Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 22SMCV00758, Date: 2024-02-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22SMCV00758 Hearing Date: February 7, 2024 Dept: 207
TENTATIVE RULING
DEPARTMENT |
207 |
HEARING DATE |
February 7, 2024 |
CASE NUMBERS |
SC128312 & 22SMCV00758 –
Related Actions |
MOTIONS |
Motions to Confirm/Enforce Settlement |
MOVING PARTY |
Defendant and Cross-Complainant Joseph Shemaria |
OPPOSING PARTY |
Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Northwestern Engineering
Company |
MOTIONS
Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Northwestern
Engineering Company (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant and Cross-Complainant Joseph
Shemaria (“Defendant”) are adjacent property owners.
Case number SC128312, which was
filed on November 1, 2017, and is nearing trial, involves a dispute over a
portion of the pathway between the properties, located toward the front of the properties,
where Plaintiff has historically kept items in storage.
Case number 22SMCV00758, which was
filed on May 24, 2022, concerns a fence located on the pathway toward the back
of the properties.
Defendant has filed motions in both
cases seeking a judgment confirming or enforcing the settlement agreement
purportedly reached between himself and Plaintiff orally in open court on
January 10, 2023. Plaintiff opposes, on
the basis that the parties did not agree to all material terms of the
settlement, and Defendant replies.
ANALYSIS
Code of Civil Procedure section
664.6 provides that “[i]f parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing
signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the
court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may
enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
664.6.) In ruling on a motion to enter judgment, the court acts as a trier of
fact. The court must determine whether the parties entered into a valid and
binding settlement. To do so, the court may receive oral testimony in addition
to declarations. (Kohn v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1530,
1533.)
The issue on a motion to enforce
settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 is whether the
parties entered into a valid and binding settlement agreement. (See Viejo v.
Bancorp. (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 200, 209, fn. 4 [“a court's power to make
factual determinations under section 664.6 is generally limited to whether the
parties entered into a valid and binding settlement agreement”].) In other words, the only issue before the
court is whether an agreement exists; not whether the agreement has been
breached.
Attached as Exhibit “D” to the
Shemaria declaration in support of the motions is a copy of a court transcript from
case number SC128312 on January 10, 2023, where the parties represented to the
Court on the morning of trial that they had reached a settlement and read into
the record the terms as follows:
MR. HUBER: WE HAVE SOME TERMS THAT WE'D LIKE TO
GET ON THE RECORD SINCE THE PARTIES ARE HERE, AND THEY'LL BE SUBJECT TO
OBVIOUSLY A FORMAL AGREEMENT TO FOLLOW. BUT MR. PARTIDA HAS THE TERMS, AND
HE'LL JUST READ THEM INTO THE RECORD, WE'LL GET THE PARTIES TO AGREE AND BE
DONE.
THE COURT: OKAY.
MR. PARTIDA: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR.
THE PLAINTIFF/CROSS-DEFENDANT NORTHWESTERN
ENGINEERING IS TO PAY DEFENDANT/CROSS-COMPLAINANT JOSEPH SHEMARIA A ONE-TIME
PAYMENT OF $39,800 WITHIN 30 DAYS OF EXECUTION OF THE FORMALIZED WRITTEN
AGREEMENT.
PLAINTIFF IS TO ENTER INTO A WRITTEN LEASE WITH
THE DEFENDANT JOSEPH SHEMARIA FOR SEVEN FIVE-YEAR TERMS TOTALING 35 YEARS TO
USE THE BREEZEWAY FOR INGRESS AND EGRESS, TEMPORARY STORAGE AND TO THROW AWAY
TRASH AT THE SPEEDWAY OVER MR. SHEMARIA'S PROPERTY.
PLAINTIFF TO PAY $200 A MONTH FOR THE LEASE.
PLAINTIFF IS TO INDEMNIFY JOSEPH SHEMARIA FOR ITS
USE OF THE BREEZEWAY AND ANY USE OVER THE PROPERTY.
PLAINTIFF TO NAME JOSEPH SHEMARIA AS AN
ADDITIONAL INSURED ON ITS INSURANCE POLICY.
PARTIES ARE TO SPLIT THE COST OF MAINTENANCE OF
THE CONCRETE AND GATE ONLY.
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE OF ALL ACTIONS,
INCLUDING PLAINTIFF'S MOST RECENT COMPLAINT.
THERE'S A GENERAL RELEASE WAIVER OF CIVIL CODE
1542: EACH PARTY IS TO BEAR THEIR OWN FEES AND COSTS, AND THERE WILL BE A
MEMORIALIZED FORMAL WRITTEN AGREEMENT OF THESE TERMS AND LEASE AGREEMENT.
MR. HUBER: I JUST HAVE SOMETHING TO ADD TO THAT,
YOUR HONOR.
THE COURT: SURE.
MR. HUBER: COUPLE THINGS: ON THE BREEZEWAY,
THAT WE WOULD ALSO BE USING IT FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE BUILDING, BUT I THINK
THAT'S A TERM WE CAN WORK OUT.
AND THEN WE ALSO HAVE A BACK ISSUE, I FORGOT
TO MENTION THAT, WITH THE BACK GATE BEING REMOVED, OR THE PARTIES
TO FIGURE OUT THE BEST WAY TO ALLOW ACCESS TO THE DUMPSTER IN THE REAR.
MR. PARTIDA: SURE.
MR. HUBER: THAT'S THE SUBJECT OF THE SECOND
LAWSUIT, THAT MR. SHEMARIA WILL ALLOW ACCESS TO THE DUMPSTER OR REMOVE THE
GATE. BUT THAT'S AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE SETTLEMENT, BUT WE CAN WORK OUT THE
PARTICULARS OF IT.
MR. SHEMARIA: I UNDERSTOOD THEY WERE GOING TO PUT
IN A GATE, NOT GOING TO REMOVE IT.
MR. PARTIDA: RIGHT. WE TALKED ABOUT A BARNYARD
TYPE OF THING ON THE FENCE, BUT WE –
MR. HUBER: YEAH, I THINK –
THE COURT: SO THEY'RE GOING TO INSTALL A GATE?
MR. PARTIDA: RIGHT.
THE COURT: WHO'S "THEY"?
MR. PARTIDA: NORTHWESTERN.
THE COURT: AND WHEN WILL THAT BE DONE? I DIDN'T
HEAR.
MR. HUBER: DO YOU WANT TO SPEAK TO THAT? HE'S –
THE COURT: WHO AM I HEARING FROM?
MR. HUBER: THIS IS MY CLIENT, MR. ADELSTEIN. HE'S
THE REPRESENTATIVE –
THE COURT: GOOD MORNING.
MR. ADELSTEIN: GOOD MORNING.
THE COURT: OKAY.
MR. HUBER: WE'RE JUST TALKING ABOUT THE BACK
PORTION, AND WE -- WE WANTED IT TO COME DOWN, THE BACK PART OF THE GATE THAT IS
CLOSEST TO THE DUMPSTER. BUT WE NEED ACCESS, AND I DON'T KNOW WHAT THAT LOOKS
LIKE. I DON'T KNOW IF THAT'S A GATE OR WE'RE TEARING THE GATE DOWN.
MR. ADELSTEIN: A GATE WOULD MAKE IT VERY
LOGISTICALLY DIFFICULT FOR ACCESS TO EGRESS GIVEN THE HEIGHT, RIGHT. AND IF IT
IS SIMPLY REMOVED, IT DOESN'T CHANGE -- IT RETURNS AS TO THE STATUS QUO.
MR. HUBER: THE PORTION THAT –
MR. ADELSTEIN: JUST THE LAST SECTION, BECAUSE
THERE'S ALREADY A STRUCTURAL –
MR. PARTIDA: CAN YOU JUST PUT A BARNYARD RAIL AND
SLIDE THAT OVER WHEN YOU NEED TO GET OUT, OR LEAVE IT OPEN?
MR. HUBER: WHAT DO YOU THINK, JOE?
MR. SHEMARIA: I DON'T KNOW. BECAUSE THE PARKING
THAT OPENS ONTO THE PARKING OF APARTMENT 3, AND SOMETIMES THEY HAVE TWO
VEHICLES, AND SO I GOT TO ALLOW FOR A SECOND CAR TO BE PARKED THERE, IF THERE
IS ONE.
MR. HUBER: I THINK TAKING JUST THAT LITTLE PIECE –
THE COURT: SO MAYBE THE PARTIES NEED TO GO OUT
THERE AND TAKE A LOOK AND WE'LL JUST BUILD IN TIME. IT SOUNDS LIKE YOU'RE GOING
TO WORK SOMETHING OUT REGARDING IT?
MR. PARTIDA: YES, YOUR HONOR.
MR. HUBER: YES.
THE COURT: THE NEED FOR A GATE IS WHAT?
MR. SHEMARIA: IT'S TO ACCESS THE TRASH DUMPSTER.
MR. HUBER: SO THERE'S A SECOND LAWSUIT, YOUR
HONOR, THAT WAS FILED LAST YEAR. AND IT'S NOT CONSOLIDATED OR RELATED TO THIS
ONE FORMALLY, BUT THE ISSUE IS ACCESS BY MY CLIENT TO A DUMPSTER THAT GOES OVER
A PORTION –
THE COURT: NO. I UNDERSTAND THAT. BUT IT SOUNDS
LIKE ONE SIDE SAYS "WE NEED A GATE," ONE SIDE SAYS "WE
DON'T."
MR. PARTIDA: I THINK THE ISSUE IS -- AND WE
CAN WORK IT OUT. EITHER WE WILL REMOVE THE FENCE, IS WHAT THEY'RE ASKING, OR
JUST TO ADD A SLIDING GATE, LIKE A BARNYARD STYLE GATE, SO THAT THE GATE IS
STILL THERE WHEN IT'S NOT IN USE.
THE COURT: SO THAT'S THE ONE OPEN ITEM THAT
YOU'RE GOING TO CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE?
MR. HUBER: CORRECT.
THE COURT: ARE YOU CONFIDENT YOU CAN WORK THAT
OUT, MR. SHEMARIA, ONE WAY OR THE OTHER?
MR. SHEMARIA: YES.
THE COURT: OKAY. MR. -- IS IT, ADELSTEIN?
MR. HUBER: IT'S ADELSTEIN, YES.
THE COURT: YOU BELIEVE YOU CAN WORK THAT LAST
PIECE OUT?
MR. ADELSTEIN: YES.
THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. SO YOU'LL CONTINUE TO
TALK ON THAT.
SO, COUNSEL, HOW LONG DO YOU WANT FOR AN OSC RE:
DISMISSAL? IT'S UP TO YOU.
(Ex. D to Shemaria Decl., emphasis added.)
Thus, the
record demonstrates the parties did not reach a complete meeting of the minds
with regard to either the breezeway at issue in case number SC128312 or the
gate at issue in case number 22SMCV00758.
With regard
to the gate at issue in case number 22SMCV00758, the parties clearly did not
come to any agreement.
And
although the parties appeared to come to agreement on several terms with
respect to the breezeway at issue in case number SC128312, the Court finds
there was not a complete settlement agreement reached there either. For example, the parties did not agree on
whether Plaintiff could use the breezeway for maintenance of the building. Moreover, the outstanding gate issue appears
material to some of the terms to which the parties did appear to agree. For example, the parties agreed to split the
cost of the maintenance of the gate, which will vary, depending on what type of
gate, or whether a gate remains at all.
Further, the parties have indicated the gate impacts egress, as well as
access to the dumpster.
Therefore,
the parties ultimately did not have a complete meeting of the minds with regard
to either the breezeway at issue in case number SC128312 or the gate at issue
in case number 22SMCV00758.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For these
reasons, the Court denies Defendant’s motions to confirm/enforce settlement.
Defendant
shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service
regarding the same.
DATED:
February 7, 2024 ___________________________
Michael E. Whitaker
Judge of the Superior Court