Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 21STCV16459, Date: 2023-01-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV16459    Hearing Date: January 20, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

              Plaintiff Michael John Centofanti (Plaintiff) sued Defendant Allison Michelle Erdman (Defendant) based on a motor vehicle collision.  Plaintiff moves to quash the subpoena for production of records Defendant served on Anthem Blue Cross.  Plaintiff requests monetary sanctions in connection with the motion.  Defendant opposes the motion.  Plaintiff replies.  

ANALYSIS

If a subpoena requires the production of documents, the court may quash the subpoena entirely or modify it.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)  In ruling on a motion to quash, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)

Current discovery standards hold that, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,[1] that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  (Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1039 (hereafter Board of Nursing).)  “To meet this [test], a party seeking to compel [the] production of records . . . must articulate specific facts justifying the discovery sought; it may not rely on mere generalities.”  (Ibid.; see Johnson v. Superior Court (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 829, 837 [finding that a subpoena was “insufficient” to compel production because it was “based wholly on the [party’s] alleged information and belief without any statement of supporting facts”].)  However, “[e]ven if information is otherwise discoverable, it may be protected by a constitutional or statutory privilege[,] [including] the right to privacy . . . .”  (Board of Nursing, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.) 

            “The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy.  Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern.  .  .  .  The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.^[2]  The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.  A court must then balance these competing considerations.”  (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [cleaned up].)

            “Legally recognized privacy interests [include] interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information (‘informational privacy’) .  .  .  .”  (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.)  “A particular class of information is [sensitive or confidential] when well-established social norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over its dissemination and use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity.”  (Ibid.) 

            It is “well-settled” that “patients have a right to privacy with respect to information contained in . . . [their] medical records.”  (Grafilo v. Wolfsohn (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1024, 1034.)  Indeed, a patient’s right to privacy “is protected by case law as well as state and federal statutes and regulations.”  (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 621, 641 (hereafter County of Los Angeles).)  Additionally, “[t]he privacy interest in psychiatric records is particularly strong, and in some respects, entitled to more robust protection than other types of medical records.”  (Grafilo v. Soorani (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 497, 507.) 

            “As one court explained in discussing the examination of medical records vis-à-vis the right to privacy:  the information that may be recorded in a doctor’s files is broad-ranging.  The chronology of ailments and treatment is potentially sensitive.  Patients may disclose highly personal details of lifestyle and information concerning sources of stress and anxiety.  These are matters of great sensitivity going to the core of the concerns for the privacy of information about an individual.”  (County of Los Angeles, 65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 641–642 [cleaned up].) 

            In Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859, it was recognized that “the filing of a lawsuit may implicitly bring about a partial waiver of one’s constitutional right of . . . privacy.”  However, the California Supreme Court held that “the scope of such ‘waiver’ must be narrowly rather than expansively construed.”   (Ibid.)  In other words, “while [a plaintiff] may not withhold information which relates to any physical or mental condition which they have put in issue by bringing this lawsuit, they are entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past.”  (Ibid.)  Therefore, it follows that a patient cannot reasonably expect certain matters to remain private if they are related to the specific issues that the patient has himself brought before a court.  On the other hand, it is objectively reasonable to expect health care records that are unrelated to a current legal dispute to remain private.

Here, the subpoena served on Anthem Blue Cross, on November 3, 2022, seeks the following:

Any and all insurance claims, insurance policies, declaration pages, files, reports, medical records, explanation of benefits (EOBs), settlement documents, repair estimates, property damage reports, witness statements, police department photos, police reports, color photographs, itemized statements of the billing charges, including but not limited to payment history, billing records to show amounts accepted as payment in full, statements of charges, payment transactions, billing write-offs, billing write-downs, billing write-ups, all charges, billing adjustments regardless of source or date, all bills sent to collections, including but not limited to records on CD-ROM, tape drive, documents stored electronically or digitally, floppy drive, hard drive, scanned documents and all other sources pertaining to MICHAEL JOHN CENTOFANTI for 7/16/2009 to present. ID#: CPR341A20720. Limited to the following body parts/conditions: loss of consciousness; concussion; tbi; brain; head; neck; back; cervical; thoracic; lumbar; headache; dizziness; memory loss; eye floaters; ringing in ears; right leg; radiculopathy into extremities; sciatica.

(Declaration of Ramin Soofer, Exhibit A.)

Plaintiff argues the insurance records sought are protected by his right to privacy.  Plaintiff attests that the subpoena uses overbroad language which does not limit the scope of the records requested by time frame, and thus creates a risk of exposing irrelevant constitutionally protected information.  In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to explain how the 10-year time limitation is too broad.  In reply, Plaintiff attests that Defendant has failed to point evidence uncovered through the extensive discovery Defendant has already completed which justifies the subject subpoena requesting documents from 10 years before the incident.

The Court agrees Defendant has not established that the production of Plaintiff’s records from 2009 to the present is justified.  Accordingly, the Court finds the language of the subpoena overbroad as to time.  Thus, there is a high probability that the subpoena as drafted could result in the disclosure of records that are unrelated to Plaintiff’s injuries at issue and are thus private and not discoverable.

Based upon the subpoena as currently crafted, Plaintiff has carried her threshold burden of establishing a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.  Defendant has failed to identify a legitimate interest, in light of Plaintiff’s discovery responses, that outweighs Plaintiff’s right to privacy in her insurance records from 2009 to the present.

Both Plaintiff and Defendant request monetary sanctions in connection with the motion.  In ruling on a motion to quash, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)  The Court declines to award such sanctions.  The Court concludes that the parties had a good faith dispute as to the proper scope of the subpoenas, and neither party has acted in bad faith.  

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Consequently, the Court grants in part Plaintiff’s motion to quash the subject subpoena, orders the subpoena served on Anthem Blue Cross limited to the following time period:  July 16, 2014 to the present (5 years before the subject incident).

Plaintiff shall give notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.