Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 22STCV04442, Date: 2022-12-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV04442    Hearing Date: December 12, 2022    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

Plaintiffs Maria Anagnos, by and through her Guardian ad Litem, Angelo Anagnos, Angelo Anagnos, Toula Anagnos, and Tina Koumoudouros (collectively, Plaintiffs)  sued Defendant Gilberto Rodriguez Santos (Defendant) based on an auto versus pedestrian collision resulting in Decedent John Anagnos’ (Decedent) death.  Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages.  Plaintiffs oppose the motion.  Defendant replies.

ANALYSIS

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).)  On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294.  (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)  Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)   As set forth in the Civil Code,

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.  (2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.  (3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)-(3), emphasis added.) 

Further, a plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice.  To wit, there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages.  (See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)  “When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice.  When a defendant must produce evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim, fairness demands that he receive adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against him.” (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29 [cleaned up].)  In Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp, the Court of Appeal noted that the plaintiffs’ assertions related to their claim for punitive damages were “insufficient to meet the specific pleading requirement.”  (Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643 [plaintiffs alleged “the conduct of Defendants was intentional, and done willfully, maliciously, with ill will towards Plaintiffs, and with conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff's injuries were exacerbated by the malicious conduct of Defendants. Defendants' conduct justifies an award of exemplary and punitive damages”]; see also Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 [“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim”].) 

In Taylor v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held:  “We consider whether punitive damages are recoverable in a personal injury action brought against an intoxicated driver.  As will appear, we have concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of “malice” under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.”  (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 892 [cleaned up].)  The California high court further held that “[o]ne who voluntarily commences, and thereafter continues, to consume alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing from the outset that he must thereafter operate a motor vehicle demonstrates, in the words of Dean Prosser, “such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton.”  (Id. at p. 899.)  But the California high court also stated, “Although the circumstances in a particular case may disclose similar wilful or wanton behavior in other forms, ordinarily, routine negligent or even reckless disobedience of traffic laws would not justify an award of punitive damages.”  (Id. at pp. 899-900, emphasis added.) 

Notwithstanding, Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages against Defendant because Defendant claims the FAC fails to include factual allegations that Defendant acted with malice or oppression or that his conduct was despicable or willful.  The Court agrees.  Here, Plaintiffs allege in pertinent part against Defendant:

• On October 18, 2021, at around 6:15 a.m., GILBERTO RODRIGUEZ SANTOS (“Mr. Santos”) was driving southbound on Downey Ave. approaching Gainford St. Mr. Santos made a left turn eastbound on Gainford St. John Anagnos was walking northbound on the east side walk of Downey Ave. and was already in the unmarked crosswalk of Downey Avenue and Gainford St. as Mr. Santos made a left turn onto Gainford St.

• Mr. Santos failed to yield to John Anagnos, a pedestrian, in a crosswalk in violation of CVC 21950(a). The intersection of Downey Ave. and Gainford St. was illuminated by ambient lighting from the streetlights along the east and west sides of Downey Avenue.

• John Anagnos's injuries caused by Mr. Santos' negligence were fatal. Upon information and belief, Mr. Santos had stopped to pick up tools, supplies and/or material prior to arriving at his job site, which was located on Gainford St. Plaintiffs assert that Mr. Santos was an employee of DOE and was acting within the scope of employment at the time of the incident.

• DEFENDANTS owed a legal duty to PLAINTIFFS to exercise the degree of care of an ordinary prudent operator of a motor vehicle.

• DEFENDANTS breached that legal duty by: (1) Failing to pay attention while conducting a motor vehicle; and (2) Traveling at an excessive rate of speed; and (3) Failing to observe traffic control devices; and (4) Failing to act reasonably under the circumstances

• DEFENDANTS' act of striking the decedent with their vehicle was in violation of California Vehicle Code section 21950(a), which states: "The driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within any marked crosswalk or within any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, except as otherwise provided in this chapter."

• DEFENDANTS, and each of them, knew or should have known that striking a pedestrian with a speeding motor vehicle would cause severe injuries. DEFENDANTS owed a legal duty to PLAINTIFFS to abide by the California Vehicle Code while operating a motor vehicle.

(See FAC,  ¶¶ 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24, 25.) 

Based upon the heightened pleading requirements pertaining to claims for punitive damages, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages against Defendant.  Plaintiffs cannot rely solely on nonspecific allegations amounting to ordinary, routine negligent acts or reckless disobedience of traffic laws.  

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ claim and prayer for punitive damages without leave to amend. [1] 

Defendant shall file and serve an answer to the amended complaint on or before December 30, 2022. 

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s rulings and file a proof of service of such.