Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 20STCV36270, Date: 2022-12-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV36270 Hearing Date: December 16, 2022 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged). Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE RULING
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DEPARTMENT |
32 |
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HEARING DATE |
December 16, 2022 |
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CASE NUMBER |
20STCV36270 |
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MOTION |
Motion for Summary Judgment |
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Defendant Courtney Washington, M.D. | |
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OPPOSING PARTY |
Plaintiff Lavelle Stewart |
MOVING PAPERS:
REPLY PAPERS:
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lavelle Stewart (Plaintiff) sued Defendants Martin Luther King Jr. Los Angeles Healthcare Corporation dba Martin Luther King Jr. Community Hospital, Sindy Hsin-Pen Wei-Mester M.D., Courtney Washington M.D. (collectively, Defendants) for professional negligence. Plaintiff alleges, in pertinent part, that the Martin Luther King Jr. Community Hospital doctors were negligent in their treatment and care of Plaintiff when they misdiagnosed her with a general headache which was later diagnosed as a bilobed aneurysm. (See Complaint, ¶ 10.) Defendant Courtney Washington M.D. (Dr. Washington) moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff opposes the motion. Dr. Washington replies.
LEGAL STANDARDS – SUMMARY JUDGMENT
“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].) Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise. If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)
“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].) Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)
DISCUSSION
“Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) establishes the general duty of each person to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others. When applied to medical professionals, this duty of care imposes a duty to use such skill, prudence and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise.” (Flores v. Liu (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 278, 290 [cleaned up].) To prevail on a claim for negligence against a medical professional, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) a medical professional had a duty to use the skill, prudence and diligence that members of the profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) breach of that duty; (3) an injury that resulted from the breach of that duty; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the breach of that duty. (Banerian v. O’Malley (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 604, 612.)
“[T]he legal standard of care required by doctors is the standard of practice required by their own profession. The courts require only that physicians and surgeons exercise in diagnosis and treatment that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the medical profession under similar circumstances. Thus, liability is not found, and the label of malpractice is not placed upon a physician's actions, unless some deviation by the physician from the standard of care that his peers consider appropriate in the situation under review is proven.” (Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1081 [cleaned up].)
Expert testimony is generally the only admissible and relevant evidence on whether a medical professional has breached the standard of care. (Landeros v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 410 [“ ‘The standard of care against which the acts of a physician are to be measured is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts; it presents the basic issue in a malpractice action and can only be proved by their testimony (citations), unless the conduct required by the particular circumstances is within the common knowledge of the layman’ ”].) As the Court of Appeal has held, in reversing summary judgments for medical professionals: “The standard of care against which the acts of a physician are to be measured is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts; it presents the basic issue in a malpractice action and can only be proved by their testimony. California courts have incorporated the expert evidence requirement into their standard for summary judgment in medical malpractice cases. When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, defendant is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.” (Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 606-607 [cleaned up].) Further, a plaintiff “is entitled to all favorable inferences that may reasonably be derived from” an expert’s declaration which must be liberally construed. (See Fernandez v. Alexander (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 770, 782.)
Dr. Washington argues Plaintiff cannot establish that Dr. Washington breached the standard of care in her treatment and care of Plaintiff, nor that an act or omission by Dr. Washington caused or contributed to Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.
Dr. Washington relies on the declaration of David Barcay, M.D. (Dr. Barcay), who is a physician board certified in emergency, internal, and critical care medicine. Dr. Barcay is currently an attending physician of the emergency department at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center. (Declaration of David Barcay, M.D. ¶ 1.) Dr. Barcay reviewed the following in order to craft his declaration and form his opinions: Plaintiff’s medical records from Martin Luther King Jr. Community Hospital and Plaintiff’s deposition testimony. (Declaration of David Barcay, M.D., ¶ 2.)
Dr. Barcay opines that Dr. Washington met the applicable standard of care relative to Plaintiff’s treatment and care. (Declaration of David Barcay, M.D., ¶ 22.). Specifically, Dr. Barcay states, “Ms. Stewart came in with a complaint of a headache with nausea and vomiting. In order to determine whether this a condition more severe than a general headache, the standard of care is for the ER Physician to look for complaints of a sudden onset of the worst headache of the patient’s life that is unremitting 10/10 and sometimes associated with neurologic symptoms and loss of consciousness as well as whether the headache had a thunderclap onset i.e., an extremely painful headache that comes on suddenly without warning. Dr. Washington appropriately elicited information from Ms. Stewart regarding these symptoms and noted that while Ms. Stewart presented with acute head pain, there was no thunderclap onset and it was not the worst headache of her life. Neuromonitoring was appropriately ordered and throughout the patient’s hospital stay it was noted that the neurological assessments were normal.” (Declaration of David Barcay, M.D., ¶ 23.) Dr. Barcay further opines that “[i]t was also appropriate and met the standard of care for Dr. Washington to order a CT scan of the brain without contrast for the headache to further assess a cause for the headache.” (Declaration of David Barcay, M.D., ¶ 24.)
Dr. Washington’s evidence is sufficient to meet Dr. Washington’s burden of persuasion/production of evidence to show that Plaintiff will be unable to establish that Dr. Washington breached the standard of care with respect to the treatment and care of Plaintiff, and Dr. Washington’s breach of the standard of care caused or contributed to Plaintiff’s claimed injuries. Thus, Dr. Washington has shifted the burden of production to Plaintiff to raise triable issues of material fact.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff presented with symptoms more severe than a general headache and thus should have elicited Dr. Washington to order a CT scan of the brain with contrast. Plaintiff advances the following evidence to indicate that her complaints when she arrived at the hospital on the night in question indicated she was suffering from a condition more severe than a general headache:
Plaintiff further attests that based on Plaintiff’s presenting symptoms at the hospital which indicated a condition more severe than a general headache, Dr. Washington should have ordered a CT scan with contrast, and her failure to do so constitutes a breach of the applicable standard of care. Plaintiff advances the following evidence in support of this proposition:
The Court notes that Dr. Barclay’s assessment that Dr. Washington’s treatment followed the proper standard of care was in part based on the fact that, in regard to Plaintiff’s headache, “there was no thunderclap onset and it was not the worst headache of her life.” (Declaration of David Barcay, M.D., ¶ 24.). Plaintiff advances evidence creating a triable issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff did present to the hospital with a headache that had a thunderclap like onset and was experiencing 10 out of 10 pain. Further, Dr. Washington admits in her deposition that if she had understood Plaintiff’s headache to be sudden onset, she would have ordered a C.T. scan with contrast.
Accordingly, in considering the competent evidence proffered by Plaintiff and Dr. Washington, and viewing said evidence most favorably to Plaintiff, the Court finds that there are triable issues of material fact regarding whether Dr. Washington breached the standard of care with respect to the treatment and care of Plaintiff, and whether said breach caused or contributed to Plaintiffs’ claimed injuries.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The Court finds that Plaintiff has met her burden of production to make a prima facie showing that triable issues of material fact exist. The Court cannot determine as a matter of law that Dr. Washington complied with the applicable standard of care in relation to the treatment and care of Plaintiff, and no alleged negligent act or omission on the part of Dr. Washington caused, contributed to, or was a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries alleged by Plaintiff.
Therefore, the Court denies Dr. Washington’s motion for summary judgment. The Clerk of the Court shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling.