Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 21STCV32595, Date: 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV32595    Hearing Date: December 15, 2022    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTIONS

Plaintiff Rosio Lus Mena (Plaintiff) sued Defendants Richard Sena, Lindsay Celeste Sena, Sharena Clemmons and Allstate Insurance Company (collectively, Defendants) based on a motor vehicle collision. 

Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s entire second amended complaint (SAC) as well as to each cause of action set forth in the Second Amended Complaint. 

Separately, Defendants Lindsay Celeste Sena, Sharena Clemmons and Allstate Insurance Company move to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages set forth in the Second Amended  Complaint. 

Plaintiff has not filed oppositions to the motion or demurrer.

ANALYSIS

1. DEMURRER

    

   “It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.”  (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  In ruling on a demurrer, the court must “liberally construe[]” the allegations of the complaint.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.”  (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)  

1. UNCERTAINTY

    

   A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the pleading is so bad that the responding party cannot reasonably respond, i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against him or her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Where a demurrer is made upon the ground of uncertainty, the demurrer must distinctly specify exactly how or why the pleading is uncertain, and where such uncertainty appears by reference to page and line numbers. (See Fenton v. Groveland Comm. Services Dist. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809.)

    

   Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations in the Second Amended Complaint are so ambiguous they have difficulty in deciphering the pleadings which hinders their ability to defend the action.  Except for the allegations against Defendant Lindsay Celeste Sena regarding the First Cause of Action – Motor Vehicle and First Cause of Action – General Negligence, the Court agrees.

    

   The Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations in the Second Amended Complaint to be nonsensical, too general and indeterminate such that Defendants cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against each of them individually or collectively.  Thus, except for the allegations against Defendant Lindsay Celeste Sena regarding the First Cause of Action – Motor Vehicle and First Cause of Action – General Negligence, the Court will sustain the demurrer based upon uncertainty. 

    

   Except for the allegations against Defendant Lindsay Celeste Sena regarding the First Cause of Action – Motor Vehicle and First Cause of Action – General Negligence, because the Court is inclined to sustain, in part, Defendants’ demurrer based on uncertainty, the Court need not address Defendants’ additional arguments regarding misjoinder, competency of Plaintiff, and Plaintiff’s failure to state sufficient facts to constitute proper causes of action against Defendants.

    

2.  NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION

    

   The basic elements of an actionable negligence claim are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; (3) and harm to the plaintiff caused by the breach.  (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.) 

    

   For pleading purposes, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleges sufficient ultimate facts to constitute negligence causes of action against Defendant Lindsay Celeste Sena.  Ultimate facts are those “constituting the cause of action” or those upon which liability depends, e.g., duty of care, breach of the duty  and causation (damages). (See Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “[T]he complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form a part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School District (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872 [at pleading stage, plaintiff need not specify which of defendant’s employees committed negligent acts or omissions].)

    

1. MOTION TO STRIKE

    

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).)  On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294.  (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)  Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)   As set forth in the Civil Code,

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.  (2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.  (3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)-(3), emphasis added.) 

Further, a plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice.  To wit, there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages.  (See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)  “When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice.  When a defendant must produce evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim, fairness demands that he receive adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against him.” (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29 [cleaned up].)  In Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp, the Court of Appeal noted that the plaintiffs’ assertions related to their claim for punitive damages were “insufficient to meet the specific pleading requirement.”  (Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643 [plaintiffs alleged “the conduct of Defendants was intentional, and done willfully, maliciously, with ill will towards Plaintiffs, and with conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff's injuries were exacerbated by the malicious conduct of Defendants. Defendants' conduct justifies an award of exemplary and punitive damages”]; see also Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 [“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim”].) 

Finally, “the imposition of punitive damages upon a corporation is based upon its own fault. It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the fault of others.” (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 31, 36.) “Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive. An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees. But the law does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation. Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders: the officers, directors, or managing agents.” (Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167 [cleaned up].)

Based upon the allegations set forth in the Second Amended Complaint, including the Exemplary Damages Attachment, the Court determines that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to warrant a claim for punitive damages against Defendants Lindsay Celeste Sena, Sharena Clemmons and Allstate Insurance Company.  Moreover, with respect to Defendant Allstate Insurance Company, Plaintiff has not alleged malice among its corporate leaders as required. 

1. LEAVE TO AMEND

    

Plaintiff has the burden of showing in what manner the Second Amended Complaint could be amended and how the amendment would change the legal effect of the complaint, i.e., state a cause of action. (See The Inland Oversight Committee v City of San Bernardino (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 771, 779; PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v Hulven Int'l, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 156, 189.) The plaintiff must not only state the legal basis for the amendment, but also the factual allegations sufficient to state a cause of action or claim. (See PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v Hulven Int'l, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 189.) Moreover, a plaintiff does not meet his or her burden by merely stating in the opposition to a demurrer or motion to strike that “if the Court finds the operative complaint deficient, plaintiff respectfully requests leave to amend.” (See Major Clients Agency v Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1133; Graham v Bank of America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 618 [asserting an abstract right to amend does not satisfy the burden].)

Here, Plaintiff has not opposed the demurrer and motion to strike.  Consequently, she has failed to meet her burden.  Thus, the Court will deny Plaintiff leave to amend the Second Amended Complaint. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court overrules in part Defendant Lindsay Celeste Sena’s demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint (First Cause of Action – Motor Vehicle; First Cause of Action – General Negligence).  Defendant Lindsay Celeste Sena shall file and serve an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint on or before January 6, 2023. 

Further, the Court sustains Defendants Richard Sena, Sharena Clemmons and Allstate Insurance Company’s demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint, and sustains in part Defendant Lindsay Celeste Sena’s demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint (First Cause of Action – Intentional Tort), without leave to amend. 

Further, the Court grants Defendants Lindsay Celeste Sena, Sharena Clemmons and Allstate Insurance Company’s motion to strike without leave to amend.

Defendants shall provide notice of the Court’s rulings and file a proof of service of such.