Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 20STCV17935, Date: 2022-09-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV17935    Hearing Date: September 27, 2022    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

            Plaintiff Taunishia Cruz sued Defendants Chloe Xiang Hua Li (“Li”), Xinggang Quan (“Quan”), City of Los Angeles (“City”), Sully-Miller Contracting Company (“Sully-Miller”), and D.B. Electric, Inc. (“D.B. Electric”) for injuries she sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident. 

            Defendant City filed a cross-complaint against Defendants/Cross-Defendants Li and Quan for indemnification, apportionment of fault, and declaratory relief. 

            Defendants/Cross-Defendants/Cross-Complainants Li and Quan filed their operative First Amended Cross-Complaint against Defendant/Cross-Complainant/Cross-Defendant City and Cross-Defendant Michelle Tatum (“Tatum”) for indemnification, apportionment of fault, and declaratory relief. 

            Defendant/Cross-Complainant Sully-Miller filed a cross-complaint against Roes 1 through 25 for equitable indemnity, apportionment, contribution, implied indemnity, and declaratory relief. 

            Defendant/Cross-Complainant D.B. Electric filed a cross-complaint against Zoes 1-100 for equitable indemnity, apportionment, contribution, implied indemnity, and declaratory relief.

Cross-Defendant Tatum now moves for a court order finding the settlement entered into between Tatum and Plaintiff was made in good faith.  No opposition has been filed.

ANALYSIS

Under section 877.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, “[a] determination by the court that [a] settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor . . . from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor . . . for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (c).)  Additionally, a determination that a settlement was made in good faith will reduce the claims against the non-settling defendants by the amount specified in the settlement agreement.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (a).)  “The party asserting the lack of good faith has the burden of proof on that issue.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d).) 

Section 877 requires “that the courts review [settlement] agreements made under its aegis to insure that the settlements appropriately balance the . . . statute’s dual objectives” (i.e., providing an “equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault” and encouraging parties to resolve their disputes by way of settlement).  (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 494 (hereafter, Tech-Bilt).)  In Tech-Bilt, the California Supreme Court set forth the factors to consider when determining whether a settlement was made in good faith.  The Tech-Bilt factors are: (1) a rough approximation of plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (4) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial; (5) the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the non-settling defendants.  (Id. at pp. 498-501.)  “Practical considerations obviously require that the [trial court’s] evaluation [of the settlement] be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.”  (Id. at p. 499.) 

“The party asserting the lack of good faith . . . [is] permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to [the above] factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of [Section 877.6].  Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.”  (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499–500.) 

The moving party on an unopposed motion for determination of good faith settlement, however, is not required to set forth a full discussion of the Tech-Bilt factors by declaration or affidavit. The moving party on an unopposed motion for determination of good faith settlement need only advance a motion setting forth the basic grounds for the determination of good faith and a declaration setting forth a brief background of the case. (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261.)

            According to Cross-Defendant Tatum’s counsel, Edward E. Dollar (“Dollar”), this lawsuit arises from a two-vehicle collision that occurred around 9:10 a.m. on November 6, 2020 at the intersection of Trinity Street and Adams Boulevard in Los Angeles.  (Declaration of Edward E. Dollar, ¶ 2.)  Dollar declares that, at the time of the accident, Plaintiff was operating a 2021 Kia Seltos that was struck by a 2006 Chrysler PT Cruiser that was operated by Cross-Defendant Tatum, causing Plaintiff’s vehicle to crash into a parked 2003 Honda ELE and Cross-Defendant Tatum’s vehicle to strike a 2013 Infiniti G37.  (Ibid.)  Dollar further states that on February 4, 2022 Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Tatum entered into an agreement to resolve all claims Plaintiff has against Cross-Defendant Tatum in exchange for a policy limit settlement of $15,000.00 conditioned upon their submission to a declaration of no other insurance or assets.  (Id. at  ¶ 4.)  Dollar indicates that the settlement was reached through arm’s-length negotiations after counsel were able to conduct sufficient investigation.  (Id. at ¶ 5.)  Dollar also states that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and made in good faith.  (Ibid.)

            The Court finds Cross-Defendant Tatum has presented sufficient, competent evidence demonstrating the settlement was made in good faith. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Cross-Defendant Tatum’s Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement

            The settlement between Cross-Defendant Tatum and Plaintiff is a good faith settlement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6.  All claims against the settling parties for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault, are barred pursuant to Section 877.6, subdivision (c).

Cross-Defendant Tatum shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a  proof of service of such.