Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 20STCV46227, Date: 2023-05-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV46227    Hearing Date: May 19, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPARTMENT

32

HEARING DATE

May 19, 2023

CASE NUMBER

20STCV46227

MOTION 

Motion for Summary Judgment; or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication

MOVING PARTIES

Defendants J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. and Marco Luevano

OPPOSING PARTIES

Plaintiffs Yi-Chuan Chang, individually and as successor-in-interest to Te-Hsi Chang and Chia-Yen Chang

 

MOVING PAPERS:

 

  1. Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
  2. Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment[1]
  3. Declaration of Austin Smith

 

OPPOSITION PAPERS:

 

  1. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities
  2. Separate Statement of Disputed and Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment

 

REPLY PAPERS:

 

1.      Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

2.      Objection to Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Material Facts

 

BACKGROUND

 

Plaintiffs Te-Hsi Chang, individually, and as successor-in-interest to the Estate of Chen Hsueh Chang, Yi-Chuan Chang, and Chia-Yen Chang (collectively, Plaintiffs), sued Defendants Marco Antonio Luevano and J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc. (collectively, Defendants) based on an incident in which Defendants’ vehicle struck Decedent Chen Hsueh Chang (Decedent) at an intersection, eventually resulting in Decedent’s death. 

 

Plaintiffs Te-Hsi Chang (Father of Decedent), Yi-Chuan Chang (Sister of Decedent) and Chia-yen Chang (Sister of Decedent) are Decedent’s father and sisters, respectively.  On January 27, 2021, Plaintiff Te-Hsi Chang, died, and on March 19, 2021, Plaintiff Yi-Chuan Chang was substituted in as successor in interest for Plaintiff Te-Hsi Chang.  (See March 19, 2021, Minute Order.)

 

Plaintiffs assert three causes of action against Defendants in the Complaint: negligence; negligent hiring, retention, or supervision; and wrongful death.  Defendants move for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, on Plaintiffs’ complaint.  Plaintiffs oppose the motion. Defendants reply.   

 

LEGAL STANDARDS –SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

 

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” ¿(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (hereafter Aguilar).) ¿“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” ¿(Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].) 

 

Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.”  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].) 

 

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty if that party contends that there is no merit to the cause of action, defense, or claim for damages, or if the party contends that there is no duty owed.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)  “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”  (Ibid.)  A cause of action has no merit if: (1) one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established, even if that element is separately pleaded, or (2) a defendant establishes an affirmative defense to that cause of action.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (n); Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 583.)  Once the defendant has shown that a cause of action has no merit, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2); Union Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 583.)  Additionally, in line with Aguilar, “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise.  If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.”  (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.) 

 

EVIDENCE

           

With respect to Defendants’ “objections” to Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Disputed and Undisputed Material Facts, the Court finds it does not comply with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354.  Rule 3.1354 provides in pertinent part:

 

All written objections to evidence must be served and filed separately from the other papers in support of or in opposition to the motion. Objections to specific evidence must be referenced by the objection number in the right column of a separate statement in opposition or reply to a motion, but the objections must not be restated or reargued in the separate statement. Each written objection must be numbered consecutively and must:

 

(1) Identify the name of the document in which the specific material objected to is located;

(2) State the exhibit, title, page, and line number of the material objected to;

(3) Quote or set forth the objectionable statement or material; and

(4) State the grounds for each objection to that statement or material.

 

Written objections to evidence must follow one of the following two formats:   [¶] . . . [¶]

 

A party submitting written objections to evidence must submit with the objections a proposed order. The proposed order must include places for the court to indicate whether it has sustained or overruled each objection. It must also include a place for the signature of the judge. The court may require that the proposed order be provided in electronic form. The proposed order must be in one of the following two formats:  [¶] . . . [¶]

 

(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b)-(c), emphasis added.)  Accordingly, the Court declines to rule on Defendants’ “objections”.

 

DISCUSSION

 

            Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ negligence and negligent hiring, retention and supervision claims fail as a matter of law because Plaintiffs seek damages which are only recoverable under a wrongful death claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60.  Defendants further argue Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claim is barred under Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148 (hereafter Diaz), based on Defendant J.B. Hunt’s admission that Defendant Marco Antonio Luevano was acting within the scope of employment when he struck Decedent with a vehicle.

 

            Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs’ wrongful death cause of action fails as matter of law based on Plaintiffs’ lack of standing under Code of Civil Procedure 377.60.

 

1.      Absence of Contested Material Facts

 

Preliminarily, the Court notes that Plaintiffs have not disputed any of the relevant material facts raised in Defendants’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.  Rather, Plaintiffs contest the correct application of the law on said undisputed facts.  As such, the Court shall assess the instant motion based on the legal significance of the undisputed facts and resolve the instant motion for summary judgment as a matter of law. (See Puentes v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 638, 643.)

 

2.      First and Second Causes of Action: Negligence and Negligent Hiring, Retention or  Supervision

 

As mentioned above, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to state causes of action for negligence and negligent hiring, retention, or supervision against Defendants.  Plaintiffs are seeking damages as a result of Decedent’s death, purportedly caused by the negligent conduct of Defendants.  But, as Defendants argue, such damages are only available pursuant to a wrongful death claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60.  The Court agrees and notes that Plaintiffs have failed to advance arguments in opposition to Defendants’ contention.  

 

Based on the Court’s finding that Plaintiffs have failed to state causes of action against Defendants for negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, the Court does not need to reach Defendants argument that Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claim is barred under Diaz.

 

  1. Third Cause of Action: Wrongful Death

 

Defendants contend that the wrongful death cause of action fails, arguing Plaintiffs Yi-Chuan Chang and Chia-Yen Chang, as Decedent’s sisters, lack standing to maintain a wrongful death cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60.

 

Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60 establishes a statutory cause of action in favor of specified heirs of a person who dies as a result of the wrongful act or neglect of another. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60.) Under a wrongful death cause of action, the specified heirs are entitled to recover damages on their own behalf for the loss they have sustained by the reason of the bodily injury victim’s death. (See Corder v. Corder (2007) 41 Cal.4th 644, 651.) The elements of a wrongful death action are (1) a tort such as negligence or another wrongful act, (2) resulting death, and (3) loss/damage suffered by the heirs. (Lattimore v. Dickey (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.)  Section 377.60 establishes standing as follows:

 

A cause of action for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another may be asserted by any of the following persons or by the decedent's personal representative on their behalf:

 

(a) The decedent's surviving spouse, domestic partner, children, and issue of deceased children, or, if there is no surviving issue of the decedent, the persons, including the surviving spouse or domestic partner, who would be entitled to the property of the decedent by intestate succession. If the parents of the decedent would be entitled to bring an action under this subdivision, and the parents are deceased, then the legal guardians of the decedent, if any, may bring an action under this subdivision as if they were the decedent's parents.

(b)(1) Whether or not qualified under subdivision (a), if they were dependent on the decedent, the putative spouse, children of the putative spouse, stepchildren, parents, or the legal guardians of the decedent if the parents are deceased.

 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60, subds. (a)-(b).)

 

Pursuant to intestate succession, when a decedent leaves neither spouse nor issue, the estate passes to the decedent’s parents.  (Prob. Code, § 6402 (b)-(c).) [2] If the parents are deceased, then the decedent’s estate passes to the decedent’s siblings. (Ibid.)

 

a.      Plaintiffs Yi-Chuan Chang and Chia-Yen Chang, as Individuals

 

Plaintiffs allege that Decedent passed away on March 1, 2019 as a result of the subject incident and was survived by her father, Te-Hsi Chang, and two sisters, Yi-Chuan Chang and Chia-Yen Chang.  (See Complaint, ¶¶ 38, 66.)  Te-Hsi Chang, Yi-Chuan Chang and Chia-Yen Chang filed the complaint against Defendants on December 3, 2020.   

 

When the wrongful death cause of action accrued, and equally important, when the complaint was filed, Decedent’s father, Te-Hsi Chang, was the only heir who had standing [3] to assert a wrongful death claim.  (Mayo v. White (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1083, 1088; Medrano v. Kern County Sheriff's Officer (E.D. Cal. 2013) 921 F.Supp.2d 1009, 1018, citing Prob. Code, § 6402, subd. (c).) 

 

On the other hand, Plaintiffs Yi-Chuan Chang and Chia-Yen Chang, as the siblings of Decedent, lacked standing to bring a wrongful death cause of action against Defendants.  (See generally Chavez v. Carpenter (2001) 91 CA4th 1433, 1440-1444 [parents had no standing where deceased son was survived by two-year-old daughter, notwithstanding daughter’s death one month after decedent].)  Thus, the Court finds Plaintiffs Yi-Chuan Chang and Chia-Yen Chang’s, as individuals, cause of action of action for wrongful death fails as a matter of law.

 

b.      Plaintiff Yi-Chuan Chang as Successor-in-Interest to Plaintiff Te-Hsi Chang

 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff Yi-Chuan Chang’s wrongful death claim fails as Plaintiff Te-Hsi Chang’s successor-in-interest.  However, Defendants are incorrect. 

 

A claimant’s wrongful death cause of action is not extinguished by the claimant’s subsequent death and may be brought by the claimant’s personal representative or successor-in-interest.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 377.30, 377.20; see also Chavez v. Carpenter, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1443-1444.)  Here, the Court ordered Plaintiff Yi-Chuan Chang to be  Plaintiff Te-Hsi Chang’s successor-in-interest.  As such, Plaintiff Yi-Chuan Chang stands in the shoes of Plaintiff Te-Hsi Chang for the purpose of maintaining the wrongful death cause of action against Defendants. 

 

4.      Amendment to Complaint

 

The Court declines to address the parties’ arguments regarding potential amendment to the Complaint to add a survival action, as such issue is not before the Court at this time.

 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 

Therefore, the Court finds that Te-Hsi Chang had standing to file a wrongful death cause of action against Defendants for Decedent’s death, and his wrongful death claim survives his own death via his successor in interest, Plaintiff Yi-Chuan Chang.  Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff Yi-Chuan Chang has standing to maintain the wrongful death cause of action alleged in the Complaint against Defendants. 

 

The Court further finds Plaintiffs, as tacitly conceded, have failed to state claims for negligence and negligent hiring, retention or supervision against Defendants.  Further, the Court finds Plaintiffs Yi-Chuan Chang and Chia-Yen Chang lacked standing as individuals to assert the wrongful death cause of action against Defendants under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60 and Probate Code section 6402.

 

As such, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and grants in part Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication as to the following:

 

·         First Cause of Action – Negligence as to Plaintiffs

·         Second Cause of Action – Negligent Hiring, Retention or Supervision as to Plaintiffs

·         Third Cause of Action – Wrongful Death - Plaintiffs Yi-Chuan Chang and Chia-Yen Chang, as individuals only

 

The Court denies in part Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication as  to the following:

 

·         Third Cause of Action – Wrongful Death – Plaintiff Yi-Chuan Chang, as successor in interest to Plaintiff Te-Hsi Chang, only

 

            The Clerk of the Court shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling.   



[1] “If summary adjudication is sought, whether separately or as an alternative to the motion for summary judgment, the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.”  (California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b); see also California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d) [“The Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in support of a motion must separately identify: (A) Each cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion”].) 

 

Here, Defendants’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts does not comply with the California Rules of Court.  The cause of action, issue of duty, affirmative defense or claim for damages for which Defendants seek summary adjudication is not specifically denoted in the separate statement.  Despite this noted procedural defect, the Court shall exercise its discretion to rule on Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication on the merits.

[2] “Except as provided in Section 6402.5, the part of the intestate estate not passing to the surviving spouse, under Section 6401, or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving spouse, passes as follows:

 

(a) To the issue of the decedent, the issue taking equally if they are all of the same degree of kinship to the decedent, but if of unequal degree those of more remote degree take in the manner provided in Section 240.

(b) If there is no surviving issue, to the decedent's parent or parents equally.

(c) If there is no surviving issue or parent, to the issue of the parents or either of them, the issue taking equally if they are all of the same degree of kinship to the decedent, but if of unequal degree those of more remote degree take in the manner provided in Section 240.” 

 

(Prob. Code, § 6402, subds. (a)-(c).) 

 

[3] “The concept of justiciability involves the intertwined criteria of ripeness and standing. Standing derives from the principle that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.  A party lacks standing if it does not have an actual and substantial interest in, or would not be benefited or harmed by, the ultimate outcome of an action.  Standing is a function not just of a party's stake in a case, but the degree of vigor or intensity with which the presents its arguments. Ripeness refers to the requirements of a current controversy. According to the Supreme Court, an action not founded upon an actual controversy between the parties to it, and brought for the purpose of securing a determination of a point of law will not be entertained. A controversy becomes ripe once it reaches, but has not passed, the point that the facts have sufficiently congealed to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made.”  (City of Santa Monica v. Stewart (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 59 [cleaned up].)