Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 20STCV30342, Date: 2022-09-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV30342    Hearing Date: September 9, 2022    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

            Defendant Minghua Wang dba Minghua Laundry moves to set aside the Clerk of the Court’s entry of default on July 20, 2021, and the default judgment entered against Defendant on April 18, 2022.  Plaintiff Fang Li opposes the motion.

ANALYSIS

Per Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), a court “may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” In addition, a court must vacate a default or dismissal when a motion for relief under Section 473, subdivision (b) is filed timely and accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect “unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)  

The party or the legal representative must seek such relief “within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b); see Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980 [“because more than six months had elapsed from the entry of default, and hence relief under section 473 was unavailable”]; People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2011) 200 Ca.App.4^th 712, 721 [motion for relief under section 473 must be brought “within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months”]).  “The six-month limit is mandatory; a court has no authority to grant relief under section 473, subdivision (b), unless an application is made within the six-month period.”  (Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 340, citations omitted.) 

Here, the Clerk of the Court entered default as to Defendant on July 20, 2021. 

Defendant filed this motion on June 7, 2022, which is ten months and eighteen days after the Clerk of the Court’s entry of default.  Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant’s motion to set aside the Clerk of the Court’s entry of default to be untimely.  Because Defendant’s motion is untimely with respect to the Clerk of the Court’s entry of default, the Court is thus unable to set aside the default judgment entered against Defendant despite Defendant’s motion being timely in that regard.  (See Pulte Homes Corp. v. Williams Mechanical, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 267, 273 [finding that where a motion to set aside default and default judgment is untimely as to the default but still timely as to the default judgment, a court cannot set aside a default judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 “because that would be ‘an idle act’”].)[1] 

            Finally, Defendant’s argument that the default judgment is void for failure to satisfy the notice requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 580 is incorrect.  Section 580 provides, in relevant part, “[t]he relief granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint, in the statement require by Section 425.11, or in the statement provided for by Section 425.115[.]”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 580, subd. (a).)  Defendant fails to establish that the relief granted to Plaintiff on April 18, 2022, exceeds the amount provided in the statement of damages Plaintiff served on Defendant on October 21, 2020.  Instead, Defendant conflates Plaintiff’s Request for Entry of Default filed on July 20, 2021, and Plaintiff’s subsequent Request for Court Judgment filed on March 28, 2022, in connection with the Court’s entry of default judgment on April 18, 2022.  Defendant incorrectly asserts, first, that the July 20, 2021, Request for Entry of Default must include state the amount of Plaintiff’s proposed judgment, and second, that Plaintiff’s failure to include such amounts voids the judgment.  Defendant’s argument is not supported by statute or case law, including Code of Civil Procedure section 580.  Defendant’s argument is thus without merit.

            Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to set aside default and default judgment. 

            The Clerk of the Court shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling.