Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 21STCV20921, Date: 2022-07-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV20921    Hearing Date: July 28, 2022    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTIONS

Plaintiff Arshaluys Arutyunyants sued defendants Francesca Catrina Lagman Legaspi (“Francesca”), Felimon Legaspi (“Felimon”), and Catherine Legaspi (“Catherine”) (collectively, “Defendants”) based on a motor vehicle collision.  Defendants appear specially and move to quash service of the summons and complaint for improper service.  Plaintiff opposes the motion.

ANALYSIS

“A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes:  (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. (2) To stay or dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient forum.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1)-(2).) 

“In the absence of a voluntary submission to the authority of the court, compliance with the statutes governing service of process is essential to establish that court's personal jurisdiction over a defendant. When a defendant challenges that jurisdiction by bringing a motion to quash, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service.” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1439–1440; accord Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1160 [“It was incumbent upon plaintiff, after the filing of defendant's motion to quash, to present evidence discharging her burden to establish the requisites of valid service on defendant”]; Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413 [“when a defendant challenges the court's personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of process “the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service” ”].)  A declaration of service by a registered process server establishes a presumption that the facts stated in the declaration are true. (Evid. Code, § 647; Rodriguez v. Cho (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 742, 750.)

“In order to obtain in personam jurisdiction through any form of constructive service there must be strict compliance with the requisite statutory procedures. (Zirbes v. Stratton (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1417, quoting Stamps v. Superior Court (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 108, 110.) A plaintiff may serve an individual defendant “by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person's dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address . . . , in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address . . . , at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20, subd. (b).)

Here, Plaintiff’s proofs of service reflect service on Defendants via substitute service at 601 Grove Place, Glendale, CA 91206 on April 22, 2022.  (See Oppositions to Motion to Quash, Exhibit A.)  Plaintiff purportedly served Defendants via substitute service on “John Doe, house resident.”  (See Oppositions to Motion to Quash, Exhibit A.)  The proof of service further states the process server mailed the documents to Defendants at the 601 Grove Place address also on April 22, 2022. (See Oppositions to Motion to Quash, Exhibit A.)

In support of their respective motions, Defendants advance Catherine’s declaration.  Catherine states that “John Doe” described in Plaintiff’s proof of service does not match any member of her household and does not reside at her household.  (Declaration of Catherine Legaspi, ¶ 1.)  Catherine also states that Francesca does not reside at the 601 Grove Place address.  (Declaration of Catherine Legaspi, ¶ 1.) 

The Court notes that neither Francesca nor Felimon have provided their own declarations to dispute any facts concerning Plaintiff’s purported service of the summons and complaint upon them.  The Court also notes that Catherine does not dispute that she and Felimon reside at the 601 Grove Place address.  With respect to whether Francesca resides at the 601 Grove Place address, Catherine’s statement is not only hearsay but also fails to establish that Francesca did not reside at the 601 Grove Place address at the time of purported service.  Catherine only states that Francesca does not reside there as of the date of her declaration.  Finally, although Catherine’s declaration states that John Doe is not a member of her household, service may also be proper upon “a person apparently in charge of” Defendants’ usual mailing address.  Defendants do not advance any evidence to dispute that 601 Grove Place, Glendale, CA 91206 is not their usual mailing address or that anyone matching the description of John Doe would have been present and been reasonably determined to be “apparently in charge” of that address on the date of service.

The Court finds Defendants have not advanced sufficient competent evidence to establish that service on John Doe on April 22, 2022, was improper.  Specifically, Defendants fail to establish that 601 Grove Place, Glendale, CA was not Defendants’ dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address at the time of service, or that Joe Doe was not a person reasonably believed to be apparently in charge of that address on the date of service.  In other words, the Court concludes Defendants have not rebutted the presumption that the facts stated in the process server’s declaration in the respective proofs of service are true. (See Floveyor International, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 789, 795 [filing a proof of service that complies with statutory standards creates a rebuttable presumption that service was proper].)

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court denies Defendants’ motions to quash service of summons and complaint.

The Clerk of the Court shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling.