Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 22SMCV02399, Date: 2025-01-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22SMCV02399 Hearing Date: January 8, 2025 Dept: 207
TENTATIVE RULING
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DEPARTMENT |
207 |
|
HEARING DATE |
January 8, 2025 |
|
CASE NUMBER |
22SMCV02399 |
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MOTION |
Continue Trial |
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MOVING PARTY |
Cross-Defendant Demand Inc. |
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OPPOSING PARTIES |
Plaintiffs Masa Sekulic and Nanad Sekulic |
MOTION
This case arises from a construction defect dispute. Plaintiffs Masa Sekulic and Nanad Sekulic
(“Plaintiffs”) filed the original complaint on November 18, 2022. On December 29, 2022, Defendant and
Cross-Complainant SoCal Kitchen Bath Inc. (“SoCal”) filed a cross-complaint
naming, among others, Cross-Defendant Demand Inc. (“Demand”). Demand was personally served with the summons
and cross-complaint on January 11, 2023.
Default was entered against Demand on March 7, 2023.
On April 2, 2024, SoCal and Demand filed a stipulation to set aside “The
Request for Entry of Default entered on March 7, 2023, 2023 [sic] as to
Cross-Defendant Demand, Inc.” However,
the parties neither filed, nor did the Court sign, an order setting aside the
entry of default against Demand.
Demand subsequently electronically filed an answer to SoCal’s
cross-complaint on May 8, 2024.
Demand now moves to continue the trial currently scheduled for
February 25, 2025. Plaintiffs oppose the
motion and Demand replies.
ANALYSIS
California Rules of Court, Rule
3.1332(c), provides:
Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a
continuance must be considered on its own merits. The court may grant a continuance only on an
affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance. Circumstances that may indicate good cause
include:
(1) The unavailability of an
essential lay or expert witness because of death, illness, or other excusable
circumstances;
(2) The unavailability of a
party because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances;
(3) The unavailability of trial
counsel because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances;
(4) The substitution of trial
counsel, but only where there is an affirmative showing that the substitution
is required in the interests of justice;
(5) The addition of a new party
if:
(A) The new party has not had a
reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; or
(B) The other parties have not
had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial in
regard to the new party's involvement in the case;
(6) A party's excused inability
to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite
diligent efforts; or
(7) A significant,
unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is
not ready for trial.
Factors the Court considers in ruling on a motion for continuance
include:
(1) The proximity of the trial
date;
(2) Whether there was any
previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial due to any party;
(3) The length of the
continuance requested;
(4) The availability of
alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or
application for a continuance;
(5) The prejudice that parties
or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance;
(6) If the case is entitled to
a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need
for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay;
(7) The court's calendar and
the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials;
(8) Whether trial counsel is
engaged in another trial;
(9) Whether all parties have
stipulated to a continuance;
(10) Whether the interests of
justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by
imposing conditions on the continuance; and
(11) Any other fact or
circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application.
(Rule 3.1332(d).)
Demand
requests a continuance of the final status conference, trial, and discovery
cut-off dates to “late April or May 2025” on the grounds that Demand did not
realize until the November 18, 2024 mediation that it was going to be the
primary focus of Plaintiffs’ construction defect claims, and it was not
involved in Plaintiffs’ expert water intrusion testing or walk-throughs done on
April 19 and 25, 2023, September 5, 2023, and February 5 and 8, 2024,
presumably because Demand was in default at the time. As such, Demand seeks to “open drywall areas
near the alleged water intrusion to try and discovery whether in fact, it is
due to improperly applied stucco, or perhaps an improper door or window
installation[.]”
Further,
Demand indicates that no depositions have been taken, and “with the impending
holiday season” the depositions will not be scheduled until “early February
2025.”
As
a threshold matter, the Court finds that because no order has been requested or
entered to set aside Demand’s default, Demand lacks standing to request a trial
continuance, or even participate in the trial at all.[1]
Moreover,
the Court does not find a trial continuance warranted under the
circumstances. Demand’s voluntary
failure to respond to the cross-complaint or otherwise attempt to participate
in the litigation until April 2024 does not warrant a trial continuance. Neither does the parties’ apparent lack of diligence
in timely completing their discovery.
Nor does Demand’s sudden realization at the November 18, 2024 mediation
that it may be seriously implicated in the water intrusion defects warrant a
continuance. Demand has been aware of
its potential liability since it was served with the cross-complaint on January
11, 2023, yet apparently did nothing to investigate or protect its interests
for nearly two years. In short, the
Court does not find Demand’s arguments to constitute good cause warranting a
trial continuance of a case involving numerous other parties and
cross-complaints.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Therefore, the Court denies Demand’s motion for a continuance of the
final status conference, trial, and related discovery cut-off dates.
Plaintiffs shall provide notice of
the Court’s ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith.
DATED: January 8, 2025 ___________________________
Michael
E. Whitaker
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1] “The entry of a default terminates a defendant's
rights to take any further affirmative steps in the litigation until either its default is set
aside or a default judgment is entered.”
(Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc. (1984) 155
Cal.App.3d 381, 385. Further, the entry
of default “[c]uts off the defendant's right to file pleadings and motions (other
than a motion to set aside default under § 473), and it also cuts off
the defendant's right to notices and the service of pleadings or papers.” (Bailey v. Citibank, N.A. (2021) 66
Cal.App.5th 335, 347, emphasis added.)