Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 22STCV05835, Date: 2022-08-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV05835    Hearing Date: August 10, 2022    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPARTMENT

32

HEARING DATE

August 10, 2022

CASE NUMBER

22STCV05835

MOTION

Motion to Transfer Venue

MOVING PARTIES

Defendants 3M Company and Scott Technologies, Inc.

OPPOSING PARTIES

Plaintiffs Ramon Phoenix Figueroa, a minor, by and through his Guardian ad Litem, Ramon Altamirano Figueroa; Amelia Clementine Figueroa, by and by and through her Guardian ad Litem, Ramon Altamirano Figueroa; the Estate of Ramon Clemente Figueroa, administered by Ramon Altamirano Figueroa; John Jones; Sandra Jones; and the Estate of Patrick Lee Jones, administered by John Jones and Sandra Jones

 

MOTION

 

Plaintiffs Ramon Phoenix Figueroa, a minor, by and through his Guardian ad Litem, Ramon Altamirano Figueroa; Amelia Clementine Figueroa, by and by and through her Guardian ad Litem, Ramon Altamirano Figueroa; the Estate of Ramon Clemente Figueroa, administered by Ramon Altamirano Figueroa; John Jones; Sandra Jones; and the Estate of Patrick Lee Jones, administered by John Jones and Sandra Jones (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) sued defendants 3M Company and Scott Technologies, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) based on the deaths of Ramon Figueroa and Patrick Jones (collectively, “Decedents”).  Plaintiffs allege Decedents’ deaths were caused by defects in two devices designed and manufactured by Defendants.   

 

Defendants move to transfer venue in this action to Tulare County.  Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

 

ANALYSIS

 

“If the action is for injury to person or personal property or for death from wrongful act or negligence, the superior court in either the county where the injury occurs or the injury causing death occurs or the county where the defendants, or some of them reside at the commencement of the action, is a proper court for the trial of the action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 395, subd. (a).)   “A corporation or association may be sued in the county where the contract is made or is to be performed, or where the obligation or liability arises, or the breach occurs; or in the county where the principal place of business of such corporation is situated, subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial as in other cases.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 395.5.) 

 

If a defendant contends that that the court in which a plaintiff filed the complaint is the wrong court, a defendant must move to transfer venue at the time a defendant answers, demurs, or moves to strike, or within the time to respond to the complaint.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 396b, subd. (a).)[1]   Yet, in actions involving multiple defendants, venue is proper in the county in which one of the defendant resides. 

 

The propriety of the court's ruling stems from the general statutory provision that in the absence of specified exceptional cases not here involved, the county in which the defendants, or some of them, reside at the commencement of the action, is the proper county for the trial of the action. Consistent therewith, the basic principles governing the determination of the venue issue were recently stated in the case of Independent Iron Works v. American President Lines, 35 Cal.2d 858, 860:   A defendant is not entitled to have an action removed to the county of his residence unless it appears that none of the other defendants are residents of the county where the action is brought.  Even when all of the defendants join in a demand for or consent to a change of venue the cause will be retained if the complaint attempts in apparent good faith to state a cause of action against a defendant who resides in the county where the action was commenced.  When a defendant who resides in the county in which an action is brought is a necessary and proper party defendant it is immaterial that another and the principal defendant resides in another county. Accordingly, a plaintiff who has brought his action in the proper county will not be compelled to go elsewhere merely because all of the defendants prefer it.

 

(Monogram Co. of Cal. v. Kingsley (1951) 38 Cal.2d 28, 29–30 [cleaned up]; accord K.R.L. Partnership v. Superior Court (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 490.)

 

Alternatively, a defendant may move for transfer of venue based on any of the grounds listed under Code of Civil Procedure section 397.  Section 397 provides, in relevant part: “The Court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the following cases:  . . .  (c) When the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.”  To that end, “[t]here is no time fixed by statute when an action may be transferred for trial because of convenience of witnesses or to promote justice.”  (Cooney v. Cooney (1944) 25 Cal.2d 202, 208.)  But as our Supreme Court has explained, such motion “must be made within a reasonable time after the case is at issue on the facts, the determination of which rests largely in the discretion of the trial court.”  (Ibid.) 

 

The purpose of the venue rules is to give the defendant some control of the choice of the forum to prevent a plaintiff from filing the action in some remote county where it would be difficult or impractical for a defendant to defend.  (See Smith v. Smith (1891) 88 Cal. 572, 576; Alexander v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 723, 731.) 

 

As the moving parties, Defendants bear the burden to advance admissible evidence to show that venue is not proper in Los Angeles County.  (See Mission Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 921, 929, fn. 7.)

 

A motion under Section 397, subdivision (c) requires an extensive factual showing that transfer will promote the “convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice.”  (See Juneau v. Juneau (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 14, 16.)  Specifically, declarations in support of the motion must show (i) the names of each witness expected to testify for both parties; (ii) the substance of their expected testimony; (iii) whether the witness has been deposed or has given a statement regarding the facts of the case and, if so, on what date; (iv) the reasons why it would be “inconvenient” for the witnesses to appear locally; and (v) the reasons why the “ends of justice” would be promoted by transfer to a different county.  (Ibid.)  Such declarations must contain admissible evidence as a change of venue cannot be predicated upon declaration consisting of hearsay and conclusions.  (Lieppman v. Lieber (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 914, 919.) 

 

Here, Defendants advance the declaration of their counsel, Jordan S. Tabak (“Tabak”).  Tabak states that the location of the library structure fire in which Decedents are alleged to have lost their lives is located in Porterville, California, less than 1 mile from the Porterville Courthouse.  (Declaration of Jordan S. Tabak, ¶ 2.)  Defendants do not advance any other declarations in support of the motion, nor does Tabak’s declaration present any admissible evidence with respect to the above-noted requisite showings.  In contrast, Plaintiffs have advanced twenty-two declarations from potential percipient witnesses, including professional firefighter colleagues of the decedents, who are willing to travel to the County of Los Angeles to participate in a trial.[2]    

 

Consequently, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs’ argument in opposition that Defendants have failed to meet their evidentiary burden.  Without more, the Court finds that Defendants have not advanced sufficient competent evidence to establish an extensive factual showing that transfer to Tulare County will promote the “convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice.”  As such, this is a simple failure of proof on the part of Defendants. 

 

Consequently, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to transfer venue to Tulare County.  The Clerk of the Court shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling. 



[1] “In its discretion, the court may order the payment to the prevailing party of reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in making or resisting the motion to transfer whether or not that party is otherwise entitled to recover his or her costs of action.  In determining whether that order for expenses and fees shall be made, the court shall take into consideration (1) whether an offer to stipulate to change of venue was reasonably made and rejected, and (2) whether the motion or selection of venue was made in good faith given the facts and law the party making the motion or selecting the venue knew or should have known.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 396b, subd. (b).) 

[2]  “The moving party must overcome the presumption that the plaintiff has selected the proper venue.  Thus, it is the moving defendant's burden to demonstrate that the plaintiff's venue selection is not proper under any of the statutory grounds.  In opposing the motion to change venue, the plaintiff may bolster his or her choice of venue with counter affidavits consistent with the complaint's theory of the type of action but amplifying the allegations relied upon for venue.”  (Fontaine v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 830, 836 [cleaned up].)