Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 21STCV02776, Date: 2023-01-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV02776    Hearing Date: January 12, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPARTMENT

32

HEARING DATE

January 12, 2023

CASE NUMBER

21STCV02776

MOTIONS

 

Motions to Quash Subpoenas;

Requests for Monetary Sanctions

MOVING PARTY

Plaintiff Charlene Sedgh

OPPOSING PARTY

Defendant Yasmine Ashraf Armanios

 

MOTION

 

              Plaintiff Charlene Sedgh (Plaintiff) sued Defendant Yasmine Ashraf Armanios (Defendant) based on a motor vehicle collision.  Plaintiff moves to quash the subpoenas for production of records Defendant served on David Zarian, M.D. (Dr. Zarian).  Plaintiff requests monetary sanctions in connection with the motions.  Defendant opposes the motions.  Plaintiff replies.  

 

ANALYSIS

 

If a subpoena requires the production of documents, the court may quash the subpoena entirely or modify it.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)  In ruling on a motion to quash, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)

 

Current discovery standards hold that, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,[1] that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  (Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1039 (hereafter Board of Nursing).)  “To meet this [test], a party seeking to compel [the] production of records . . . must articulate specific facts justifying the discovery sought; it may not rely on mere generalities.”  (Ibid.; see Johnson v. Superior Court (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 829, 837 [finding that a subpoena was “insufficient” to compel production because it was “based wholly on the [party’s] alleged information and belief without any statement of supporting facts”].)  However, “[e]ven if information is otherwise discoverable, it may be protected by a constitutional or statutory privilege[,] [including] the right to privacy . . . .”  (Board of Nursing, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.) 

 

            “The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy.  Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern.  .  .  .  The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.[2]  The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.  A court must then balance these competing considerations.”  (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [cleaned up].)

            “Legally recognized privacy interests [include] interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information (‘informational privacy’) .  .  .  .”  (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.)  “A particular class of information is [sensitive or confidential] when well-established social norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over its dissemination and use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity.”  (Ibid.) 

 

            It is “well-settled” that “patients have a right to privacy with respect to information contained in . . . [their] medical records.”  (Grafilo v. Wolfsohn (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1024, 1034.)  Indeed, a patient’s right to privacy “is protected by case law as well as state and federal statutes and regulations.”  (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 621, 641 (hereafter County of Los Angeles).)  Additionally, “[t]he privacy interest in psychiatric records is particularly strong, and in some respects, entitled to more robust protection than other types of medical records.”  (Grafilo v. Soorani (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 497, 507.) 

            “As one court explained in discussing the examination of medical records vis-à-vis the right to privacy:  the information that may be recorded in a doctor’s files is broad-ranging.  The chronology of ailments and treatment is potentially sensitive.  Patients may disclose highly personal details of lifestyle and information concerning sources of stress and anxiety.  These are matters of great sensitivity going to the core of the concerns for the privacy of information about an individual.”  (County of Los Angeles, 65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 641–642 [cleaned up].) 

 

            In Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859, it was recognized that “the filing of a lawsuit may implicitly bring about a partial waiver of one’s constitutional right of . . . privacy.”  However, the California Supreme Court held that “the scope of such ‘waiver’ must be narrowly rather than expansively construed.”   (Ibid.)  In other words, “while [a plaintiff] may not withhold information which relates to any physical or mental condition which they have put in issue by bringing this lawsuit, they are entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past.”  (Ibid.)  Therefore, it follows that a patient cannot reasonably expect certain matters to remain private if they are related to the specific issues that the patient has himself brought before a court.  On the other hand, it is objectively reasonable to expect health care records that are unrelated to a current legal dispute to remain private.

 

Here, the subpoenas served on Dr. Zarian, on September 8, 2022, seek the following:

 

Any and all itemized statements of charges and billing, rendered in the course of the care, treatment and examination of the patient, including all health insurance information and claim forms; medical bills, medical billing records, liens, explanation of benefits statements, correspondence relating to billing, records showing write-offs of amounts billed, and records of payment by insurance carriers, governmental entities and/or any other person or entity. All meds, bills and films from 1/1/2010 to present

 

(Declaration of Cathy Pantelic, Exhibit B.)

 

Any and all documents and medical records pertaining to the examination, care, diagnosis, and treatment of the patient, including but not limited to all office, emergency room, inpatient and outpatient charts and records, nurse's notes, radiological reports, photographs, physical therapy and rehabilitation records including all descriptions of exercises prescribed; any and all records regarding prescriptions, including the type of medication, date prescription was filled, doctor who wrote the prescription, instructions on taking the medication, and dosage; and any other information available regarding the prescription(s);sign-in sheets, and documentation which indicate date(s) and time(s) of patient's appointments; all films, including X-Rays, MRl's, CT and CAT scans . BREAKDOWNS FOR APPROVAL. All meds, bills and films from 1/1/2010 to present

 

 

(Declaration of Cathy Pantelic, Exhibit B.)

 

Plaintiff argues the medical and medical billing records sought are protected by her right to privacy.  Plaintiff attests that the subpoenas use overbroad language which do not limit the scope of the records requested by time frame or body part, and thus create risk of exposing irrelevant constitutionally protected information. 

 

In opposition, Defendant argues that because Plaintiff has been seeing Dr. Zarian, for ten years preceding the subject incident, the subpoenaed records from Dr. Zarian will provide directly relevant records that are essential for a fair resolution of this action.  Further, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has placed a wider range of her physical and mental conditions and body parts at issue then she attests in the instant motion.  Plaintiff states that she has placed injuries to her head, neck, right shoulder, chest, stomach, and low back at issue.  (See Declaration of Cathy Pantelic, ¶ 4, Exhibit A.)  However, Defendant highlights Plaintiff’s response to Form Interrogatory 6.3 where she further describes the injuries she attributes to the incident.  In Response 6.3 Plaintiff lists TMJ as an additional complaint and further describes her neck injury as radiating into upper extremities, and her lower back injury radiating into lower extremities.  (See Declaration of Cathy Pantelic, ¶ 4, Exhibit A.). Defendant concludes that based on these descriptions in her Form Interrogatory response, Plaintiff’s claimed injuries and current complaints potentially encompass a vast array of manifestations.

 

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s history as Dr. Zarian’s patient for ten years, as well as her response to Form Interrogatory 6.3, do not provide justification for Defendant to seek all of Plaintiff’s medical and billing records from Dr. Zarian, without limitation to affected body parts and timeframe. 

 

Accordingly, the Court finds the language of the subpoenas overbroad, indefinite as to a time frame of the records being sought, and are without reasonable limitation in scope.  Thus, there is a high probability that the subpoenas as drafted could result in the disclosure of records that are unrelated to Plaintiff’s injuries at issue and are thus private and not discoverable.

 

Based upon the subpoenas as currently crafted, Plaintiff has carried her threshold burden of establishing a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.  Defendant has failed to identify a legitimate interest, in light of Plaintiff’s discovery responses, that outweighs Plaintiff’s right to privacy in her insurance records.

 

Plaintiff requests monetary sanctions in connection with the motions.  In ruling on a motion to quash, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)  The Court declines to award such sanctions.  The Court concludes that the parties had a good faith dispute as to the proper scope of the subpoenas, and neither party has acted in bad faith.  

 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Consequently, the Court grants in part Plaintiff’s motions to quash the subject subpoenas and orders such subpoenas quashed. 

 

            Plaintiff shall give notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.

 



[1] “A patient has a statutory privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, any confidential communication between the patient and a physician, or between the patient and a psychotherapist, absent waiver or some statutory exception to the privilege.  These privileges apply to discovery as well as to trial, and they preclude disclosure to the court as well as to the parties.”  (Simek v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 169, 173 [cleaned up].)  Specifically, the Evidence Code holds that “[t]he patient, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between patient and physician . . . .”  (Evid. Code, § 994; see also Evid. Code, § 1014 [“the patient, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between patient and psychotherapist”].)  However, the Evidence Code provides that “there is no privilege under this article as to any communication relevant to an issue concerning the condition of the patient if such issue has been tendered by” the patient or a patient-related party.  (See Evid. Code, § 996; see also Evid. Code, § 1016 [regarding a patient’s emotional or mental condition].) 

[2] “This initial inquiry is necessary to permit courts to weed out claims that involve so insignificant or de minimis an intrusion on constitutionally protected privacy interests as not even to require an explanation or justification by the defendant.”  (Lewis v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 561, 571 [cleaned up].)