Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 21STCV02776, Date: 2023-01-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV02776    Hearing Date: January 11, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTIONS

              Plaintiff Charlene Sedgh (Plaintiff) sued Defendant Yasmine Ashraf Armanios (Defendant) based on a motor vehicle collision.  Plaintiff moves to quash the subpoenas for production of records Defendant served on National General Premier Insurance Company (NGPIC) and Blue Shield of California (Blue Shield).  Plaintiff requests monetary sanctions in connection with the motion.  Defendant opposes the motion.  Plaintiff replies.  

ANALYSIS

If a subpoena requires the production of documents, the court may quash the subpoena entirely or modify it.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)  In ruling on a motion to quash, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)

Current discovery standards hold that, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,[1] that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  (Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1039 (hereafter Board of Nursing).)  “To meet this [test], a party seeking to compel [the] production of records . . . must articulate specific facts justifying the discovery sought; it may not rely on mere generalities.”  (Ibid.; see Johnson v. Superior Court (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 829, 837 [finding that a subpoena was “insufficient” to compel production because it was “based wholly on the [party’s] alleged information and belief without any statement of supporting facts”].)  However, “[e]ven if information is otherwise discoverable, it may be protected by a constitutional or statutory privilege[,] [including] the right to privacy . . . .”  (Board of Nursing, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.) 

            “The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy.  Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern.  .  .  .  The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.^[2]  The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.  A court must then balance these competing considerations.”  (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [cleaned up].)

            “Legally recognized privacy interests [include] interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information (‘informational privacy’) .  .  .  .”  (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.)  “A particular class of information is [sensitive or confidential] when well-established social norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over its dissemination and use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity.”  (Ibid.) 

            It is “well-settled” that “patients have a right to privacy with respect to information contained in . . . [their] medical records.”  (Grafilo v. Wolfsohn (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1024, 1034.)  Indeed, a patient’s right to privacy “is protected by case law as well as state and federal statutes and regulations.”  (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 621, 641 (hereafter County of Los Angeles).)  Additionally, “[t]he privacy interest in psychiatric records is particularly strong, and in some respects, entitled to more robust protection than other types of medical records.”  (Grafilo v. Soorani (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 497, 507.) 

            “As one court explained in discussing the examination of medical records vis-à-vis the right to privacy:  the information that may be recorded in a doctor’s files is broad-ranging.  The chronology of ailments and treatment is potentially sensitive.  Patients may disclose highly personal details of lifestyle and information concerning sources of stress and anxiety.  These are matters of great sensitivity going to the core of the concerns for the privacy of information about an individual.”  (County of Los Angeles, 65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 641–642 [cleaned up].) 

            In Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859, it was recognized that “the filing of a lawsuit may implicitly bring about a partial waiver of one’s constitutional right of . . . privacy.”  However, the California Supreme Court held that “the scope of such ‘waiver’ must be narrowly rather than expansively construed.”   (Ibid.)  In other words, “while [a plaintiff] may not withhold information which relates to any physical or mental condition which they have put in issue by bringing this lawsuit, they are entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past.”  (Ibid.)  Therefore, it follows that a patient cannot reasonably expect certain matters to remain private if they are related to the specific issues that the patient has himself brought before a court.  On the other hand, it is objectively reasonable to expect health care records that are unrelated to a current legal dispute to remain private.

Here, the NGPIC subpoena seeks the following:

Any and all non-privileged documents and records contained in the insurance claim file, including but not limited to the policy agreement, declaration page including policy limit, endorsement and attachments; copies of claims regardless of being paid, witness statements, written or recorded; color duplicates of photographs (laser copies acceptable), videotapes, and/or color digital images; law enforcement agency reports; repair estimates and bills/invoices; drawings, charts, maps and/or diagrams, medical reports and writings, medical bills and/or charges; all workers' compensation records, claims, correspondence, notes and memos; unemployment, leave of absence and disability information, any payment and benefit notices or payments, regardless of date. Entire claims file for Policy no. 2005937752 for the 10/14/2020 accident.

(Declaration of Cathy Pantelic, Exhibit B.)

            The Blue shield subpoena seeks the following:

Medical records and billing records about individuals maintained by or for a covered health care provider; Enrollment, payment, claims adjudication, and case or medical management record systems maintained by or for a health plan; other records that are used, in whole or in part, by or for the covered entity to make decisions about individuals. Entire file for Policy no. XED909923187 from 1/1/2010 to present

(Declaration of Cathy Pantelic, Exhibit B.)

Plaintiff specifically moves to quash the subject subpoenas because she believes the requests for medical records in each subpoena are improper on multiple grounds.  Plaintiff first argues the subpoenas should be quashed because they seek records which the custodians of records cannot authenticate per Evidence Code section 1561.  (See Evid. Code, § 1561, subd. (a); Cooley v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1045.)  Plaintiff assumes that because NGPIC and Blue Shield did not prepare or generate the sought medical records themselves, they cannot sufficiently “attest to various attributes of the records relevant to their authenticity and trustworthiness” to serve as custodians of the records for Section 1561 purposes.  The Court finds Plaintiff’s argument to be speculative and her reliance on Cooley is misplaced as NGPIC and Blue Shield have not attested that they cannot certify any of the records sought.  To the extent NGPIC and Blue Shield are unable to certify any of the records in their possession that they feel would otherwise be responsive, NGPIC and Blue Shield may duly object to their production per Cooley. 

Plaintiff next argues the medical and medical billing records sought are protected by her right to privacy.  Plaintiff attests that the subpoenas use overbroad language which do not limit the scope of the records requested by time frame or body part, and thus create risk of exposing irrelevant constitutionally protected information. 

In opposition, Defendant argues that the NGPIC subpoena is limited in time and scope by reference to the specific claims files for the NGPIC policy for the subject incident.  Defendant states the Blue Shield subpoena is limited in time frame from January 1, 2010 to present.  Further, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has placed a wider range of her physical and mental conditions and body parts at issue then she attests in the instant motion. 

Plaintiff states that she has placed injuries to her head, neck, right shoulder, chest, stomach, and low back at issue.  (See Declaration of Cathy Pantelic, ¶ 4, Exhibit A.)  However, Defendant highlights Plaintiff’s response to Form Interrogatory 6.3 where she further describes the injuries she attributes to the incident.  In Response 6.3, Plaintiff lists TMJ as an additional complaint and further describes her neck injury as radiating into upper extremities, and her lower back injury radiating into lower extremities.  (See Declaration of Cathy Pantelic, ¶ 4, Exhibit A.). Defendant concludes that based on these descriptions in her Form Interrogatory response, Plaintiff’s claimed injuries and current complaints potentially encompass a vast array of manifestations.

As to Defendant’s claimed limitations on timeframe for requested documents, the Court finds the current subpoena language does not clearly set forth such limitations.  The Court interprets the NGPIC subpoena language, as currently phrased to be requesting “[a]ny and all unprivileged documents . . .” in addition to the “[e]ntire claims file for Policy no. 2005937752 for the 10/14/2020 accident”.  Similarly, the Court interprets the Blue Shield subpoena to be requesting the “[entire file for Policy no. XED909923187 from 1/1/2010 to present”, in addition to the other records preliminarily described in the subpoena language.  Further the Court finds that Plaintiff’s response to Form Interrogatory 6.3 does not provide justification for Defendant to seek all Plaintiff’s medical records without limitation to affected body parts. 

Accordingly, the Court finds the language of the subpoenas overbroad, indefinite as to a time frame of the records being sought, and are without reasonable limitation in scope.  Thus, there is a high probability that the subpoenas as drafted could result in the disclosure of records that are unrelated to Plaintiff’s injuries at issue and are thus private and not discoverable.

Based upon the subpoenas as currently crafted, Plaintiff has carried her threshold burden of establishing a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.  Defendant has failed to identify a legitimate interest, in light of Plaintiff’s discovery responses, that outweighs Plaintiff’s right to privacy in the records sought.

Plaintiff requests monetary sanctions in connection with the motions.  In ruling on a motion to quash, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)  The Court declines to award such sanctions.  The Court concludes that the parties had a good faith dispute as to the proper scope of the subpoenas, and neither party has acted in bad faith.  

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Consequently, the Court grants in part Plaintiff’s motions to quash the subject subpoenas and orders such subpoenas quashed. 

Plaintiff shall give notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.