Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 20STCV46227, Date: 2023-05-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV46227 Hearing Date: May 19, 2023 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer
concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be
reached. If the parties are unable to
reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the
party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s
intention to submit. The email shall
include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information
(if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative
ruling. If the Court does not receive an
email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there
are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar
or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this
tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is
highly encouraged). Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative
ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the
subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE
RULING
DEPARTMENT |
32 |
HEARING DATE |
May 19, 2023 |
CASE NUMBER |
20STCV46227 |
MOTION |
Motion for Summary
Judgment; or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication |
MOVING PARTIES |
Defendants J.B.
Hunt Transport, Inc. and Marco Luevano |
OPPOSING PARTIES |
Plaintiffs
Yi-Chuan Chang, individually and as successor-in-interest to Te-Hsi Chang and
Chia-Yen Chang |
MOVING
PAPERS:
OPPOSITION
PAPERS:
REPLY PAPERS:
1. Reply
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
2. Objection
to Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Material Facts
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Te-Hsi Chang,
individually, and as successor-in-interest to the Estate of Chen Hsueh Chang,
Yi-Chuan Chang, and Chia-Yen Chang (collectively, Plaintiffs), sued Defendants
Marco Antonio Luevano and J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc. (collectively,
Defendants) based on an incident in which Defendants’ vehicle struck Decedent
Chen Hsueh Chang (Decedent) at an intersection, eventually resulting in
Decedent’s death.
Plaintiffs Te-Hsi Chang
(Father of Decedent), Yi-Chuan Chang (Sister of Decedent) and Chia-yen Chang
(Sister of Decedent) are Decedent’s father and sisters, respectively. On January 27, 2021, Plaintiff Te-Hsi Chang,
died, and on March 19, 2021, Plaintiff Yi-Chuan Chang was substituted in as
successor in interest for Plaintiff Te-Hsi Chang. (See March 19, 2021, Minute Order.)
Plaintiffs assert three causes
of action against Defendants in the Complaint: negligence; negligent hiring,
retention, or supervision; and wrongful death.
Defendants move for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary
adjudication, on Plaintiffs’ complaint. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. Defendants
reply.
LEGAL
STANDARDS –SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of
persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material
fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to
find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in
accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” ¿(Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (hereafter Aguilar).) ¿“[T]he
party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make
a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material
fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the
opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a
prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” ¿(Ibid.;
Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474
[summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary
adjudication motions].)
Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the
manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary
judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th. at p. 840
[cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or
summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the
light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of that party”].)
A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more
causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty
if that party contends that there is no merit to the cause of action, defense,
or claim for damages, or if the party contends that there is no duty owed. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.
(f)(1).) “A motion for summary
adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of
action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Ibid.) A cause of action has no merit if: (1) one or
more elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established, even if
that element is separately pleaded, or (2) a defendant establishes an
affirmative defense to that cause of action.
(See Code Civ. Proc., §
437c, subd. (n); Union Bank v. Superior
Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 583.)
Once the defendant has shown that a cause of action has no merit, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists
as to that cause of action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2); Union Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p.
583.) Additionally, in line with Aguilar,
“[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to
exercise. If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged
causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of
fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp.
v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)
EVIDENCE
With respect to Defendants’ “objections”
to Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Disputed and Undisputed Material Facts,
the Court finds it does not comply with the requirements of California Rules of
Court, rule 3.1354. Rule 3.1354 provides
in pertinent part:
All written objections to
evidence must be served and filed separately from the other papers in support
of or in opposition to the motion. Objections to specific evidence must be
referenced by the objection number in the right column of a separate statement
in opposition or reply to a motion, but the objections must not be restated or
reargued in the separate statement. Each written objection must be
numbered consecutively and must:
(1) Identify the name of the
document in which the specific material objected to is located;
(2) State the exhibit, title,
page, and line number of the material objected to;
(3) Quote or set forth the
objectionable statement or material; and
(4) State the grounds for each
objection to that statement or material.
Written objections to
evidence must follow one of the following two formats: [¶] . . . [¶]
A party submitting
written objections to evidence must submit with the objections a proposed order.
The proposed order must include places for the court to indicate whether it has
sustained or overruled each objection. It must also include a place for the
signature of the judge. The court may require that the proposed order be
provided in electronic form. The proposed order must be in one of the
following two formats: [¶] . . .
[¶]
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1354(b)-(c), emphasis added.)
Accordingly, the Court declines to rule on Defendants’ “objections”.
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ negligence
and negligent hiring, retention and supervision claims fail as a matter of law
because Plaintiffs seek damages which are only recoverable under a wrongful
death claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60. Defendants further argue Plaintiffs’
negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claim is barred under Diaz v.
Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148 (hereafter Diaz), based on Defendant
J.B. Hunt’s admission that Defendant Marco Antonio Luevano was acting
within the scope of employment when he struck Decedent with a vehicle.
Defendants
next argue that Plaintiffs’ wrongful death cause of action fails as matter of
law based on Plaintiffs’ lack of standing under Code of Civil Procedure 377.60.
1.
Absence of
Contested Material Facts
Preliminarily, the Court notes
that Plaintiffs have not disputed any of the relevant material facts raised in
Defendants’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment. Rather, Plaintiffs
contest the correct application of the law on said undisputed facts. As such, the Court shall assess the instant
motion based on the legal significance of the undisputed facts and resolve the
instant motion for summary judgment as a matter of law. (See Puentes v.
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 638, 643.)
2.
First and
Second Causes of Action: Negligence and Negligent Hiring, Retention or Supervision
As mentioned above, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to
state causes of action for negligence and negligent hiring, retention, or supervision
against Defendants. Plaintiffs are
seeking damages as a result of Decedent’s death, purportedly caused by the
negligent conduct of Defendants. But, as
Defendants argue, such damages are only available pursuant to a wrongful death
claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60. The Court agrees and notes that Plaintiffs
have failed to advance arguments in opposition to Defendants’ contention.
Based on the Court’s finding that Plaintiffs have failed to state causes
of action against Defendants for negligence and negligent hiring, retention,
and supervision, the Court does not need to reach Defendants argument that
Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claim is barred under Diaz.
Defendants contend that the
wrongful death cause of action fails, arguing Plaintiffs Yi-Chuan Chang and
Chia-Yen Chang, as Decedent’s sisters, lack standing to maintain a wrongful
death cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60.
Code of Civil Procedure section
377.60 establishes a statutory cause of action in favor of specified heirs of a
person who dies as a result of the wrongful act or neglect of another. (See
Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60.) Under a wrongful death cause of action, the
specified heirs are entitled to recover damages on their own behalf for the
loss they have sustained by the reason of the bodily injury victim’s death.
(See Corder v. Corder (2007) 41 Cal.4th 644, 651.) The elements of a
wrongful death action are (1) a tort such as negligence or another wrongful
act, (2) resulting death, and (3) loss/damage suffered by the heirs. (Lattimore
v. Dickey (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.) Section 377.60 establishes standing as
follows:
A cause
of action for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another may be asserted by any of the following persons or by the decedent's
personal representative on their behalf:
(a) The
decedent's surviving spouse, domestic partner, children, and issue of deceased
children, or, if there is no surviving issue of the decedent, the persons,
including the surviving spouse or domestic partner, who would be entitled to
the property of the decedent by intestate succession. If the parents of the
decedent would be entitled to bring an action under this subdivision, and the
parents are deceased, then the legal guardians of the decedent, if any, may
bring an action under this subdivision as if they were the decedent's parents.
(b)(1)
Whether or not qualified under subdivision (a), if they were dependent on the
decedent, the putative spouse, children of the putative spouse, stepchildren,
parents, or the legal guardians of the decedent if the parents are deceased.
(Code
Civ. Proc., § 377.60, subds. (a)-(b).)
Pursuant to intestate
succession, when a decedent leaves neither spouse nor issue, the estate passes
to the decedent’s parents. (Prob. Code,
§ 6402 (b)-(c).) [2] If the parents are deceased, then the
decedent’s estate passes to the decedent’s siblings. (Ibid.)
a.
Plaintiffs Yi-Chuan Chang and Chia-Yen
Chang, as Individuals
Plaintiffs allege that
Decedent passed away on March 1, 2019 as a result of the subject incident and
was survived by her father, Te-Hsi Chang, and two sisters, Yi-Chuan Chang and
Chia-Yen Chang. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 38,
66.) Te-Hsi Chang, Yi-Chuan Chang and
Chia-Yen Chang filed the complaint against Defendants on December 3, 2020.
When the wrongful death cause
of action accrued, and equally important, when the complaint was filed, Decedent’s
father, Te-Hsi Chang, was the only heir who had standing [3] to assert a wrongful death claim. (Mayo v. White (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d
1083, 1088; Medrano v. Kern County Sheriff's Officer (E.D. Cal. 2013)
921 F.Supp.2d 1009, 1018, citing Prob. Code, § 6402, subd. (c).)
On the other hand, Plaintiffs
Yi-Chuan Chang and Chia-Yen Chang, as the siblings of Decedent, lacked standing
to bring a wrongful death cause of action against Defendants. (See generally Chavez v. Carpenter (2001)
91 CA4th 1433, 1440-1444 [parents had no standing where deceased son was
survived by two-year-old daughter, notwithstanding daughter’s death one month
after decedent].) Thus, the Court finds Plaintiffs
Yi-Chuan Chang and Chia-Yen Chang’s, as individuals, cause of action of action
for wrongful death fails as a matter of law.
b.
Plaintiff Yi-Chuan Chang as
Successor-in-Interest to Plaintiff Te-Hsi Chang
Defendants contend that
Plaintiff Yi-Chuan Chang’s wrongful death claim fails as Plaintiff Te-Hsi
Chang’s successor-in-interest. However,
Defendants are incorrect.
A claimant’s wrongful death
cause of action is not extinguished by the claimant’s subsequent death and may
be brought by the claimant’s personal representative or
successor-in-interest. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 377.30, 377.20; see also Chavez v. Carpenter, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1443-1444.) Here, the Court ordered
Plaintiff Yi-Chuan Chang to be Plaintiff
Te-Hsi Chang’s successor-in-interest. As
such, Plaintiff Yi-Chuan Chang stands in the shoes of Plaintiff Te-Hsi Chang
for the purpose of maintaining the wrongful death cause of action against
Defendants.
4.
Amendment to Complaint
The Court declines to address
the parties’ arguments regarding potential amendment to the Complaint to add a
survival action, as such issue is not before the Court at this time.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Therefore, the Court finds that Te-Hsi Chang had standing to file a
wrongful death cause of action against Defendants for Decedent’s death, and his
wrongful death claim survives his own death via his successor in interest,
Plaintiff Yi-Chuan Chang. Accordingly,
the Court finds Plaintiff Yi-Chuan Chang has standing to maintain the wrongful
death cause of action alleged in the Complaint against Defendants.
The Court further finds Plaintiffs, as tacitly conceded, have failed to
state claims for negligence and negligent hiring, retention or supervision
against Defendants. Further, the Court
finds Plaintiffs Yi-Chuan Chang and Chia-Yen Chang lacked standing as individuals to assert the
wrongful death cause of action against Defendants under Code of Civil Procedure
section 377.60 and Probate Code section 6402.
As such, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and grants
in part Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication as to the following:
·
First
Cause of Action – Negligence as to Plaintiffs
·
Second
Cause of Action – Negligent Hiring, Retention or Supervision as to Plaintiffs
·
Third
Cause of Action – Wrongful Death - Plaintiffs Yi-Chuan Chang and
Chia-Yen Chang, as individuals only
The
Court denies in part Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication as to the following:
·
Third
Cause of Action – Wrongful Death – Plaintiff Yi-Chuan Chang, as
successor in interest to Plaintiff Te-Hsi Chang, only
The
Clerk of the Court shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling.
[1] “If summary adjudication is sought, whether separately
or as an alternative to the motion for summary judgment, the specific cause of
action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be
stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the
separate statement of undisputed material facts.” (California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b);
see also California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d) [“The Separate Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts in support of a motion must separately identify: (A)
Each cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty or affirmative defense
that is the subject of the motion”].)
Here, Defendants’ Separate Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts does not comply with the California Rules of Court. The cause of action, issue of duty,
affirmative defense or claim for damages for which Defendants seek summary
adjudication is not specifically denoted in the separate statement. Despite this noted procedural defect, the
Court shall exercise its discretion to rule on Defendant’s motion for summary
adjudication on the merits.
[2] “Except as provided in Section 6402.5, the part of
the intestate estate not passing to the surviving spouse, under Section 6401,
or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving spouse, passes as
follows:
(a) To the issue of the decedent, the issue taking
equally if they are all of the same degree of kinship to the decedent, but if
of unequal degree those of more remote degree take in the manner provided in
Section 240.
(b) If there is no surviving issue, to the decedent's
parent or parents equally.
(c) If there is no surviving issue or parent, to the
issue of the parents or either of them, the issue taking equally if they are
all of the same degree of kinship to the decedent, but if of unequal degree
those of more remote degree take in the manner provided in Section 240.”
(Prob. Code, § 6402, subds. (a)-(c).)
[3] “The concept of justiciability involves the
intertwined criteria of ripeness and standing. Standing derives from the
principle that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest. A party lacks standing if it
does not have an actual and substantial interest in, or would not be benefited
or harmed by, the ultimate outcome of an action. Standing is a function not just of a party's
stake in a case, but the degree of vigor or intensity with which the presents
its arguments. Ripeness refers to the requirements of a current controversy.
According to the Supreme Court, an action not founded upon an actual
controversy between the parties to it, and brought for the purpose of securing
a determination of a point of law will not be entertained. A controversy
becomes ripe once it reaches, but has not passed, the point that the facts have
sufficiently congealed to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be
made.” (City of Santa Monica v.
Stewart (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 59 [cleaned up].)