Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 21STCV08362, Date: 2022-12-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV08362    Hearing Date: December 8, 2022    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

Plaintiff Catherine Rodriguez (Plaintiff) sued Defendant Office Depot (Defendant) based on injuries Plaintiff allegedly sustained when she stepped on a nail in Defendant’s store.  Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) on August 30, 2022, which is the operative pleading.  Defendant demurs to the first and second causes of action in Plaintiff’s FAC.  Defendant also moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages and related portions of Plaintiff’s complaint.  Plaintiff opposes the motion and demurrer.  Defendant replies.

ANALYSIS

1. DEMURRER

    

   “It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.”  (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  In ruling on a demurrer, the court must “liberally construe[]” the allegations of the complaint.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.”  (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.) 

    

   Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action for general negligence and premises liability.  Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to proffer support factual allegations to establish Defendant’s duty, breach, or causation.

    

   The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; and (3) harm to the plaintiff caused by that breach.  (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.)  “[R]ecovery in a negligence action depends as a threshold matter on whether the defendant had a duty to use due care . . . .”  (Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 397 [cleaned up].) 

    

   Further, the elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.  (McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)  Therefore, to prevail on a claim for premises liability, Plaintiff must prove: (1) defendant owned or controlled the subject property; (2) defendant was negligent in the use or maintenance of the property; (3) plaintiff was harmed; and (4) defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm.  (See Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108.)

    

   For pleading purposes, the Court finds the following factual allegations are sufficient to establish Defendant owed an applicable duty of care to Plaintiff as an invitee; the presence of a nail on the store’s floor may have constituted a breach of said duty or dangerous condition; and the presence of the nail on the store floor caused Plaintiff’s claimed injuries:

    

• “Defendant OFFICE DEPOT, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, owned, controlled and or possessed the Office Depot store located at 6227 Topanga Canyon Blvd., Woodland Hills, California which was open to the public for business.”  (FAC, ¶ 5.)

   

• “On and about March 5, 2019, Plaintiff was lawfully shopping inside the Office Depot store at 6227 Topanga Canyon Blvd., Woodland Hills, California.  At said time and place, Plaintiff was walking through the store heading to the restroom when she stepped on a nail that was negligently left on the floor of the store location controlled and possessed by Defendant Office Depot.”  (FAC, ¶ 6.)

• “Plaintiff is informed and believes and theron alleges that the nail on the floor was the same type by the Defendants and their employees in constructing and building the office furniture at the business.” (FAC, ¶ 7.)

• “As a direct and proximate result of negligence of the Defendants, Plaintiff was hurt and injured in her health, strength and activity.” (FAC, ¶ 16.)

   

  As such, the Court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to the first and second causes of action for negligence and premises liability.

   

1. MOTION TO STRIKE

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).) On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294.  (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)  Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)   As set forth in the Civil Code,

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.  (2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.  (3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)-(3), emphasis added.) 

Further, a plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice.  To wit, there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages.  (See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)  “When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice.  When a defendant must produce evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim, fairness demands that he receive adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against him.” (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29 [cleaned up].)  In Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp, the Court of Appeal noted that the plaintiffs’ assertions related to their claim for punitive damages were “insufficient to meet the specific pleading requirement.”  (Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643 [plaintiffs alleged “the conduct of Defendants was intentional, and done willfully, maliciously, with ill will towards Plaintiffs, and with conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff's injuries were exacerbated by the malicious conduct of Defendants. Defendants' conduct justifies an award of exemplary and punitive damages”]; see also Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 [“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim”].) 

Finally, “the imposition of punitive damages upon a corporation is based upon its own fault. It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the fault of others.” (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 31, 36.) “Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive. An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees. But the law does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation. Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders: the officers, directors, or managing agents.” (Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167 [cleaned up].)

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to allege specific conduct that would qualify as malicious or oppressive.  In opposition, Plaintiff proffers the following allegations contained within the FAC which she argues support her prayer for punitive damages:

• “Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the nail on the floor was the same type used by the Defendants and their employees in constructing and building the office furniture at the business."  (FAC, ¶ 7.)

• “Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that defendants had actual notice of the dangerous condition on the floor on March 5, 2019 that was caused by Defendants and their employees."  (FAC, ¶ 10.)

• “Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant has had a history of similar accidents occurring prior to the Plaintiffs accident and have failed to take reasonable steps to prevent these types of accidents from continuing. Defendants' conduct, as set forth hereinabove, was grossly negligent, malicious, oppressive, despicable, carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, and subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of her rights."  (FAC, ¶ 18.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant has had similar accidents to the one at issue in the past and has failed to take reasonable steps to prevent said incidents are insufficient to claim punitive damages against Defendant.  In short, Plaintiff’s allegations lack the factual specificity required, including allegations “of malice among corporate leaders: the officers, directors, or managing agents.” 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to the first and second causes of action in the FAC.  Further, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s claim and prayer for punitive damages in the FAC with leave to amend.

Plaintiff shall file and serve an amended complaint in conformance with the Court’s ruling within 20 days of notice of the Court’s ruling.  Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.