Judge Michael E. Whitaker, Case 21STCV21965 2023-05-09 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 21STCV21965, Date: 2023-05-09 Tentative Ruling

PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged). Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.

Plaintiffs Manuel Marquez (Plaintiff) and Jassmin Marquez (Jassmin), by and through her guardian ad litem, Manuel Marquez (collectively, Plaintiffs) sued Defendant Maria Pendarvis (Defendant) based on injuries Plaintiffs allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle collision .

Defendant moves for summary adjudication on the following issue: whether Plaintiff is precluded from recovering non-economic damages against Defendant, pursuant to California Civil Code section 3333.4, based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with financial responsibility laws at the time of the underlying motor vehicle collision. Plaintiff opposes the motion. Defendant replies.

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty if that party contends that there is no merit to the cause of action, defense, or claim for damages, or if the party contends that there is no duty owed. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Ibid.) A cause of action has no merit if: (1) one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established, even if that element is separately pleaded, or (2) a defendant establishes an affirmative defense to that cause of action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (n); Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 583.) Once the defendant has shown that a cause of action has no merit, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2); Union Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 583.)

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” ¿(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (hereafter Aguilar).) ¿“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” ¿(Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].) Further, in line with Aguilar, “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise. If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)

Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

With respect to Plaintiff’s objection to Defendant’s evidence included in Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Undisputed and Disputed Material Facts in Support of Opposition to Motion for Summary Adjudication, the Court finds that the purported evidentiary objection does not comply with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354. Rule 3.1354 provides in pertinent part:

All written objections to evidence must be served and filed separately from the other papers in support of or in opposition to the motion. Objections to specific evidence must be referenced by the objection number in the right column of a separate statement in opposition or reply to a motion, but the objections must not be restated or reargued in the separate statement. Each written objection must be numbered consecutively and must:

(1) Identify the name of the document in which the specific material objected to is located;

(2) State the exhibit, title, page, and line number of the material objected to;

Written objections to evidence must follow one of the following two formats: [¶] . . . [¶]

A party submitting written objections to evidence must submit with the objections a proposed order. The proposed order must include places for the court to indicate whether it has sustained or overruled each objection. It must also include a place for the signature of the judge. The court may require that the proposed order be provided in electronic form. The proposed order must be in one of the following two formats: [¶] . . . [¶]

(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b)-(c), emphasis added.) By including the objection in the Separate Statement, rather than filing the objection separately, Plaintiff has failed to comply with Rule 3.1354. As such, the Court declines to rule on Plaintiff’s ostensible evidentiary objection.

Defendant requests the Court grant summary adjudication on the issue of whether Plaintiff is precluded from recovering noneconomic damages pursuant to Civil Code section 3333.4. Civil Code section 3333.4 provides in pertinent part:

[I]n any action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle, a person shall not recover non-economic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, and other nonpecuniary damages if any of the following applies:

(2) The injured person was the owner of a vehicle involved in the accident and the vehicle was not insured as required by the financial responsibility laws of this state.

(3) The injured person was the operative of a vehicle involved in the accident and the operator cannot establish his or her financial responsibility as required by the financial responsibility laws of this state.

(Civ. Code, § 3333.4, subd. (a).) Thus, the statute applies to two sets of individuals: owners of uninsured vehicles and uninsured operators of vehicles.

Plaintiff was driving a blue 2016 Hyundai Elantra, with Jassmin, a passenger, when a vehicle collision occurred with Defendant. (See Declaration of Andrew S. Attia, ¶¶ 3, 6, Exhibits B, D.) Defendant argues that because at the time of the accident the blue 2016 Hyundai Elantra that Plaintiff was operating was an uninsured vehicle, and Plaintiff himself was uninsured, Plaintiff is barred from recovering noneconomic damages.

Defendant advances the Traffic Collision Report for the subject accident which indicates that Plaintiff reported insurance carrier is “Infinity” with policy number “104600057207001.” (Declaration of Andrew S. Attia, ¶ 4, Exhibit B [Traffic Collision Report, p. 1].) Defendant further advances a letter that Kyobum Lee, a State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company claims adjuster (Lee), received from Plaintiff’s counsel. The letter appears to be originally generated by the insurance company Kemper Auto/Infinity on May 13, 2021. (Declaration of Kyobum Lee, ¶ 4, Exhibit I.) The letter indicates the following:

· . . . Michelle Granda has/had coverage with our company under policy #104-60005-7207-001. The effective dates of the policy covering the vehicles are from 08/06/2020 to 11/21/2020 12:01 AM CST.

· The rated drivers listed on the policy are/were as follows: . . . Manuel Eli Marquez DL# B9950802

(Declaration of Kyobum Lee, ¶ 4, Exhibit I.) The letter does not indicate that the 2016 Hyundai Elantra was covered under the stated policy.

Additionally, Defendant advances the following relevant portions of Plaintiff’s deposition transcript:

Q. Have you ever had a driver’s license with a driver’s license No. B9950802?

(Deposition of Manuel Marquez, pp. 8:2-3, 14:19-23, 15:13-15, 103:20-15, 113:20-114:1.)

Next Defendant advances a letter Lee received from Kemper Auto/Infinity on June 24, 2022, which states the following: “We completed our coverage investigation of the above-referenced loss. There is no coverage for any damages resulting from this accident because we found no policy insuring 2016 Hyundai Elantra at the time of the accident.” (Declaration of Kyobum Lee, ¶ 5, Exhibit J.) Finally, Defendant advances an email Lee received from Colton Coolidge, a Kemper Auto/Infinity adjuster (Coolidge), which states “[t]here was not active coverage for the 2016 HYNDAI ELANTRA on policy number 104600057207001.” (Declaration of Kyobum Lee, ¶¶ 6-7, Exhibit K.)

Based on the foregoing evidence, Defendant has sufficiently established the following: (1) Plaintiff was not covered under the Kemper Auto/Infinity insurance policy, Policy No. 104600057202001 and (2) the 2016 Hyundai Elantra was not covered under the Kemper Auto/Infinity insurance policy, Policy No. 104600057202001. In summary, Defendant has met her burdens of production and persuasion establishing that there are no triable issues of material fact regarding whether Plaintiff or the subject vehicle were insured at the time of the incident as required under California law.

Consequently, Defendant has shifted the burden of production to Plaintiff to raise triable issues of material fact as to whether Plaintiff or the 2016 Hyundai Elantra were covered by insurance at the time of the subject incident.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that, because Plaintiff did not own the 2016 Hyundai Elantra, the fact that said vehicle was uninsured at the time of the incident does not bar Plaintiff from recovering noneconomic damages under Section 3333.4. This contention is correct pursuant to subdivision (a)(2) of Section 3333.4. However, the operator of a vehicle involved in an accident can also be barred from recovering noneconomic damages if he or she cannot establish compliance with the insurance coverage requirement. (Civ. Code, § 3333.4, subd. (a)(3).) Here, Plaintiff has failed to advance any evidence to dispute Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff was not insured at the time of the subject vehicular collision.

Moreover, Plaintiff purportedly disputes Undisputed Material Fact (hereinafter UMF) 17 (“Plaintiff has failed to provide documentation demonstrating Plaintiff complied with California’s financial responsibility laws”) by highlighting the May 13, 2021 letter. As discussed above, this letter states that a “Manuel Eli Marquez” with a driver’s license number of “B9950802” was covered under the policy number “104600057207001.” (Declaration of Kyobum Lee, ¶ 4, Exhibit I.) Yet Plaintiff directly disputes in his deposition that he has ever been referred to as “Manuel Eli Marquez,” or that he ever had the license number “B9950802.” (Deposition of Manuel Marquez, pp. 113:20-114:1.) Thus, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of production to establish that Plaintiff was covered by any insurance policy at the time of the subject vehicular collision.

Considering the competent evidence proffered by Defendant and viewing said evidence most favorably to Plaintiff, the Court finds that there are no triable issues of material fact as to whether either Plaintiff or the subject 2016 Hyundai Elantra were insured at the time of the incident. In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of production in establishing that there are triable issues of material fact as to whether Plaintiff had complied with financial responsibility laws at the time of the subject vehicular collision.

To that end, the Court finds that as a matter of law Plaintiff Manuel Marquez is precluded from recovering non-economic damages resulting from the underlying motor vehicle incident against Defendant pursuant to Civil Code section 3333.4. Consequently, the Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication. Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.

[1] “If summary adjudication is sought, whether separately or as an alternative to the motion for summary judgment, the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.” (California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b); see also California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d) [“The Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in support of a motion must separately identify: (A) Each cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion”].)

Here, Defendant’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts does not comply with the California Rules of Court. The cause of action, issue of duty, affirmative defense or claim for damages for which Defendant seeks summary adjudication is not specifically denoted in the separate statement. Despite this noted procedural defect, the Court shall exercise its discretion to rule on Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication on the merits.

DEPARTMENT	32
HEARING DATE	May 9, 2023
CASE NUMBER	21STCV21965
MOTION	Motion for Summary Adjudication
MOVING PARTY	Defendant Maria Pendarvis
OPPOSING PARTY	Plaintiff Manuel Marquez