Judge Michael E. Whitaker, Case 20STCV30481 2022-09-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 20STCV30481, Date: 2022-09-13 Tentative Ruling

PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged). Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.

Plaintiffs Jose R. Torres (“Jose”) and Catherine Torres (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege they sustained injuries when a bus operated by defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“Metro”) and driven by defendant Alfredo Gallardo (“Gallardo”) struck Jose’s parked vehicle. (Complaint, ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs allege Gallardo was operating the bus at an excessive rate of speed and lost control of the bus, causing it to collide with Jose’s vehicle. (Ibid.) Metro moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ complaint. Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.)

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].) Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

With respect to Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections, the Court rules as follows:

Under Evidence Code section 451, “[j]udicial notice shall be taken of the following: (a) The decisional, constitutional, and public statutory law of this state and of the United States and the provisions of any charter described in Section 3, 4, or 5 of Article XI of the California Constitution…(f) Facts and propositions of generalized knowledge that are so universally known that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute. ” (Evid. Code, § 451, subds. (a), (f).)

Under Evidence Code section 452, “[j]udicial notice may be taken of the following matters to the extent that they are not embraced within Section 451: (a) The decisional, constitutional, and statutory law of any state of the United States and the resolutions and private acts of the Congress of the United States and of the Legislature of this state. (b) Regulations and legislative enactments issued by or under the authority of the United States or any public entity in the United States. (c) Official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States (d) Record of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States…(g) Facts and propositions that are of such common knowledge within the territorial jurisdictions of the court that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute. (h) Facts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capably of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (a)-(d), (g), (h).)

The Court “shall take notice of any matter specified in Section 452 if a party requests it and: (a) Gives each adverse party sufficient notice of the request, through the pleadings or otherwise, to enable such adverse party to prepare to meet the request; and (b) Furnishes the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter.” (Evid. Code, § 453.)

Here, the Court grants Metro’s requests for judicial notice Nos. 1-7 per Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d). The Court grants Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice No. 2, and denies Plaintiffs’ requests for judicial notice Nos. 1, 3-5.

Metro moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ sole cause of action for negligence. Metro asserts Plaintiffs cannot establish that Metro breached a duty to Plaintiffs or that an act or omission on the part of Metro caused Plaintiffs’ harm.

The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; and (3) harm to the plaintiff caused by that breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.) “[R]ecovery in a negligence action depends as a threshold matter on whether the defendant had a duty to use due care . . . .” (Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 397 [cleaned up].)

“To state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish the defendant owed a legal duty of care. Generally speaking, all persons have a duty to take reasonable care in their activities to avoid causing injury, though particular policy considerations may weigh in favor of limiting that duty in certain circumstances.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 209 [hereafter, “Brown”].) In general, “[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” (Civ. Code, § 1714.) Section 1714 “establishes the default rule that each person has a duty to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 214.)

Breach occurs when the defendant’s conduct falls below the standard of care established by law for the protection of others. (Rest.2d Torts, § 282; Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 396-397.) The usual standard is what an ordinarily prudent person would do under the circumstances. (Tucker v. Lombardo (1956) 47 Cal.2d 457, 463-464.) While not dispositive, custom and practice in the local business or social community may be considered in establishing a standard of care. (Bullis v. Security Pacific National Bank (1978) 21 Cal.3d 801, 809.) Further, compliance with all safety rules and codes does not establish due care as a matter of law, but may be considered in determining due care. (Amos v. Alpha Property Management (1999) 73 Cal.app.4th 895, 901.)

Causation is established by showing that a defendant’s breach of duty was a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff’s injury, and there is no legal rule relieving defendant from liability. (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1205.) Defendant’s negligence is the actual cause, or cause in fact, of plaintiff’s injury if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. (Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041, 1052.) The doctrine of proximate cause relieves defendants from liability for injuries they, in fact, caused, based on considerations of policy and justice. (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1205.) But proximate cause only becomes relevant after it has first been determined that defendant’s conduct was the cause in fact of plaintiff’s injury. (See Rest.2d Torts, § 431, subd. (a).)

“A defendant or cross-defendant has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); accord Doe v. Good Samaritan Hosp. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 653, 661 [“It is not until the defendant meets this burden that the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the defense”].)

Furthermore, “[t]he requirement of a separate statement from the moving party and a responding statement from the party opposing summary judgment serves two functions: to give the parties notice of the material facts at issue in the motion and to permit the trial court to focus on whether those facts are truly undisputed.” (Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1210.) Stated in a different way, “[t]he purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is to permit a party to show that material factual claims arising from the pleadings need not be tried because they are not in dispute. The purpose is carried out in section 437c, subdivision (b)(1) by requiring the moving party to include in the moving papers a separate statement setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts which the moving party contends are undisputed together with a reference to the supporting evidence. The complaint measures the materiality of the facts tendered in a defendant's challenge to the plaintiff's cause of action, hence the moving party's separate statement must address the material facts set forth in the complaint.” (Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 168 [cleaned up].) And “[w]here the evidence presented by defendant does not support judgment in his favor, the motion must be denied without looking at the opposing evidence, if any, submitted by plaintiff.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 940.)

In light of the Court’s rulings on Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections, the Court finds Metro has not proffered sufficient competent evidence to establish there is no triable issue of material fact and that Metro is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Stated differently, Metro has provided advanced sufficient competent evidence to support Undisputed Material Facts Nos. 5, 6 and 7.

Accordingly, the Court denies Metro’s motion for summary judgment. The Clerk of the Court shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling.

[1] Metro advances additional evidence in connection with its reply papers. The Court declines to consider this evidence, as Plaintiff has not had an opportunity to respond. (San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 316 [“Where a remedy as drastic as summary judgment is involved, due process requires a party be fully advised of the issues to be addressed and be given adequate notice of what facts it must rebut in order to prevail”]; see also Wall Street Network Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171.)

DEPARTMENT	32
HEARING DATE	September 13, 2022
CASE NUMBER	20STCV30481
MOTION	Motion for Summary Judgment
MOVING PARTY	Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority
OPPOSING PARTIES	Plaintiffs Jose R. Torres and Catherine Torres