Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 20STCV30522, Date: 2023-01-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV30522    Hearing Date: January 13, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPARTMENT

32

HEARING DATE

January 13, 2023

CASE NUMBER

20STCV30522

MOTION

Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Summary Adjudication

MOVING PARTY

Defendant Bird Rides, Inc.

OPPOSING PARTY

Plaintiff Robert Lawrence

 

MOVING PAPERS:

 

  1. Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative Summary Adjudication; Memorandum of Points and Authorities
  2. Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative Summary Adjudication
  3. Declaration of Sarah G. Odegaard in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative Summary Adjudication
  4. Appendix of Evidence in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative Summary Adjudication
  5. Declaration of Jonathan Grubb in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative Summary Adjudication

 

OPPOSITION PAPERS:

 

  1. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative Summary Adjudication; Memorandum of Points and Authorities (hereafter, “Plaintiff’s Opposition”)
  2. Separate Statement in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative Summary Adjudication
  3. Appendix of Evidence in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative Summary Adjudication
  4. Declaration of Robert Lawrence in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative Summary Adjudication
  5. Declaration of Kia Sinay in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative Summary Adjudication
  6. Declaration of K.T. Tran in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative Summary Adjudication
  7. Objections to Evidence Submitted in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative Summary Adjudication

 

REPLY PAPERS:

 

  1. Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative Summary Adjudication
  2. Response to Plaintiff’s Separate Statement in Support of Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
  3. Opposition to Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendant’s Evidence  
  4. Objections to Plaintiff’s Evidence in Support of Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment

 

BACKGROUND

 

Plaintiff Robert Lawrence (Plaintiff) sued Defendant Bird Rides, Inc. (Defendant) for negligence and public nuisance based on injuries Plaintiff sustained when he tripped and fell over an electric scooter owned by Defendant which was allegedly lying flat on a sidewalk.  Defendant moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, on Plaintiff’s complaint.   Plaintiff opposes the motion.  Defendant replies to the opposition.

 

LEGAL STANDARDS –SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

 

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Ibid.)  

 

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.  Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”  (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)  Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.”  (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].) 

 

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty if that party contends that there is no merit to the cause of action, defense, or claim for damages, or if the party contends that there is no duty owed.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)  “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”  (Ibid.)  A cause of action has no merit if: (1) one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established, even if that element is separately pleaded, or (2) a defendant establishes an affirmative defense to that cause of action.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (n); Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 583.)  Once the defendant has shown that a cause of action has no merit, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2); Union Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 583.) 

EVIDENCE  

 

With respect to Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections, the Court finds Plaintiff’s objections do not comply with the requirements set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354.  Rules 3.1354 provides in pertinent part:

 

All written objections to evidence must be served and filed separately from the other papers in support of or in opposition to the motion. Objections to specific evidence must be referenced by the objection number in the right column of a separate statement in opposition or reply to a motion, but the objections must not be restated or reargued in the separate statement. Each written objection must be numbered consecutively and must:

 

(1) Identify the name of the document in which the specific material objected to is located;

(2) State the exhibit, title, page, and line number of the material objected to;

(3) Quote or set forth the objectionable statement or material; and

(4) State the grounds for each objection to that statement or material.

 

Written objections to evidence must follow one of the following two formats:   [¶] . . . [¶]

 

A party submitting written objections to evidence must submit with the objections a proposed order. The proposed order must include places for the court to indicate whether it has sustained or overruled each objection. It must also include a place for the signature of the judge. The court may require that the proposed order be provided in electronic form. The proposed order must be in one of the following two formats:  [¶] . . . [¶]

 

(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b)-(c), emphasis added.)  Here, Plaintiff did not number each objection consecutively nor separately and adequately define each piece of evidence he was objecting to.  Plaintiff did not submit a proposed order following one of the prescribed formats.  Nevertheless, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections.

 

            Regarding Defendant’s evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Robert Lawrence, the Court rules as follows:

 

  1. Sustained.

  2. Overruled

  3. Overruled

  4. Overruled

  5. Overruled

  6. Overruled

  7. Overruled

  8. Overruled

  9. Overruled

 

            Regarding Defendant’s evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Kia Sinay, the Court rules as follows:

 

  1. Overruled

DISCUSSION

 

            Plaintiff’s complaint asserts causes of action for negligence and public nuisance against Defendant.   Defendant moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, arguing that Defendant did owe a duty of due care to Plaintiff, did not breach a duty of due care to Plaintiff, and Defendant’s breach of a duty of due care did not cause or contribute to Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.    

 

  1. ELEMENTS: NEGLIGENCE AND PUBLIC NUISNCE

 

The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; and (3) harm to the plaintiff caused by that breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.) 

 

To establish [a claim of public nuisance], [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:

 

1. That [name of defendant], by acting or failing to act, created a condition or permitted a condition to exist that [insert one or more of the following:]

[was harmful to health;] [or]

[was indecent or offensive to the senses;] [or]

[was an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property;] [or]

[unlawfully obstructed the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway;] [or]

[was [a/an] [fire hazard/specify other potentially dangerous condition] to [name of plaintiff]’s property;]

2. That the condition affected a substantial number of people at the same time;

3. That an ordinary person would be reasonably annoyed or disturbed by the condition;

4. That the seriousness of the harm outweighs the social utility of [name of defendant]'s conduct;

[5. That [name of plaintiff] did not consent to [name of defendant]'s conduct;]

6. That [name of plaintiff] suffered harm that was different from the type of harm suffered by the general public; and

7. That [name of defendant]'s conduct was a substantial factor in causing [name of plaintiff]'s harm.

 

(Judicial Council Of California Civil Jury Instruction 2020; see also Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1548.) “The elements of a cause of action for public nuisance include the existence of a duty and causation.”  (Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 542 [cleaned up].)  “Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim. The nuisance claim stands or falls with the determination of the negligence cause of action in such cases.”  (Ibid. [cleaned up].) 

 

  1. DEFENDANT’S EVIDENCE

     

                Defendant the following Undisputed Material Facts (UMFs), with supporting evidence, in support of its summary judgment motion, or in the alternative, summary adjudication motion.  Those Undisputed Material Facts are as follows: 

     

 

(UMF Nos. 23-51.) 

 

            Further, Defendant advances the declaration of Jonathan Grubb, Senior Director of City Technology for Defendant since 2018 who avers to the following:

 

 

(Declaration of Jonathan Grubb, ¶ 24, emphasis added, Exhibit E; see also UMF Nos. 4, 12.)

 

  1. PLAINTIFF’S EVIDENCE

     

                In opposition Plaintiff advances his declaration in which he declares as follows:

     

 

(Declaration of Robert Lawrence, ¶¶ 3-12, emphasis added.)  In addition, Plaintiff proffers his deposition testimony in which Plaintiff testified as to the location of the subject incident:  “That was on Main Street in Santa Monica, near Strand Avenue.  It was on the southwest corner of Strand and Main.”  (See Declaration of K.T. Tran, Exhibit 1, 25:13-18.)   Further, Plaintiff advances the declaration of Kia Sinay who states as follows:

 

 

(Declaration of Kia Sinay, ¶¶ 3-5.) 

 

            “The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to discover proof, to expedite litigation, and to provide for prompt disposition of actions where there is, in fact, no triable issue.”  (Versa Technologies, Inc. v. Superior Court (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 237, 240, emphasis added.)  Stated differently, if there is one triable issue of material fact, a trial court is without authority to grant a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication.  That is the precisely what is before this Court. 

 

            There is triable issue of material fact as to the location of the subject incident:  to wit, did the subject incident take place on Main Street near Bicknell Avenue as illustrated in Exhibit E to the Grubb’s declaration?  Or did the subject incident take place on Main Street between Strand Street and Hollister Avenue as declared by Plaintiff and Kia Sinay?  Equally important is whether the scooter depicted in Exhibit E of Grubb’s declaration is the same scooter depicted in Exhibits 1-3 of Plaintiff’s declaration.  If it is the same scooter, Defendant may not be liable to Plaintiff because the reasonable inference is that a third party created the hazard that caused or contributed to Plaintiff’s alleged injuries, not Defendant.  On the other hand, if it is not the same scooter, then Defendant may be liable to Plaintiff because it created or contributed to the risk of harm to Plaintiff.  There is no evidence in the record that the same scooter is depicted in photos proffered by the parties. [1]

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 

In considering the competent evidence proffered by Plaintiff and Defendant, and viewing said evidence most favorable toward Plaintiff, the Court finds that there are triable issues of material fact concerning whether Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of due care; whether Defendant’s breached the duty of due care; and whether Defendant’s breach of the duty of due care caused or contributed to Plaintiff’s injuries.  In particular, the Court finds that there are triable issues of material fact concerning Defendant’s Undisputed Material Facts 4 and 12.  In other words, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that Plaintiff cannot establish the requisite elements of his claims of negligence and public nuisance. 

 

Therefore, the Court denies Defendant’s motion for summary judgment or in the alternative motion for summary adjudication. 

 

The Clerk of the Court shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling.    



[1] “To state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish the defendant owed a legal duty of care. Generally speaking, all persons have a duty to take reasonable care in their activities to avoid causing injury, though particular policy considerations may weigh in favor of limiting that duty in certain circumstances.”  (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 209 (hereafter Brown).)  In general, “[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.”  (Civ. Code, § 1714.)  Section 1714 “establishes the default rule that each person has a duty to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.”  (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 214.) 

 

The issue before the Brown court concerned “[h]ow courts should decide whether a defendant has a legal duty to take action to protect the plaintiff from injuries caused by a third party.”  (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 209.)  “Duty is not universal; not every defendant owes every plaintiff a duty of care. A duty exists only if the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct.  Whether a duty exists is a question of law to be resolved by the court.”  (Id. at p. 213 [cleaned up].)  “[W]hether to recognize a duty to protect is governed by a two-step inquiry.  First, the court must determine whether there exists a special relationship between the parties or some other set of circumstances giving rise to an affirmative duty to protect.  Second, if so, the court must consult the factors described in Rowland[1] to determine whether relevant policy considerations counsel limiting that duty.”  (Id. at p. 209.) 

 

“Section 1714 states a broad rule, but it has limits. We have explained that the law imposes a general duty of care on a defendant only when it is the defendant who has created a risk of harm to the plaintiff, including when the defendant is responsible for making the plaintiff's position worse.   The law does not impose the same duty on a defendant who did not contribute to the risk that the plaintiff would suffer the harm alleged.  Generally, the person who has not created a peril is not liable in tort merely for failure to take affirmative action to assist or protect another from that peril.”  (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 214 [cleaned up].)

 

Further, “as a general matter, there is no duty to act to protect others from the conduct of third parties.”  (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 214.)   But “[t]he no-duty-to-protect rule is not absolute . . . .”  (Id. at p. 215.)  “In a case involving harm caused by a third party, a person may have an affirmative duty to protect the victim of another's harm if that person is in what the law calls a “special relationship” with either the victim or the person who created the harm.”  (Ibid.)