Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 22SMCV01293, Date: 2023-12-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22SMCV01293 Hearing Date: December 7, 2023 Dept: 207
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
DEPARTMENT |
207 |
|
HEARING DATE |
December
7, 2023 |
|
CASE NUMBER |
22SMCV01293 |
|
MOTION |
Motion
for Summary Judgment/Adjudication |
|
MOVING PARTY: |
Defendant
Ashley Wendell |
|
OPPOSING PARTIES: |
Plaintiffs
Stefan Wrobel and Melissa Pena |
DEFENDANT’S MOVING PAPERS:
PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION PAPERS:
DEFENDANT’S REPLY PAPERS:
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Stefan Wrobel (“Wrobel”) and Melissa Pena (“Pena”)
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) sued Defendants Hazel & Oak Construction, LLC
(“H&O”); Stephen Robert Brown (“Brown”); and Ashley Wendell (“Wendell” or
“Defendant”) (collectively, “Defendants”) stemming from two agreements between
Plaintiffs and H&O for H&O to perform construction services on
Plaintiffs’ two residential properties, located at 27 Buccaneer Street (“27
property”) and 29 Buccaneer Street (“29 property”), in Marina Del Rey,
California. There is a separate
agreement for each property.
The first amended complaint alleges seven causes of action: (1) breach
of written contract; (2) statutory disgorgement (B&P code §7031); (3)
fraud; (4) negligent misrepresentation; (5) negligence; (6) alter ego; and (7)
constructive trust.
Although the contracts at issue are between Plaintiffs and H&O,
signed by Brown on behalf of H&O, Plaintiffs seek to hold Wendell liable on
a theory of alter ego liability.
Plaintiffs also seek a constructive trust, alleging H&O transferred
funds to Wendell that should rightfully have been transferred to Plaintiffs
instead.
Defendant Ashley Wendell moves for summary judgment, or in the
alternative, adjudication, on the basis that Plaintiffs cannot establish the
elements of their claims as to Wendell.
Wendell contends that although Plaintiffs hired her company, Outline
Studios, to do the interior design work for the projects, and although she is in
a romantic relationship and lives with Defendant Brown, principal of Defendant
H&O, which Plaintiffs hired to do the construction work on the projects, Wendell
is not affiliated with H&O, and therefore cannot be held liable for the
alleged unsatisfactory construction work of H&O.
Plaintiffs oppose, arguing
there are disputed triable issues of material fact regarding Wendell’s official
connections to H&O and its finances, as well as to Brown. Wendell has replied.
LEGAL STANDARDS – SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATIION
“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of
persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material
fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to
find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in
accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “[T]he party moving for summary
judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of
the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his
burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then
subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of
the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.)
“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what
inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from
the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in
mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine
issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the
issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues
must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75
Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].) Further, “the trial court may not weigh the
evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more
likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the
court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see
also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9
Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary
adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light
most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of that party”].)
EVIDENCE
1. Wendell’s Request for Judicial Notice
Wendell requests the Court
take Judicial Notice of the operative first amended complaint. Defendants have not opposed.
Judicial notice may be taken
of records of any court in this state.
(Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).)
Because the first amended complaint is part of the Court’s record for
this case, the Court may take judicial notice of it. (Ibid.) However, “while courts are free to take
judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, including
the truth of results reached, they may not take judicial notice of the truth of
hearsay statements in decisions and court files. Courts may not take judicial notice of
allegations in affidavits, declarations and probation reports in court records
because such matters are reasonably subject to dispute and therefore require
formal proof.” (Lockley v. Law Office
of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875,
882 [cleaned up].) Accordingly, the
Court takes judicial notice of the existence of the first amended complaint filed
in this matter as a court record, but not the truth of the allegations
contained therein.
2. Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiffs
request the Court take Judicial notice of three documents:
Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c) permits courts to take
judicial notice of “Official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of the United States and of any state of the United States.”
Official notices, statements, and certificates made by the Secretary
of State and by the Franchise Tax Board are properly the subject of judicial
notice as documents reflecting official acts of the executive department of the
State of California, pursuant to Evidence Code, section 452, subdivision
(c). (Friends of Shingle Springs
Interchange, Inc. v. County of El Dorado (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1470,
1483–1484.) However, “materials
prepared by private parties and merely on file with the state agencies” may not
be properly judicially noticed as an official act of a legislative, executive,
or judicial department of the United States or any state of the United
States. (People v. Thacker (1985)
175 Cal.App.3d 594, 598.)
Because the documents sought to be judicially noticed were all
prepared by private parties, as opposed to by the Secretary of State, the court
denies Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice.
3. Plaintiffs’ Evidentiary Objections
The Court rules as follows on
Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections:
DISCUSSION
Wendell contends that
Plaintiffs cannot establish the elements of any of their causes of action,
which all arise from H&O’s alleged conduct, against Wendell, because Wendell
has no official connection to, or ownership of H&O, its corporate records,
or its finances.
The two general requirements
for alter ego liability are: “(1) that there be such unity of interest and
ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual
no longer exist and (2) that, if the acts are treated as those of the
corporation alone, an inequitable result will follow.” (Mesler v. Bragg
Mgmt. Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 300 (hereafter Mesler).)
Several factors are often considered
in applying the doctrine, including but not limited to (1) commingling of funds
and other assets; (2) failure to segregate funds of the separate entities; (3) the unauthorized diversion of corporate funds
or assets to other than corporate uses; (4) the treatment by an individual of
the assets of the corporation as his own; (5) the failure to obtain authority
to issue stock or to subscribe to or issue the same; (6) the holding out by an
individual that he is personally liable for the debts of the corporation; (7)
the failure to maintain minutes or adequate corporate records; (8) sole
ownership of all of the stock in a corporation by one individual or the members
of a family; (9) the failure to adequately capitalize a corporation; (10) the
total absence of corporate assets, and undercapitalization; (11) the use of a
corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality or conduit for a single venture or
the business of an individual or another corporation; (12) the concealment and
misrepresentation of the identity of the responsible ownership, management and
financial interest, or concealment of personal business activities; (13) the
disregard of legal formalities and the failure to maintain arm's length
relationships among related entities; (14) the use of the corporate entity to
procure labor, services or merchandise for another person or entity; (15) the
diversion of assets from a corporation by or to a stockholder or other person
or entity, to the detriment of creditors, or the manipulation of assets and
liabilities between entities so as to concentrate the assets in one and the
liabilities in another; (16) the contracting with another with intent to avoid
performance by use of a corporate entity as a shield against personal
liability, or the use of a corporation as a subterfuge of illegal transactions;
and (17) the formation and use of a corporation to transfer to it the existing
liability of another person or entity. (Leek
v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 417–418.)
Wendell’s Evidence
In support, Wendell has provided
the following admissible evidence:
Therefore, Wendell has met her burden of production and persuasion to
establish her prima facie case that there is no basis to hold Wendell liable as
an alter ego for H&O or for a constructive trust.
Plaintiffs’ Evidence
Plaintiffs have provided the
following evidence:
(SSUF Nos. 46-49.)
With regard to the bank account transfers, Wendell has explained on
Reply that the account is in the name of “Stephen Robert Brown Sole Prop DBA
Hazel and Oak Construction” and Wendell believed this was Brown’s personal
account. The two transfers for $1,774
were for Brown’s half of the couple’s mortgage payment, and the two transfers
for $5,000 and $15,000 (totaling $20,000) were to pay Brown back for money he
had deposited to Wendell in connection with the anticipated joint purchase of
real property with Wendell, but ultimately Brown decided not to purchase the
property and Wendell purchased it herself.
(Reply at pp. 10-11.)
As discussed above, the Court is disinclined to consider reply
evidence. (See fn. 1, supra.) But even if the Court were to consider the
additional evidence Wendell has provided on Reply to explain some of the
transfers, the Court notes that the $20,000 is listed as coming from Outline,
not from Wendell, and is sent to the bank account for H&O, not Brown’s
personal bank account. Therefore, there remains
a disputed issue of material fact regarding comingling of funds among Brown,
H&O, Outline, and Wendell, as well as use of corporate funds for personal
uses.
Moreover, the agreement for the 29 property incorporating Outline’s
drawings into the construction plan may exceed the scope of an interior
designer’s duties, suggesting Wendell may have done work for H&O. Additionally, there is some disputed evidence
that Brown held out Wendell as the “project manager” for the construction
project. Furthermore, there is evidence
that Outline performed tasks for H&O, such as coordinating the purchase of
the Emser Tile H&O paid for.
Therefore, Plaintiffs have met their burden of production in
establishing genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment or
summary adjudication with respect to Undisputed Material Fact Nos. 6, 14,
24-31, and 36.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Because genuine issues of
material fact preclude summary judgment on the issue of alter ego liability, Wendell’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Adjudication is denied as
to all Issues 1 through 7.
Wendell shall provide notice
of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service regarding the same.
DATED:
December 7, 2023 ___________________________
Michael E. Whitaker
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1] Wendell advances additional evidence in
connection with the reply papers. The
Court declines to consider that evidence (Declarations of Michael K. Murray and
Ashley Wendell), as Plaintiffs has not had an opportunity to respond. (San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 316 [“Where a remedy as
drastic as summary judgment is involved, due process requires a party be fully
advised of the issues to be addressed and be given adequate notice of what
facts it must rebut in order to prevail”]; see also Wall Street Network Ltd.
v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171.)