Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 21SMCV01495, Date: 2023-10-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21SMCV01495 Hearing Date: October 6, 2023 Dept: 207
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
DEPARTMENT |
207 |
|
HEARING DATE |
October
6, 2023 |
|
CASE NUMBER |
21SMCV01495 |
|
MOTION |
Motion
for Terminating, or in the alternative Issue, Evidentiary and Monetary Sanctions |
|
MOVING PARTIES |
Plaintiffs
Trinidad Velazquez, Hector Velazquez, and Wilson Acevedo |
|
OPPOSING PARTY |
Defendant
Craig L. Chisvin |
MOTION
Plaintiffs Trinidad Velazquez,
Hector Velazquez, and Wilson Acevedo (“Plaintiffs”) move for terminating, or in
the alternative, evidentiary, and monetary sanctions against Defendant Craig
Chisvin (“Defendant”) for failure to comply with the Court’s July 26, 2023
Order, ordering Defendant to serve verified responses without objections to the
Form Interrogatories (“FROG”) served on October 11, 2022 and to pay monetary
sanctions of $1,520 within 30 days of notice of the Court’s order. (July 26, 2023 Order.)
Defendant filed an untimely
opposition and Plaintiffs have replied.
ANALYSIS
I.
Untimely Opposition
In Reply, Plaintiffs request the
Court disregard Defendant’s untimely filed opposition.
Code of Civil Procedure
section 1005, subdivision (b) provides: “All papers opposing a motion […] shall be
filed with the court and a copy served on each party at least nine court days,
and all reply papers at least five court days before the hearing.” The court has discretion whether to consider
late-filed papers. (Cal. Rules of Court,
Rule 3.1300(d).)
The hearing in this matter is set for October
6, 2023, making the Opposition papers due on September 25, and Reply papers due
September 29. Defendant did not file the
Opposition papers until September 27, at 9:34 p.m., and has offered no
explanation for the delay. Because of
Defendant’s delay in filing the Opposition, Plaintiffs effectively had only two
days (September 28 and September 29) to review the Opposition, and draft and
file the Reply brief.
Plaintiffs did, however, timely file
a Reply brief, addressing the substance of Defendant’s Opposition, at 1:15 p.m.
on September 29.
Because Plaintiffs were not
prejudiced by Defendant’s untimely Opposition, the Court exercises its
discretion in considering the opposition.
II.
Terminating Sanctions
When a party misuses the discovery process by disobeying a court order
to provide discovery, the court in its discretion may impose a terminating
sanction by striking a party’s pleading or dismissing the action of the party. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2023.010, subd. (g),
2023.030, subds. (d)(1) & (d)(3); 2030.290, subd. (c).)
California discovery law authorizes a range of
penalties for a party's refusal to obey a discovery order, including monetary
sanctions, evidentiary sanctions, issue sanctions, and terminating
sanctions. A court has broad discretion
in selecting the appropriate penalty, . . . . Despite this broad discretion,
the courts have long recognized that the terminating sanction is a drastic
penalty and should be used sparingly. A
trial court must be cautious when imposing a terminating sanction because the
sanction eliminates a party's fundamental right to a trial, thus implicating
due process rights. The trial court
should select a sanction that is tailored to the harm caused by the withheld
discovery. Sanctions should be
appropriate to the dereliction, and should not exceed that which is required to
protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery.
(Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract
Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604 [cleaned up]; see
also Moofly Productions, LLC v. Favila (2020) 46 CalApp.5th 1 (hereafter
Moofly).)
In Moofly, the Court of Appeal noted that “terminating
sanctions are appropriate only if a party's failure to obey a court order
actually prejudiced the opposing party.” (Moofly, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at
p. 11.) Moofly cites to Morgan
v. Ransom as support for this proposition.
In Morgan v. Ransom, the appellate court held that the trial
court erred because the interrogatories themselves had not been presented to
the trial court, and therefore, there had been no analysis of whether the
information sought was actually relevant to any of the issues in the case. (Morgan v. Ransom (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d
664, 669-670.) In other words, to the
extent the information sought was not relevant to the case, the plaintiff’s
failure to provide responses would not have prejudiced the defendant.
In support of the Motion, Plaintiffs point out several
other instances of Defendant’s conduct they find objectionable, including that
Defendant repeatedly requested extensions of time to respond to the complaint, failed
to timely file the answer, resulting in default being taken against Defendant
and Chisvin Law Group, APC, which was only ultimately set aside as to Defendant
and not Chisvin Law Group, Defendant’s improper subsequent filing of an answer
on behalf of both Defendant and Chisvin Law Group, Defendant’s limited
availability in scheduling his deposition, and his ultimate failure to appear
for his schedule deposition, as well as his inability to attend the mandatory
settlement conference. (Motion, pp. 3-6;
Armenta Decl., ¶¶ 3-36.)
Ultimately, none of those incidents have been deemed
an abuse of the discovery process by the Court, and as such, they have no
bearing on the Court’s determination of instant motion.
The only conduct at issue involves Defendant’s
failure to comply with the Court’s July 26, 2023 Order, ordering Defendant to (1)
serve verified responses to the FROG, without objections, and (2) pay monetary
sanctions in the amount of $1,520 to Plaintiff (Trinidad Velazquez) through
Plaintiff’s counsel, within 30 days of notice of the Court’s order. Plaintiffs mailed Defendant notice of the ruling
on July 26, 2023. Thus, Defendant’s
responses and sanctions were due no later than August 25, 2023.
Defendant concedes in the Opposition that he failed
to timely comply with the Court’s July 26, 2023 Order, but represents that
Plaintiffs will receive the responses to FROG and the monetary sanctions prior
to the hearing on this motion. (Opposition,
2:26-28; Chisvin Decl., ¶ 4.) Defendant
further urges that the requested terminating sanctions are disproportionate remedies.
The Court finds that Defendant’s failure to timely
comply with the Court’s July 26, 2023 Order compelling him to serve verified
responses to the FROG without objections constitutes a continuing abuse of the
discovery process. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (g).) However, Plaintiffs do not demonstrate any
prejudice they have suffered as a result of Defendant’s failure to timely
comply with the Court’s July 26, 2023 Order.
In addition, the Court notes that Defendant
has not paid the monetary sanctions in the amount of $1520.00 to Plaintiffs as
ordered. But “a terminating sanction
issued solely because of a failure to pay a monetary discovery sanction is
never justified.” (Newland v.
Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 615.) The Court therefore denies Plaintiffs’
request for terminating sanctions for non-payment of the monetary sanctions as
unwarranted under the circumstances as such request for sanctions seems punitive
in nature.
The purpose of the discovery statutes is to enable
a party to obtain evidence under the control of his adversary in order to
further the efficient and economical disposition of a lawsuit. Where no answers
are filed, a trial judge is empowered to select one of the sanctions authorized
by . . . the Code of Civil Procedure.
Where a motion to compel has been granted, and discovery has been
delayed or denied, the court must make orders in regard to the refusal as are
just. The penalty should be appropriate
to the dereliction, and should not exceed that which is required to protect the
interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery. Where a motion to compel has previously been
granted, the sanction should not operate in such a fashion as to put the
prevailing party in a better position than he would have had if he had obtained
the discovery sought and it had been completely favorable to his cause. The
sanction of dismissal or the rendition of a default judgment against the
disobedient party is ordinarily a drastic measure which should be employed with
caution.
(Deyo
v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 793 [cleaned up].)
In short, based upon the record, the Court declines
to issue terminating sanctions against Defendant.
III.
Issue and Evidentiary Sanctions
“A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of
motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is
sought, and specify the type of sanction sought. The notice of motion shall be
supported by a memorandum of points and authorities, and accompanied by a
declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction
sought.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040;
see generally Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990) 223
Cal.App.3d 1429 [appellate court addresses adequacy of notice of monetary
sanctions request].)
Here, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ notice with
respect to their request for issue and evidentiary sanctions to be
defective. Plaintiffs failed to outline
in their notice the “designated facts” that should be established in the action
as issue sanctions, and did not identify the “designated matters” which should
be excluded as evidentiary sanctions.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subds. (b)-(c).) Instead, Plaintiffs simply stated in the
notice: “in the alternative, impose
issue and evidentiary sanctions pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure§§ 2023.030 (b) and (c) against CHISVIN.” (See Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion,
2:6-7.) Moreover, in the moving papers, Plaintiffs
also do not delineate with specificity the issue and evidentiary sanctions they
request to impose on Defendant.
Accordingly, based upon the notice defects, the
Court denies Plaintiffs’ request for issue and evidentiary sanctions,
notwithstanding Defendant’s misuse of the discovery process in disobeying the
Court’s July 26, 2023 Order.
IV.
Monetary Sanctions
“If a
party . . . fails to obey an order compelling answers, the court may make those
orders that are just, including the imposition of . . . a monetary sanction
under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd.
(c).) To wit, Code of Civil Procedure
section 2023.030 provides in pertinent part:
“The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in
the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or
both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone
as a result of that conduct . . . unless [the court] finds that the one subject
to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other
circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd.
(a).)
Plaintiffs
request monetary sanctions in connection with the motion. The Court finds that Defendant has failed to
obey the Court’s order of July 26, 2023.
As such, Defendant has engaged in the misuse of the discovery process,
warranting the imposition of monetary sanctions. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (g)
[“Disobeying a court order to provide discovery”].)
Accordingly,
the Court will impose monetary sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $1460.00,
which represents four hours of attorney time to prepare the moving and reply papers,
and attend the hearing, at $350 per hour, plus the motion filing fee of $60.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Having found that Defendant’s
failure to comply with the Court’s July 26, 2023 Order constitutes an abuse of
the discovery process, the Court grants in part Plaintiffs’ motion for monetary sanctions. Thus, the Court orders Defendant to
pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $1460.00, to Plaintiffs by and through
counsel for Plaintiffs, within 20 days of notice of the Court’s order.
Further, for the reasons
stated above, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ request for terminating, issue and
evidentiary sanctions at this time.
Plaintiffs shall provide
notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.
DATED: October 6, 2023 ________________________________
Michael
E. Whitaker
Judge
of the Superior Court