Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 21STCV42301, Date: 2023-05-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV42301    Hearing Date: May 22, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

NOTE:  2 TENTATIVE RULINGS BELOW 

TENTATIVE RULING - NO. 1

MOTION

Plaintiff Mamie Mitchell sued, in part, Defendants Alexander R. Baldwin, III (Baldwin) and El Dorado Pictures, Inc. based on injuries Plaintiff alleges she sustained when Baldwin discharged a loaded gun towards Plaintiff on the Rust production.  

Baldwin then filed a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Hannah Gutiérrez-Reed, David Halls, Seth Kenney, PDQ Arm and Prop, LLC, and Sarah Zachry (collectively, Cross-Defendants). 

Defendant/Cross-Defendant Sarah Zachry (Zachry) appears specially and moves separately to quash service of the summons and cross-complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Baldwin opposes the motion.  Zachry replies to the opposition.

On March 7, 2023, the original hearing date for the instant motion, the Court granted Baldwin’s request for a continuance to allow Baldwin to conduct jurisdictional discovery on the issues presented by Zachry’s motion.  Pursuant to the Court’s order, Baldwin filed his supplemental opposition on May 1, 2023, and Zachry filed her supplemental reply on May 15, 2023.

JUDICIAL NOTICE

Under Evidence Code section 452, “[j]udicial notice may be taken of the following matters to the extent that they are not embraced within Section 451:  . . .  (d) Record of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States . . . .” (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

Here, the Court grants Zachry’s unopposed request for judicial notice of the operative second amended complaint filed by Plaintiff Mamie Mitchell and the operative cross-complaint filed by Baldwin per Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d)(1).

EVIDENCE

With respect to Zachry’s evidentiary objections, the Court rules as follows:

1.     Sustained

2.     Sustained

3.     Sustained

4.     Sustained

5.     Sustained

ANALYSIS

“A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes:  (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)  And “[a] defendant or cross-defendant may make a motion under this section and simultaneously answer, demur, or move to strike the complaint or cross-complaint.  [N]o act by a party who makes a motion under this section, including filing an answer, demurrer, or motion to strike constitutes an appearance, unless the court denies the motion made under this section. If the court denies the motion made under this section, the defendant or cross-defendant is not deemed to have generally appeared until entry of the order denying the motion.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (e)(1).)

“[W]hen jurisdiction is challenged by a nonresident defendant, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to demonstrate that ‘minimum contacts’ exist between the defendant and the forum state to justify imposition of personal jurisdiction.” (Mihlon v. Superior Court (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 703, 710.)  It is thus upon the plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that all jurisdictional criteria are met. (Ziller Electronics Lab GmbH v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1232.)  If plaintiff meets this burden, “it becomes the defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the existence of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.”  (Buchanan v. Soto (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1362.)  The trial court has discretion to continue the hearing on a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction to allow plaintiff to conduct discovery on the jurisdictional issues.  (HealthMarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1173.) 

Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, state courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who have “minimum contacts” with the forum state. Minimum contacts exist when the relationship between the nonresident and the forum state is such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” (International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316, internal quotations omitted.)

“Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. A nonresident defendant may be subject to the general jurisdiction of the forum if his or her contacts in the forum state are substantial[,] continuous and systematic. In such a case, it is not necessary that the specific cause of action alleged be connected with the defendant’s business relationship to the forum. Such a defendant's contacts with the forum are so wide-ranging that they take the place of physical presence in the forum as a basis for jurisdiction.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 445-446, internal quotations & citations omitted.)

Even if a nonresident defendant does not have sufficient contacts with California such that the defendant is subject to suit in California generally, the defendant may nonetheless be subject to jurisdiction in California for claims based on the defendant’s activities in the state. To assert “limited” or “specific” personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (a) the out-of-state defendant purposefully established contacts with the forum state; (b) the plaintiff’s cause of action “arises out of” or is “related to” defendant’s contacts with the forum state; and (c) the forum’s exercise of personal jurisdiction in the particular case comports with “fair play and substantial justice.” (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 477-478.)

Here, Zachry argues this Court lacks both general and specific personal jurisdiction over Zachry.  Zachry advances her own declaration in support of the instant motion.  Zachry avers to the following:

Zachry worked as the props master on the set of Rust, which was filmed just outside of Santa Fe, New Mexico.  (Zachry Dec. ¶ 2.)  Zachry lives in New Mexico and has been a resident of the State of New Mexico since she was born. (Zachry Dec. ¶ 3.)  Zachry graduated from the University of New Mexico in 2019, and prior to working on Rust she worked on approximately five other films, all of which were produced in New Mexico.  (Zachry Dec. ¶ 4.) Zachry has never been a resident of the State of California, and she has not lived or worked in California.  (Zachry Dec. ¶ 5.)  Zachry has not traveled to California for any purpose related to her employment with, or work on, the Rust production.  (Zachry Dec. ¶ 6.)  The last time that she visited California was in 2019 when she traveled to the state to attend a friend’s wedding and she has not been to California at any time since then.  (Zachry Dec. ¶ 6.)  Zachry states she has never been served with the November 17, 2021 complaint and the August 3, 2022 second amended complaint filed by Plaintiff.  (Zachry Dec. ¶ 6.)

Zachry argues that there is no allegation in the underlying complaint or the cross-complaint that Zachry’s work was conducted in California or that she received some benefit relating to the fact that some defendants reside in California.  Beyond erroneously alleging that Zachry “has consented to jurisdiction” in California, Zachary argues that the cross-complaint does not allege that she has any contacts with California sufficient for exerting personal jurisdiction over her. 

In opposition Baldwin argues Zachry is subject to specific personal jurisdiction of the Court because she purposefully availed herself of the forum state’s benefits by engaging in an employment relationship with numerous California entities.  Further, Baldwin argues Zachry’s negligent conduct arose from her contacts with California residents and businesses.  Baldwin claims Zachry contracted and continuously interacted with California entities in a professional capacity before and during filming, and her negligence on the  Rust set directly caused the tragic death of Hutchins, the physical injury of Souza, as well as the injuries asserted in the cross-complaint.  However, Baldwin does not advance any evidence of the employment relationships and professional contacts Zachry purportedly has in or with California residents or entities. 

In reply, Zachry argues that Baldwin’s “evidence” supporting his contention that Zachry purposefully availed herself of forum benefits and established purposeful California contacts is set forth in the cross-complaint and is therefore inadmissible.  Zachry argues that Baldwin does not meet his burden of proof to establish the existence of any factual basis for a California court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over her.  Moreover, Zachry contends that Baldwin concedes in the opposition that there are no facts which support the exercise of general jurisdiction over her. 

Based upon the initial record, established as of March 7, 2023, the Court found Baldwin had not met his burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that all personal jurisdiction criteria had been met vis-à-vis Zachry.

Supplemental Papers

In the supplemental opposition, Baldwin argues that jurisdictional discovery establishes the following, and thus supports the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Zachry: (1) Zachry purposefully availed herself of the privileges and benefits of the forum state through her professional interaction with California entities before and during the filming of Rust; (2) Zachary’s California contacts arise from and relate directly to the underlying controversy; and (3) nothing in the record establishes that the exercise of jurisdiction over Zachry would be unreasonable. 

First, Baldwin argues that Zachry’s work-related relationships with California entities developed during her employment on Rust demonstrate that she has purposefully availed herself of the privileges of, and further has derived a benefit from, conducting business in California.  In support of the foregoing contention, Baldwin points to the professional relationship between Zachry with Luis Alvarez (Alvarez), the owner of The Hand Prop Room LP, located in Los Angeles.  Baldwin advances evidence of text messages exchanged between Zachry and Alvarez in which they discussed availability and pricing of various props within The Hand Prop Room LP’s inventory, which Zachry needed for the Rust production.  (Declaration of Luke Nikas, ¶ 4, Exhibit A.)  The text message exchange included multiple requests by Zachry for Alvarez to FedEx selected props from Alvarez’s shop in Los Angeles, to a Rust Movie Productions location in Santa Fe.  (Declaration of Luke Nikas, ¶ 4, Exhibit A.)  Alvarez confirmed the dispatch of Zachry’s requested props by texting Zachry pictures of the FedEx shipping labels.  (Declaration of Luke Nikas, ¶ 4, Exhibit A.) 

Baldwin next highlights Zachry’s communications with Jonah Foxman (Foxman) from El Dorado films, located in Universal City, California, as another example of Zachry’s continuous professional interaction with California contacts.  Baldwin advances evidence of two email exchanges between Zachry and Foxman in which they discuss various options for the prop knife Baldwin would use for his character during filming.  (Declaration of Luke Nikas, ¶¶ 5-6, Exhibits B, C.) 

Finally, Baldwin argues that Zachry’s employment contract with Rust Movie Productions, LLC, itself, should have placed Zachry on reasonable notice that she could be subject to a suit arising out of her work on the Rust production in California.  Baldwin bases this contention on the purported fact that “the film industry and overall production of Rust is so clearly intertwined with the state of California.”  (Supplemental Opposition, p. 3.)

In opposition, Zachry argues her communication and interaction with California contacts was not self-motivated, but rather directed by her employer for the purpose of the Rust production and conducted solely in a representative professional capacity.  Thus, Zachry concludes these contacts cannot be used to establish that she purposefully availed herself of the privileges and benefits of conducting business in California.  (See Rivelli v. Hemm (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 380, 395-396 [“It is the defendant's intentional conduct (here, Straumann) directed at the forum that creates the necessary contacts to assert jurisdiction . . .  not the mere fact that an officer of the foreign corporation also exercised director duties in-forum”].)  Zachry advances her own declaration in support of the foregoing contention:

·       As I recently verified in said Responses, I did not contact the Hand Prop Room LLP in Los Angeles on my own behalf to rent film props nor based on my own decision to do so. (Document Request Response No. 4, pp. 6-7). Instead, after I was hired as an employee of Rust Productions, Seth Kenney of New Mexico directed me to contact Luis Alvarez, an employee of the Hand Prop Room, LLC regarding potential rental of Western themed props needed for the film. (Id.) Thereafter, I contacted Mr. Alvarez via text message and Mr. Alvarez responded with photographs of items available to rent.

·       At the time of my correspondences with Jonah Foxman of El Dorado Pictures, I believed that Mr. Foxman was located in New York City and acted as Alec Baldwin’s personal assistant. Mr. Foxman’s email correspondence to me came from the email address “nyoffice@eldoradopictures.com” and Mr. Foxman’s email signature block listed a phone number with a New York area code. In any event, I only communicated with Mr. Foxman as a representative of Mr. Baldwin in Mr. Baldwin’ capacity as a member of the cast. I responded to Mr. Foxman solely in my capacity as an employee of Rust Production after my supervisors directed me to communicate with Foxman on Mr. Baldwin’s preferences on props other than firearms and/or ammunition.

(Supplemental Declaration of Sarah Zachry, ¶¶ 3, 9.)

            Zachry further characterizes Baldwin’s assumption that her employment with Rust Movie Productions, LLC, or involvement with the Rust production in itself, should have put her on notice of her potential liability in California, as completely unreasonable.  Zachry highlights the lack of any clear indication of connection between her employment with Rust Movie Productions, LLC, and California entities, in her declaration:

·       [O]n or about September 23, 2021, I was contacted by Row Walters inquiring as to whether I would be interested in working as prop master on the film Rust, to be filmed outside of Santa Fe, New Mexico. As prop master, I would be working under the supervision of Walters as co-producer of Rust. (Interrogatory Response No 5., p. 5). On September 24, 2021 I agreed to accept the position. Shortly thereafter, I was provided a “Crew Deal Memo” by Rust Movie Productions, LLC a New Mexico LLC (Rust Productions), as Producer, proposing to hire me as a crew member. I executed and returned the Crew Deal Memo on receipt and thus became an employee of Rust Productions. I never agreed to become employed by any other entity involved in filming Rust.

·       At the time that I was hired and throughout the time that I worked on Rust, I did not know where El Dorado Pictures was located nor that it was a California company. El Dorado Pictures was not my employer, had no right to supervise my work on the film and never purported to supervise my work.

(Supplemental Declaration of Sarah Zachry, ¶¶ 2, 8.)

            The Court agrees with Zachry and finds that Zachry’s two established interactions with California contacts, which were directed by, and within the scope of her employment with, her New Mexico based employer, are not sufficient to establish that Zachry purposefully established contacts with the forum state of California.  As such the first required element of specific personal jurisdiction is not satisfied, and consequently Baldwin cannot meet his burden in demonstrating that California can exercise personal jurisdiction over Zachry.

            The Court further notes, notwithstanding Baldwin’s failure to establish the first element of specific jurisdiction, the connection between Zachry’s contacts with California and Baldwin’s cause of action against Zachry is extremely tenuous.  As Zachry notes in her opposition, Baldwin is alleging Zachry negligently failed to supervise the use and storage of firearms and ammunition on the set of the Rust production, leading to the subject incident.  Zachry’s contacts with California involved the selection and ordering of a variety of western themed props for the production.  However, none of these props included firearms or ammunition.  As such, there is little, if any connection between Zachry’s purportedly negligent supervision of the firearms and ammunition during the Rust production, and her procurement of non-firearm related props from California.  The Court finds the following excerpts of Zachry’s declaration further support the foregoing contention:

·       The actual items I ordered on behalf of Rust Productions from the Hand Prop Room were vintage saddle bags, canteens, shackles, books, keys, a poker set, luggage, pots and pans, spoons, forks, a walking stick, a set of bowie knives, and a gun belt. The props were shipped to Rust Movie Productions LLC’s office in Santa Fe, New Mexico and the shipment was paid for through Rust Production’s Federal Express account.

·       The gun belt that I obtained from the Hand Prop Room was not used by Alec Baldwin in Rust. I am informed and believe that Mr. Baldwin’s gun belt was a custom shoulder rig ordered through Seth Kenney of PDQ Arm & Prop.

·       I am informed and believe that Seth Kenney of PDQ Arm & Prop selected all of the firearms to be used in Rust before I was hired to work on the production. I did not order or obtain any of the firearms used in the film.

·       I did not order or supply any of the ammunition used in Rust. I am informed and believe that Seth Kenney as owner of PDQ Arm & Prop, LLC, a New Mexico Limited Liability Company located in Albuquerque, New Mexico supplied the majority of the ammunition for the film. To my knowledge, a few boxes of ammunition were supplied by Hannah Gutierrez-Reed and man named “Billy Ray” both of whom I understood were residents of New Mexico. It was my understanding that the ammunition to be used in the film consisted solely of blanks and dummies. 8. At the time that I was hired and throughout the time that I worked on Rust, I did not know where El Dorado Pictures was located nor that it was a California company. El Dorado Pictures was not my employer, had no right to supervise my work on the film and never purported to supervise my work.

(Supplemental Declaration of Sarah Zachry, ¶¶ 4, 5, 6, 7.) 

Lastly, based upon the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that asserting personal jurisdiction over Zachary would violate “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”  In particular, it would be unfair and unreasonable for Zachary to answer to Baldwin’s cross-complaint in California when she, a resident of New Mexico, was hired in New Mexico for a film production that was to occur in New Mexico, and her only contacts, albeit limited, with California entities and individuals were solely related to her job duties.  As such, the Court cannot reach the conclusion that Zachary’s contacts were volitional and intended for her personal gain as opposed to the benefit of her employer, Rust Movie Productions, a New Mexico corporation. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court finds Baldwin has not met his burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that all personal jurisdictional criteria are met vis-à-vis Zachry.  Accordingly, the Court grants Zachry’s motion to quash service of the summons and Baldwin’s cross-complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.

            The Clerk of the Court shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling.    

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING - NO. 2

MOTION

Plaintiff Mamie Mitchell sued, in part, Defendants Alexander R. Baldwin, III (Baldwin) and El Dorado Pictures, Inc. based on injuries Plaintiff alleges she sustained when Baldwin discharged a loaded gun towards Plaintiff on the Rust production.  

Cross-Complainant Baldwin then filed a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Hannah Gutiérrez-Reed, David Halls, Seth Kenney, PDQ Arm and Prop, LLC, and Sarah Zachry (collectively, Cross-Defendants). 

Cross-Defendant Hannah Gutierrez-Reed (Gutierrez-Reed) appears specially and moves separately to quash service of the summons and cross-complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Baldwin opposes the motion.  Gutierrez-Reed replies to the opposition.

On February 8, 2023, the original hearing date for the instant motion, the Court granted Baldwin’s request for a continuance to allow Baldwin to conduct jurisdictional discovery on the issues presented by Gutierrez-Reed’s motion.  Pursuant to the Court’s order, Baldwin filed his supplemental opposition on May 1, 2023, and Gutierrez-Reed filed her supplemental reply on May 15, 2023. [1]

ANALYSIS

“A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes:  (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)  And “[a] defendant or cross-defendant may make a motion under this section and simultaneously answer, demur, or move to strike the complaint or cross-complaint.  [N]o act by a party who makes a motion under this section, including filing an answer, demurrer, or motion to strike constitutes an appearance, unless the court denies the motion made under this section. If the court denies the motion made under this section, the defendant or cross-defendant is not deemed to have generally appeared until entry of the order denying the motion.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (e)(1).)

“[W]hen jurisdiction is challenged by a nonresident defendant, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to demonstrate that ‘minimum contacts’ exist between the defendant and the forum state to justify imposition of personal jurisdiction.” (Mihlon v. Superior Court (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 703, 710.)  It is thus upon the plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that all jurisdictional criteria are met. (Ziller Electronics Lab GmbH v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1232.)  If plaintiff meets this burden, “it becomes the defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the existence of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.”  (Buchanan v. Soto (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1362.)  The trial court has discretion to continue the hearing on a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction to allow plaintiff to conduct discovery on the jurisdictional issues.  (HealthMarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1173.) 

Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, state courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who have “minimum contacts” with the forum state. Minimum contacts exist when the relationship between the nonresident and the forum state is such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” (International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316, internal quotations omitted.)

“Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. A nonresident defendant may be subject to the general jurisdiction of the forum if his or her contacts in the forum state are substantial[,] continuous and systematic. In such a case, it is not necessary that the specific cause of action alleged be connected with the defendant’s business relationship to the forum. Such a defendant's contacts with the forum are so wide-ranging that they take the place of physical presence in the forum as a basis for jurisdiction.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 445-446, internal quotations & citations omitted.)

Even if a nonresident defendant does not have sufficient contacts with California such that the defendant is subject to suit in California generally, the defendant may nonetheless be subject to jurisdiction in California for claims based on the defendant’s activities in the state. To assert “limited” or “specific” personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (a) the out-of-state defendant purposefully established contacts with the forum state; (b) the plaintiff’s cause of action “arises out of” or is “related to” defendant’s contacts with the forum state; and (c) the forum’s exercise of personal jurisdiction in the particular case comports with “fair play and substantial justice.” (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 477-478.)

Here, Gutierrez-Reed argues the Court lacks both general and specific personal jurisdiction over Gutierrez-Reed. Gutierrez-Reed advances her own declaration in support of the instant motion. Gutierrez-Reed avers to the following:

·       At all relevant times, I was employed by Rust Movie Production, LLC to work as the Key Assistant Props on the set of the movie Rust, on location in the State of New Mexico.

·       I have never owned or operated any business in the State of California.

·       My only employment in the State of California was two days spent as a production assistant for the movie Once Upon a Time in Hollywood in 2015.

·       I have never been a member of any unions in the State of California.

·       During the relevant time period, I would, on occasion, use the home address of a friend that lived in California as a mailing address. However, I never lived or resided at that address.

·       I do not own, rent, or lease any real property in the State of California, and I have not resided in Los Angeles County, or anywhere else in the State of California, in approximately 20 years.

·       I have lived in, and been a resident of, the State of Arizona for the last twenty years.

(Declaration of Hannah Gutierrez-Reed, ¶¶ 4-10.) 

In addition, because the acts alleged in both the underlying complaint and cross-complaint occurred outside of California and she uses a California mailing address on occasion, Gutierrez-Reed argues it is not foreseeable she would be subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction over her. Gutierrez-Reed also argues that even if minimum contacts are established, a California court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over her would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice seeing as the incident at issue took place in New Mexico, and the underlying claims are raised by a resident of New York.

In opposition Baldwin argues Gutierrez-Reed is subject to specific jurisdiction of the Court because she purposefully availed herself of the forum state based on her previous jobs with California-produced films and using a California mailing address at the time of the subject incident. Baldwin highlights that Gutierrez-Reed admits that she (1) worked as a production assistant in California in 2015 and (2) used the residence of a friend living in California as a mailing address on occasion. (See Declaration of Hannah Gutierrez-Reed, ¶¶ 6, 8.)

Next, Baldwin argues that Gutierrez-Reed’s use of a California mailing address was done with the express purpose of reaping the personal and professional benefits associated with such an address— benefits ordinarily available only to residents.  Baldwin continues in contending  that by engaging in employment relationships with California entities, such as Armorer and Key Assistant Props, Gutierrez-Reed created continuing obligations between herself and residents of California.  As such, as Baldwin asserts, Gutierrez-Reed availed herself of the privilege of conducting business in California and purposely derived a benefit from those interstate activities.

In reply Gutierrez-Reed argues first that Baldwin has failed to establish the initial element of whether Gutierrez-Reed purposefully availed herself of the privilege of conducting activities in California because the only evidence Baldwin relied on upon was Gutierrez-Reed’s use of a friend’s address in California. Further, Gutierrez-Reed attests that the residence of other individuals involved with the production of Rust is immaterial to Gutierrez-Reed’s connection to California and does not establish that she purposefully subjected herself to California’s jurisdiction. Next, Gutierrez-Reed argues that Baldwin fails to establish how the underlying incident arose out of Gutierrez-Reed’s limited connections to California.

Additionally, Gutierrez-Reed argues that Baldwin advances several contentions within his opposition which are not supported by admissible evidence.  For example, Baldwin claims that Gutierrez-Reed contracted with and continuously interacted with California contacts in a professional capacity prior to and during filming of Rust.  However, Baldwin does not advance any evidence to support that assertion. Gutierrez-Reed concludes that the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over her would violate notions of fair play and substantial justice seeing as neither Gutierrez-Reed nor Baldwin are residents of California.

Based upon the initial record, established as of February 8, 2023, the Court found Baldwin had not met his burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that all personal jurisdiction criteria had been met vis-à-vis Gutierrez-Reed.

Supplemental Papers

In the supplemental opposition, Baldwin argues that jurisdictional discovery establishes the following, and thus supports the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Gutierrez-Reed: (1) Gutierrez-Reed purposefully availed herself of the privileges and benefits of the forum state, California; (2) Gutierrez-Reed’s California contacts arise from and relate directly to the underlying controversy; and (3) nothing in the record establishes that the exercise of jurisdiction over Gutierrez-Reed would be unreasonable. 

First, Baldwin argues that Gutierrez-Reed’s multiple employment relationships with California entities, [2] and attempts to use a California address to gain membership to a California union, demonstrate that she has purposefully availed herself to the privileges of, and further has derived a benefit from, conducting business in California. 

In support of the foregoing contention, Baldwin points to Gutierrez-Reed’s efforts to join Local 44 of the International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees union (IATSE).  Baldwin advances a copy of an email sent to Gutierrez-Reed from a Local 44 representative.  In the email the representative states:  “. . . if you are looking for membership with IATSE 44 in LA then the best way is to have an address in LA.”  (Declaration of Luke Nikas, ¶ 4, Exhibit A.)  A few months later, another representative from Local 44 emailed Gutierrez-Reed outlining the application process for placement on the Industry Experience Roster with the Contract Services Administration Trust Fund (CSATF) and join Local 44.  (Declaration of Luke Nikas, ¶ 6, Exhibit C.)  Gutierrez-Reed then applied for a “Contract Service Letter,” with Local 44 indicating:  “Ill (sic) probably need my california address put into the address for the VERIFICATION letter.  10074 Sully Dr Los Angeles, ca 91352.”  (Declaration of Luke Nikas, ¶ 7, Exhibit D.)  Gutierrez-Reed’s application for placement on the “Industry Experience Roster” was eventually denied.  (Declaration of Luke Nikas, ¶ 8, Exhibit E.)

Baldwin concludes that via Gutierrez-Reed’s past employment with California entities in California, representations that she has a California mailing address in order to gain professional opportunities, and attempts to join a California union, which would further afford her professional benefits, demonstrate that she has purposefully availed herself to the benefits of not only working in California, but also the benefits of being perceived as living in California.

In her supplemental reply, Gutierrez-Reed highlights that the union application, which Baldwin relies on to establish purposeful contacts, was denied because she had not performed any work within California under the jurisdiction of Local 44.  Gutierrez-Reed further contends, as she discussed in her initial moving papers, using a mailing address in California is insufficient by itself to establish the purposeful availment element required to exercise personal jurisdiction.

In regard to the second element for specific jurisdiction Baldwin cites to Virtualmagic Asia, Inc. v. FilCartoons, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 228 to elucidate the legal standard for determining whether a defendant’s forum contacts and the underlying controversy are sufficiently related to find that the controversy “arises out of” the forum contacts.   Virtualmagic Asia states that “the ‘arising out of or relating to’ standard is a disjunctive, flexible standard that does not require the defendant’s forum contacts be directed at the plaintiff to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction.”  (Id. at p. 236.)   Baldwin notes both Gutierrez-Reeds’ contacts with California, as well as the alleged conduct giving rise to her liability in the subject case, are based on her career as armorer for motion picture and television productions.  Informed by the flexible standard outlined in Virtualmagic Asia, Baldwin thus concludes that this overlap demonstrates Gutierrez-Reed’s California contacts are sufficiently related to the underlying controversy for purposes of exercising specific jurisdiction.

In reply, Gutierrez-Reed stresses the need for “a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue” in order for the second element of specific jurisdiction to be met.  (See Rivelli v. Hemm (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 380, 374.)  Gutierrez-Reed argues this required link between Gutierrez-Reed’s contacts with California and the underlying incident has not been established.  The Court agrees.  The controversy herein is based on Plaintiff’s alleged injuries resulting from a firearm being discharged during filming of Rust.  However, Baldwin fails to explain how Gutierrez-Reed’s past employments, use of a California mailing address, and failed union application, are linked to the Rust production, and specifically, to the discharge of the firearm.  The fact that Gutierrez-Reed has worked as an armorer both in California and on the set of Rust is of no moment – those facts do not establish that Gutierrez-Reed’s previous similar work for different California companies led to or caused the subject incident on the set of Rust. 

Accordingly, the Court finds, even if Baldwin had established that Gutierrez-Reed has purposefully availed herself of the benefits of conducting business in California, he has failed to demonstrate that the controversy herein arose out of her professional contacts with California.  In fact, the record shows that whatever contacts Gutierrez-Reed had with California are unconnected, in particular, to the harm Baldwin claims in the cross-complaint.    

Finally, based upon the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that asserting personal jurisdiction over Gutierrez-Reed would violate “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”  In particular, it would be unfair and unreasonable for Gutierrez-Reed to answer to Baldwin’s cross-complaint in California when she, a resident of Arizona, was hired by Rust Movie Productions, a New Mexico corporation, for a film production that was to occur in New Mexico, and her contacts, albeit limited, with California entities and individuals were not directly attendant to her employment with the Rust production. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court finds Baldwin has not met his burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that all personal jurisdictional criteria are met vis-à-vis Gutierrez-Reed.  Accordingly, the Court grants Gutierrez-Reed’s motion to quash service of the summons and Baldwin’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.

            The Clerk of the Court shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling.