Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING - NO. 2

MOTION

            Defendant Lisa Jimenez (Defendant) appears specially and moves to quash service of the summons and complaint or in the alternative motion to dismiss.  Plaintiffs Raymond Ofoegbu and Fidelin Edoziem (collectively, Plaintiffs) oppose the motion. 

ANALYSIS

In the complaint, Plaintiffs allege the accident at issue occurred on September 22, 2018. (Complaint, ¶ 9.)  Hence, under Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1, Plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued on September 22, 2018 and the applicable statute of limitations lapsed on September 22, 2020.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1 [statute of limitations on a cause of action for negligence is two years].)  The Court notes Plaintiffs filed the Amendment to Complaint naming Lisa Jimenez as Doe 1 (hereafter Doe Amendment), after the statute of limitations lapsed, on October 17, 2022.   

“When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint, or the affidavit if the action is commenced by affidavit, and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly . . . .”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 474.) 

Code of Civil Procedure section 474 permits a plaintiff to amend complaints by adding parties as Doe defendants when the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant at the time the complaint is filed. The purpose of section 474 is to enable a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations when he or she is ignorant of the identity of the defendant. The cases discussing section 474 deal with whether the plaintiff was truly ignorant of the identity of the person brought into the case as a Doe defendant because if that requirement is met, the amendment to the complaint relates back to the date the complaint was filed and the statute of limitations is preserved.

(Davis v. Marin (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 380, 386–387 [cleaned up].)  And as stated in Weil & Brown:

Where a complaint is amended after the statute of limitations has run to identify a fictitiously-named defendant, and to assert a cause of action against that defendant not included in the original complaint, the amended complaint will be given relation back effect, so as to avoid the statute of limitations, provided:

• the original complaint stated a valid cause of action against the now-identified “Doe” defendant; and

• plaintiff was “genuinely ignorant” of the defendant's identity or the facts rendering defendant liable when the original complaint was filed; and

• the amended complaint, identifying the defendant, is based on the “same general set of facts” as the original and refers to the “same accident and same injuries.” (Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 600-601; San Diego Navy Broadway Complex Coalition v. California Coastal Comm'n (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 563, 579; Eghtesad v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 406, 415.)

   

  (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2022), ¶ 6:740, emphasis added (hereafter Relation Back Doctrine).)  A Doe defendant bears the burden to prove that the plaintiff was aware of the identity of the Doe defendant at the time the plaintiff filed the initial complaint. (See Breceda v. Gamsby (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 167, 179.)

   

            Yet, “Even a person whose identity was known to the plaintiff when the action was filed may be brough in under section 474 as a ‘Doe’ defendant if the plaintiff was initially unaware of that person’s true relationship to the injuries upon which the action was based; or if a change in law has indicated that persons not originally joined might also be held liable.  But in each of the cases allowing late joinder of known persons under section 474, there has been some showing that at the time the original complaint was filed the plaintiff was ignorant of something having a bearing upon the liability of the newly-summoned party.”  (Miller v. Thomas (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 440, 445.) 

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ Doe Amendment is defective because Plaintiffs were aware, or should have been aware, of Defendant’s identity at the time the complaint was filed.  Defendant advances her declaration stating: 

• I was involved in the motor vehicle accident on September 22, 2018 with the plaintiffs of the instant lawsuit.

• I was the driver and only occupant of the vehicle I was driving at the time of the subject accident.

• I subsequently exchanged information with the plaintiff driver at the scene of the accident on September 22, 2018.

(Declaration of Lisa Jimenez, ¶¶ 4-6.) 

In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that they did not know Defendant was driving the vehicle involved in the subject accident when they filed the complaint.  Plaintiffs advance the declaration of Raymond Ofoegbu who states:

• I was the driver of the vehicle involved in the incident on September 18, 20218 (sic) with defendant driver, Lisa Jiminez.

• The defendant driver, Lisa Jiminez, did not exchange her drivers license or any other identifying information other than her first name at the scene of the incident or at any other time.

• The defendant driver, Lisa Jiminez, stated that her husband had her drivers license.

   

  (Declaration of Raymond Ofoegbu, ¶¶ 3-5.)  Plaintiff Raymond Ofoegbu’s statements beg the following questions:  Did the driver refuse to divulge her last name at the time of the subject incident?  If the driver did not have a driver’s license, did Plaintiff inquire if she had other forms of identification such as the car registration, insurance card, etc.?  Did Plaintiff obtain a phone number from the driver, and if not, why?  Moreover, per the complaint, Plaintiff Fidelina Edoziem was a passenger at the time of the subject incident (see Complaint, ¶ 7) – does she have personal knowledge of Defendant’s purported refusal to divulge her last name?  The Court notes that Plaintiff Fidelina Edoziem did not submit a declaration in opposition to the motion. 

   

              Further, Plaintiffs advance the declaration of Hess Panah, counsel for Plaintiffs, in which he declares: 

   

• Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff, driver, Raymond Ofoegbu’s declaration attesting to the fact that Lisa Jiminez’s driver’s license was not presented at the scene. My office did not have defendant driver, Lisa Jiminez’s drivers license when we filed the complaint. Based upon investigative efforts and through the vehicle owners information, we were able to attain Lisa Jiminez’s information. In order to preserve the statute of limitations, my office file a complaint with DOE amendments 1-50.  Once we attained the defendant drivers name, we filed a DOE amendment as to Lisa Jiminez.

Interestingly, what is missing from Plaintiffs’ additional evidence in support of their position that they were truly ignorant of Defendant’s identity at the time the complaint was filed is two-fold:  first, what efforts did they undertake, and when, to determine Defendant’s full identity as the driver, and second, when did Plaintiffs first learn of Defendant’s full identity as the driver?  [1]  In the Court’s estimation, the information is critical because it would support Plaintiffs’ position that they did not know Defendant’s last name at the time of the subject incident, and would not have uncovered it but for their efforts. 

            As such, the Court gives more weight and credibility to Defendant’s declaration, and finds that Plaintiffs were not truly ignorant of Defendant’s identity at the time the complaint was filed.  Therefore, the Court determines that Plaintiffs’ complaint regarding Defendant is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Stated differently, the Court finds that the Doe Amendment does not relate back to the date of the filing of the complaint. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court grants in the alternative Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint as to  Defendant for the reasons stated above.  The Clerk of the Court shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling.