Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 22STCV01113, Date: 2023-01-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV01113    Hearing Date: January 6, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPARTMENT

32

HEARING DATE

January 6, 2023

CASE NUMBER

22STCV01113

MOTION

Motion to Quash Subpoenas

MOVING PARTY

Plaintiff Rodney Fink

OPPOSING PARTY

Defendant Cammaranos American Grille, LLC

 

MOTION

 

              Plaintiff Rodney Fink sued Defendant Cammarano’s, LLC (Defendant) based on injuries Plaintiff alleges he sustained from a slip and fall incident at a restaurant owned by Defendant. 

 

            Plaintiff moves to quash the deposition subpoenas Defendant served on (1) KPCS/KFH/SCPMG; (2) VA Greater LA Healthcare System – Sepulveda (Medical); (3) Los Robles Regional Medical Center; (4) Kaiser Permanente Billing Services/Collections Department (Billing); (5) S.C.P.M.G.-Anaheim (X-Rays); (6) VA Greater LA Healthcare System – Sepulveda c/o Office of Regional Counsel (Billing); (7) VA Greater LA Healthcare System – Sepulveda (X-Rays); and (8) Los Robles Regional Medical Center (X-Rays) (collectively, Deponents). 

 

            Defendant filed and served an opposition to the motion on December 30, 2022.  Per Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, Defendant’s opposition should have been filed and served on or before December 22, 2022 (9 court days before the scheduled hearing).  Thus, the Court will not consider Defendant’s untimely opposition.   

 

ANALYSIS

 

If a subpoena requires the production of documents, the court may quash the subpoena entirely or modify it.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)  In ruling on a motion to quash, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)

 

Current discovery standards hold that, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,[1] that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  (Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1039 (hereafter Board of Nursing).)  “To meet this [test], a party seeking to compel [the] production of records . . . must articulate specific facts justifying the discovery sought; it may not rely on mere generalities.”  (Ibid.; see Johnson v. Superior Court (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 829, 837 [finding that a subpoena was “insufficient” to compel production because it was “based wholly on the [party’s] alleged information and belief without any statement of supporting facts”].)  However, “[e]ven if information is otherwise discoverable, it may be protected by a constitutional or statutory privilege[,] [including] the right to privacy . . . .”  (Board of Nursing, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.) 

 

            “The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy.  Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern.  .  .  .  The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.[2]  The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.  A court must then balance these competing considerations.”  (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [cleaned up].)

            “Legally recognized privacy interests [include] interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information (‘informational privacy’) .  .  .  .”  (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35 (hereafter Hill).)  “A particular class of information is [sensitive or confidential] when well-established social norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over its dissemination and use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity.”  (Ibid.) 

 

            Here, the subpoenas seek all medical and billing records related to the treatment and care of Plaintiff, without limitation by body part, from October 2, 2012, to the present date.  (Declaration of Brigitte M. Mayo, Exhibit B.)  Plaintiff argues the subpoenas are overbroad and seek information protected by constitutional right to privacy and that is not otherwise relevant to the issues in this litigation.

 

            Defendant has failed to publish what Plaintiff has stated in his discovery responses that would warrant compliance with the subpoenas as crafted.  Without such information, the Court cannot determine that the subject subpoenas are narrowly tailored to the specific issues Plaintiff has brought before the Court.

 

            Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has carried his threshold burden of establishing a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonably expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.

 

            Plaintiff requests monetary sanctions in connection with the motion.  In ruling on a motion to quash, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)  Here, the Court finds the subpoenas at issue are over broad and thus oppressive.  As such, the Court shall impose monetary sanctions against Defendant and its counsel of record, Jeffrey E. Lerman, of Stratman & Williams-Abrego, in the amount of $810, which accounts for three hours of attorney time to prepare the moving papers and attend the hearing at $250 per hour, in addition to the filing fee of $60.

 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 

Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to quash the subpoenas Defendant served on Deponents, and orders said subpoenas quashed.

 

            Further, the Court orders Defendant and Defendant’s counsel of record, Jeffrey E. Lerman, of Stratman & Williams-Abrego, jointly and severally, to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $810 to Plaintiff, by and through counsel for Plaintiff, within 30 days of notice of the Court’s orders.

 

Plaintiff shall provide notice of the Court’s orders and file a proof of service of such.



[1] “A patient has a statutory privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, any confidential communication between the patient and a physician, or between the patient and a psychotherapist, absent waiver or some statutory exception to the privilege.  These privileges apply to discovery as well as to trial, and they preclude disclosure to the court as well as to the parties.”  (Simek v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 169, 173 [cleaned up].)  Specifically, the Evidence Code holds that “[t]he patient, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between patient and physician . . . .”  (Evid. Code, § 994; see also Evid. Code, § 1014 [“the patient, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between patient and psychotherapist”].)  However, the Evidence Code provides that “there is no privilege under this article as to any communication relevant to an issue concerning the condition of the patient if such issue has been tendered by” the patient or a patient-related party.  (See Evid. Code, § 996; see also Evid. Code, § 1016 [regarding a patient’s emotional or mental condition].) 

[2] “This initial inquiry is necessary to permit courts to weed out claims that involve so insignificant or de minimis an intrusion on constitutionally protected privacy interests as not even to require an explanation or justification by the defendant.”  (Lewis v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 561, 571 [cleaned up].)