Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 21STCV07961, Date: 2023-01-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV07961    Hearing Date: January 18, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

Plaintiff Alfredo Huerta-Mondragon sued Defendants Lyft, Inc., George Tharwt Shavik Mekhail, and Atia Nada (collectively, Defendants) based on injuries Plaintiff alleges she sustained in a motor vehicle collision between Plaintiff’s vehicle and the vehicle of a driver for Defendant Lyft, Inc.’s ridesharing platform.  Defendant Lyft, Inc. (Lyft) demurs to the third cause of action in Plaintiff’s complaint for strict products liability.  Plaintiff opposes the demurrer.  Lyft replies.

ANALYSIS

1. DEMURRER

    

   “It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.”  (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  In ruling on a demurrer, the court must “liberally construe[]” the allegations of the complaint.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.”  (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.) 

    

1. Strict Product Liability

    

               Defendant demurs to the third cause of action for strict product liability for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.  Specifically, Defendants argue the third cause of action fails as a matter of law because Lyft’s ridesharing application (Lyft App) is not a product.  Lyft further contend that even if the Lyft App could be considered a product, Plaintiff’s assertion that the Lyft App was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries is deficient as a matter of law.  In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that strict products liability is applicable to Lyft through a stream of commerce theory.   

    

   A defendant “may be held strictly liable for its product if the plaintiff was injured while using the product in a reasonably foreseeable way. In order for there to be strict liability, the product does not have to be unreasonably dangerous—just defective. Products liability may be premised upon a theory of design defect, manufacturing defect, or failure to warn.” (Romine v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 990, 1000, internal quotations and citations omitted.)  “Whether or not a product was defectively designed or manufactured is a factual issues to be determined by the trier of fact.  However, whether or not the subject object or instrumentality is a ‘product’ is a question of law for the trial court[.]”  (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611. 

    

               Lyft assert that the Lyft App is not a “product” because Lyft is a service provider and the Lyft App is incidental to the provision of Lyft’s intended services: facilitating rideshares.  The Court agrees.  As the Court of Appeal has explained,

    

   [t]he doctrine of strict liability in tort applies to producing and marketing enterprises responsible for placing products in the stream of commerce.  Where purchase of a product is the primary objective or essence of the transaction, strict liability applies even to those who are mere conduits in distributing the product to the consumer.  Courts have not extended the doctrine of strict liability to transactions whose primary objective is obtaining services.  Courts have also declined to apply strict liability where the transaction’s service aspect predominates and any product sale is merely incidental to the provision of the service. 

    

   (Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 344, internal citations omitted.)

    

               Here, the complaint alleges that Lyft is a service provider engaged in the business of facilitating transportation options and vehicles for users of their service. (See Complaint, ¶ 1.)  Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant George Tharwt Shafik Mekhail was using the Lyft App at the time of the subject collision because he was required to as a Lyft driver.  (See Complaint, ¶ 27.)  With respect to the Lyft App, Plaintiff alleges it “is defective in its design as it requires a driver, such as Defendant GEORGE THARWT SHAFIK MAEKHAIL, to engage in distracted driving including but not limited to conduct that requires the driver to constantly monitor the LYFT APP and its associated hardware for incoming messages, to respond and communicate through the LYFT APP and its attendant hardware in such a manner which constitutes instant messaging and/or text messaging and/or distracted driving and/or which causes the driver to redirect their attention from the roadway.”  (Complaint, ¶ 29.) 

    

               In essence, Plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate that the primary objective of the “product” is for customers to secure transportation from one location to another.  In other words, the transaction’s service aspect predominates.  The Court therefore concludes, as a matter of law, that the Lyft App is not a “product” such that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for strict product liability.  Further, based on the applicable case law provided by Lyft and the lack of either any countervailing case law or explanation by Plaintiff of how the complaint may be amended to properly state a claim for strict products liability, the Court denies leave to amend. [1]

    

   CONCLUSION AND ORDER

    

   Therefore, the Court sustains Lyft’s demurrer to the third cause of action in the complaint without leave to amend.  The Court orders Lyft to file and serve an answer to the complaint within 20 days of hearing on the demurrer.

    

   Lyft shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.