Judge Michael E. Whitaker, Case 22STCV01372 2023-01-24 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 22STCV01372, Date: 2023-01-24 Tentative Ruling

PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged). Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.

Plaintiff Jenell Nelson (Plaintiff) sued Defendants Century Housing Corporation and Century Villages at Cabrillo, Inc. (collectively, Defendants) based on injuries Plaintiff alleges she sustained as a result of her son, Decedent, being killed in an incident where a car collided with a security guard kiosk while Decedent was inside. Plaintiff moves to quash the subpoena issued by Defendant Century Housing Corporation to Fox Rental Car (Fox). Defendants oppose the motion.

If a subpoena requires the production of documents, the court may quash the subpoena entirely or modify it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).) In ruling on a motion to quash, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)

Current discovery standards hold that, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1039 (hereafter Board of Nursing).) “To meet this [test], a party seeking to compel [the] production of records . . . must articulate specific facts justifying the discovery sought; it may not rely on mere generalities.” (Ibid.; see Johnson v. Superior Court (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 829, 837 [finding that a subpoena was “insufficient” to compel production because it was “based wholly on the [party’s] alleged information and belief without any statement of supporting facts”].) However, “[e]ven if information is otherwise discoverable, it may be protected by a constitutional or statutory privilege[,] [including] the right to privacy . . . .” (Board of Nursing, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.)

“The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern. . . . The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.^{^[1]} The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [cleaned up].)

“Legally recognized privacy interests [include] interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information (‘informational privacy’) . . . .” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.) “A particular class of information is [sensitive or confidential] when well-established social norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over its dissemination and use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff has a right of privacy in her employment records. (See Alch v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426.) “The public interest in preserving confidential, personnel information generally outweighs a private litigant’s interest in obtaining that information. A showing of relevancy may be enough to cause the court to balance the compelling public need for discovery against the fundamental right of privacy.” (Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 640, 652) “[O]bvious invasions of interests fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 557.) “Even when the balance does weigh in favor of disclosure, the scope of disclosure must be narrowly circumscribed.” (Life Technologies, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at pp. 652-653, emphasis in original.)

Plaintiff argues the subpoena is overbroad because it infringes upon Plaintiff’s right to privacy and seeks irrelevant information. Plaintiff specifically attests that the employment records from Fox are irrelevant because Plaintiff does not seek damages for her own lost income or earning capacity and was not working for Fox at the time of Decedent’s death. Further, Plaintiff argues that Defendants cannot demonstrate how any of Plaintiff’s own employment records show the financial support that Decedent was providing to Plaintiff. Plaintiff concludes that any relevance that Plaintiff’s employment records may have in this action does not outweigh her privacy interests in her complete employment file.

In opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s employment records are directly relevant to Plaintiff’s claim of financial dependence on her son, Decedent, because they provide information on Plaintiff’s sources of income, for example potential disability benefits if Plaintiff stopped working due to a disability. Further, Defendants point to Plaintiff’s verified response to discovery in which she indicates that her sole source of financial support was Decedent in the ten years prior to his death. (See Special Interrogatories, Set No. One, No. 48.) Defendants argue that this response is in contradiction to the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel advanced with the instant motion which indicates that Plaintiff was employed and receiving income until 2016/2017. (See Declaration of Ian A. Cuthbertson, ¶ 5.)

The Court finds Defendants have sufficiently demonstrated that the records requested from Fox are relevant, in part, to Plaintiff’s claim that she was financially dependent of Decedent for the ten years prior to Decedent’s death. However, the Court finds the subpoena to be overbroad in scope and finds that certain records sought have no bearing on whether Plaintiff was financially dependent on Decedent, including “Resume, Education and training records, Disciplinary notices or documents, Employment Application, Performance Evaluations, Attendance & Absentee Record, Requests for Time Off, Documentation of Certification and/or License (if applicable).”

Therefore, the Court grants in part Plaintiff’s motion to quash the subpoena of Plaintiff’s employment records from Fox, and orders the subpoena limited as follows:

Plaintiff shall give notice of the Court’s ruling, and file a proof of service of such.

[1] “This initial inquiry is necessary to permit courts to weed out claims that involve so insignificant or de minimis an intrusion on constitutionally protected privacy interests as not even to require an explanation or justification by the defendant.” (Lewis v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 561, 571 [cleaned up].)

Plaintiff Anaiya Smith by and through her guardian-ad-litem, Marquitta Cobb (Plaintiff) sued Defendants Century Housing Corporation and Century Villages at Cabrillo, Inc. (collectively, Defendants) based on injuries Plaintiff alleges she sustained as a result of her father, Decedent, being killed in an incident where a car collided with a security guard kiosk while Decedent was inside. Plaintiff moves to quash the subpoena issued by Defendant Century Housing Corporation to Vistamar School (Vistamar). Defendants oppose the motion. Plaintiff replies.

“The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right to privacy. Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern. . . . The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.^{^[1]} The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [cleaned up].)

Plaintiff argues that Defendants have no legitimate reason relevant to Plaintiff’s claims to justify this subpoena’s request because Plaintiff has not put her academic status or performance at issue in any way.

In opposition, Plaintiff’s claim of loss of concentration, difficulty following directions and difficulty in school as a result of the incident puts in issue Plaintiff’s academic record. Defendants specifically point to Plaintiff’s Verified response to Form Interrogatory, Set One, No. 6.2 in which she described the following injuries as a result of the underlying incident: “depression, insomnia, anxiety, weight loss, loss of appetite, loss of concentration – harder to follow directions, making school harder. . . .” (Declaration of Heather F. Lunn.) Defendants conclude that Plaintiff’s education records may contain information that allow Defendants to evaluate her claimed injuries, determine the nature of her academic difficulties, when they began, the extent to which they impact her school performance, her ability to learn and progress.

In reply, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has failed to establish why they are entitled to an unlimited scope of documents concerning Plaintiff’s entire academic history from Vistamar.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the subpoena as currently drafted is overbroad in scope and time, and thus infringes in part on Plaintiff’s constitutional right to privacy, as the subpoena seeks “[a]ny and all scholastic records”. However, the Court also finds that based on Plaintiff’s claimed injuries, a portion of the records sought in the subpoena at issue are relevant to the case at hand and thus discoverable.

Therefore, the Court grants in part Plaintiff’s motion to quash the Vistamar subpoena and orders the subpoena limited as follows:

Plaintiff shall give notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.

DEPARTMENT	32
HEARING DATE	January 24, 2023
CASE NUMBER	22STCV01372
MOTION	Motion to Quash Subpoena
MOVING PARTY	Plaintiff Jenell Nelson
OPPOSING PARTIES	Defendants Century Housing Corporation and Century Villages at Cabrillo, Inc.

DEPARTMENT	32
HEARING DATE	January 24, 2023
CASE NUMBER	22STCV01372
MOTION	Motion to Quash Subpoena
MOVING PARTY	Plaintiff Anaiya Smith by and through her guardian-ad-litem, Marquitta Cobb
OPPOSING PARTIES	Defendants Century Housing Corporation and Century Villages at Cabrillo, Inc.