brittan N. Cortney, ¶¶ 5, 7.) However, the Court notes that the Declaration of Brittan N. Cortney is unsigned and thus defective.

[2] “This initial inquiry is necessary to permit courts to weed out claims that involve so insignificant or de minimis an intrusion on constitutionally protected privacy interests as not even to require an explanation or justification by the defendant.” (Lewis v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 561, 571 [cleaned up].)

DEPARTMENT	32
HEARING DATE	April 18, 2023
CASE NUMBER	20STCV15459
MOTIONS	Motions to Compel Responses to Demands for Inspection
MOVING PARTY	Defendant Los Angeles Dodgers, LLC
OPPOSING PARTIES	Plaintiffs Rafael Reyna and Christel Reyna