Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 21STCV02488, Date: 2022-12-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV02488    Hearing Date: December 7, 2022    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPARTMENT

32

HEARING DATE

December 7, 2022

CASE NUMBER

21STCV02488

MOTION

Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement

MOVING PARTIES

Defendant County of Los Angeles

OPPOSING PARTIES

Defendant Babytrend, Inc.

 

MOTION

 

Plaintiff Leah Garcia (Plaintiff) settled her claims against Defendant County of Los Angeles (Settling Defendant).  Settling Defendant moves for a determination that its settlement with Plaintiff was entered into in good faith.  Defendant Babytrend, Inc. (Defendant Babytrend) opposes the motion.  Settling Defendant replies.

 

Preliminarily, Settling Defendant contends that Defendant Babytrend’s opposition is untimely.  Per Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, all papers opposing a motion shall be filed with the Court and a copy served on each party at least nine court days before the hearing.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).)  Based on the hearing date of December 7, 2022, Defendant Babytrend was required to file and serve oppositions no later than November 22, 2022.  Defendant Babytrend filed its opposition on November 28, 2022.  Notwithstanding, Settling Defendant has submitted a reply to the opposition with full briefing on the merits.  The Court therefore concludes that Settling Defendant will not be prejudiced by the Court’s consideration of Defendant Babytrend’s opposition on its merits and exercises its discretion to do so.

 

JUDICIAL NOTICE

 

            The Court grants Settling Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the following documents pursuant to Evidence Code sections 451, 452, and 453:

 

  1. The Order Authorizing the Removal of minor J.C. issued by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Rudolph Diaz on November 7, 2018
  2. Los Angeles County Juvenile Court Minute Order dated November 14, 2018, Case No. 18CCJP07282B
  3. Los Angeles County Juvenile Court Minute Order dated March 5, 2019, Case No. 18CCJP07282B
  4. Los Angeles County Juvenile Court Minute Order dated October 29, 2019, Case No. 18CCJP07282B
  5. Relevant chapters of the California Department of Social Services Child Welfare Services Manual
  6. Resource Family Approval Written Directives Prepared by California Department of Social Services, Version 6
  7. The Order After Judicial Review entered by the Juvenile Court dated July 7, 2021 releasing the portions of the juvenile court record relating to Plaintiff

 

ANALYSIS

 

Under section 877.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, “[a] determination by the court that [a] settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor . . . from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor . . . for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (c).)  “The party asserting the lack of good faith has the burden of proof on that issue.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d).) 

 

Section 877.6 requires “that the courts review [settlement] agreements made under its aegis to insure that the settlements appropriately balance the . . . statute’s dual objectives” (i.e., providing an “equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault” and encouraging parties to resolve their disputes by way of settlement).  (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 494 (hereafter, Tech-Bilt).)  In Tech-Bilt, the California Supreme Court set forth the factors to consider when determining whether a settlement was made in good faith.  The Tech-Bilt factors are: (1) a rough approximation of plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (4) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial; (5) the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the non-settling defendants.  (Id. at pp. 498-501.)  “Practical considerations obviously require that the [trial court’s] evaluation [of the settlement] be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.”  (Id. at p. 499.) 

 

“The party asserting the lack of good faith . . . [is] permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to [the above] factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of [Section 877.6].  Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.”  (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499–500.)  

 

In this case, Plaintiff alleges injuries based on the death of her biological child (Decedent).  Decedent, under the care of a foster parent, died of asphyxiation while strapped in a car child seat.  Settling Defendant assigned Decedent to the foster parent, provided the foster parent with training, and completed assessments of the foster parent.  Defendant Babytrend is the manufacturer of the car child seat.  As the party contesting the good faith of the settlement, Defendant Babytrend bears the burden to demonstrate that the settlement is not in good faith. 

 

  1. APPLICATION OF THE TECH-BILT FACTORS TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE [1]

     

  1. A ROUGH APPROXIMATION OF PLAINTIFF’S TOTAL RECOVERY AND THE SETTLOR’S PROPORTIONATE LIABILITY.  

     

    The first Tech-Bilt factor consists of two parts – a rough approximation of Plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability.  When approximating a plaintiff’s total recovery or the settling defendant’s proportionate liability, “judges should . . . not yearn for the unreal goal of mathematical certainty.  Because the application of section 877.6 requires an educated guess as to what may occur should the case go to trial, all that can be expected is an estimate, not a definitive conclusion.”  (North County Contractor’s Assn. v. Touchstone Ins. Services (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1090 (hereafter North County).)   

     

    Additionally, “a court not only looks at the alleged tortfeasor’s liability to the plaintiff, but it must also consider the culpability of the tortfeasor vis-à-vis other parties alleged to be responsible for the same injury.  Potential liability for indemnity to a nonsettling defendant is an important consideration for the trial court in determining whether to approve a settlement by an alleged tortfeasor.  [Citation.]”  (TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166.) 
     

    Here, in opposition, Defendant Babytrend argues that a reasonable estimate of Plaintiff’s damages is in the range of $8 million to $10 million.  Defendant Babytrend bases this estimation on its assumption that Plaintiff will make an extremely sympathetic witness when describing her journey to turn her life around and regain custody of her child, Decedent.  In reply, Settling Defendant argues that Defendant Babytrend has not proffered any evidence of a demand or a sampling of recent verdicts to substantiate its estimate of a verdict in the range of $8 million to $10 million.  The Court notes Plaintiff claimed $15 million in general damages in her Statement of Damages filed with the Court March 11, 2021.

     

    Based on Defendant’s estimation of Plaintiff’s potential total recovery and the proportionate liability of Settling Defendant as described by Defendant Babytrend, Defendant Babytrend argues the settlement amount of $75,000 is greatly outside of the reasonable range of Settling Defendant’s share of liability for Plaintiff’s injuries.  Defendant Babytrend attests that a governmental entity such as Settling Defendant can be liable for the tortious conduct of an independent contractor.  Defendant Babytrend further argues discovery indicates an agency relationship between Settling Defendant and the foster parent caring for Decedent suggesting that Settling Defendant would be liable for the foster parent’s acts and omissions in relation to Decedent. 

     

    In reply, Settling Defendant points to the following evidence establishing that the foster parent was not an agent of Settling Defendant with respect to Decedent’s care and thus not subject to liability:

     

 

Therefore, the Court grants Settling Defendant’s motion for determination of good faith settlement.  Settling Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file proof of service of such.

 



[1] The Court notes that Defendant Babytrend does not squarely address the following Tech-Bilt factors:  “(4) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial; (5) the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the non-settling defendants.”